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INTRODUCTION 
In an age c~ relatIvism, when ablolutes are orten 
ablolutely denied, the lot of efficient causality is not an 
enviable one. The cQus.al concept 1s considered in some cirole. 
aa nothing more than the naive outlook of a decadent rationalis-
tic age. Acoording to the Heisenberg uncertainty prinoiple, a 
oomplete knowledge of the state of a physical system at anJ 
given instant is not suffioient to permit an exaot prediction ot 
that systemts future behavior. The best one can do is to make 
statistical oaloulations. "As a consequence," says Tolman, "we 
now have to regard the true connection between physical cause 
and etrect as a statistical one."l The causal prinoiple is also 
attaoked. For Ayar, it is an example of nonsensical metaphysioal 
assertions, 
We may • • • derine a metaphYlical sentence as a 
sentence which purports to express a genuine pro-
pOSition, but doe., in tact, express neither a 
tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And aa 
tautologies and .mpiricall~poth.s.s form the 
entire elass of significant propositiOns, we are 
Justified in concluding that all metaphysioal 
propOSitions are nonsensical.2 
1 Richard O. Tolman, "A Survey of the SCience.," 
SCience, BaltImore, OVI, August 15, 1947, 137. 
2 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, ~ Logio, 
seoond ed., Rew York, 1950, 41. 
viii 
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This contemporary attitude toward efticient causallt7 
ls not a ~ecent phenomenon. Its historical and ideological 
roots oan be traced back througb Hume to Desc~tes. With the 
Carteslan pbilosophJ, as Haritaln polnts out, began a retro-
gression in which human reason graduallr lost its grasp on 
aeing, and became available only for the mathemattcal readlng ot 
senso~ phenomena, and tor the buIldIng up ot correspondlng 
materlal techniques, fta field in which any absolute reality, an7 
absolute truth, and &nJ absolute value is of course forbidden.") 
But thepoat-Cartesian period also saw the riae ot one 
ot the most ambitious defenders ot cauaalit7, Immanuel Kant. Hia 
Oritical philosophy was an arrest1ng dlspla7 in the philosophical 
p,rroteohnica set ott by Hume in the twllI~t hours ot elgbteenth 
centurr rationalism and the Enlightenment. 
The problem ot causalit7 not onl7 rouaed Kant tram the 
"dogmatIc slumber" ot ratlonalls. but also constituted the cru-
cial test ot bis philosophy. As the clearest and most indIspen-
sable lnatanoe ot the synthetIc! prIori, causalltr was the 
obstacle betore which both empIricIsm and rationalism had been 
brought to a complete standstill. The rationalist was contronted 
with the very diffioult task of demonstratIng a prInciple whloh 
was considered indIspensable tor science and pract1cal 11te and 
ret the opposite of which did not seem. 2r1ma tacle at least, 
) Jacques Harltaln, ~ Ran,e ~ Beason, .ew York, 
x 
oontradictory. He was further faced with the awkward tact that 
partioular causal laws in nature were held to be unintelligible 
and indemonstrable ~ priori but discoverable only b1 mean. ot 
induction tram particular exper1enc.s. The empiricist, on the 
other hand, if he wished to be consistent with his first prin-
oiple., had the s till more difficult, it not impossible, task 
ot deriving the universal and necessary principle of causality 
from a mere enumeration of particulars. 
Kant claimed that with his Critical philosoPnJ he 
could prove the objective validity of the principle of causality. 
Causality is thus a test-case in a larger issue. Upon the ~uth 
or falsity of Kant's causal teaching depends the success or 
t&ilure ot Kant's Critical philosophy to answer the challenge ot 
the synthetiC ~ priori. 
In this thesis we shall center our attention upon Kant' 
doctrine of causality. The larger iasu. of the synthetiC ~ 
2riori w~ll only be touohed upon. Our purpose will be to aee 
whether Kant's o~sal doctrine, springing tram the roots ot his 
Critical philosophy, conclusively answered Hume's challenge or 
whether the Humenn diadain ot efficient causality in certain 
contemporary circles only emphasizes Kant'. tailure. 
The study ot Kantian causality naturally presuppose. a 
study ot its leading l1nes ot thought as well as its dependence 
on the findings ot previous thinkers. But Kant's causal doc-
trine is oDv10ualy too complex to be treated 1n all it. ramit1-
xi 
cationa wfth1n the bounds of this thesis. Consequently, only 
one aspect of Kantian caus~lit1 will be treated, that of oausa-
lity 1n the phenomenal physical orde~. The problem ot causalit1 
In the noumenal order ot tree will (Kant's moral order) as well 
as the role of causality in the phenomenal psyohical order ot 
the empirical e go will not be treated. 
To limit the soope of the thesis to stll1 more manage-
able proportiona, we shall conoentrate on two important and 
rather intrioate paslages in the Oritique £! ~ Reason, the 
"Transoendental Deduction ot the categories" and the "Second 
Analogy." The first passage deals with the obJeotivity of the 
causal oonoept, or oategory. It is the foundation tor the seoond 
passage 1n whioh Kant explains the objeotivity of the causal 
prinoiple. '!he t ext usually cited is the s eoond edition of the 
Critique o! ~ Reason, In Norman Kemp Smith's translation.4 
We note here that, following Smith, we employ the term nappearano ," 
rather than "phenomenon," for Kant's Ersche1nung. 
The matter of the thesis will be as follows. Atter 
posing the problem of causal1ty in its historic form by a perusal 
of the doctrines ot the chiof representatives of e1ghteenth cen-
tury rat10nalism and empiricism (Chapter I). we shall rocua 
attention on Kant's solution (Chapter IIi'. Here we shall bring 
4 Immanuel Kant, Cr1tljUe of Pure Reason. trans. Nor-
man Kemp Smith. New York, 19~.erealter-we 'sEa11 refer to this 
work in the footnotes simply as the Critique. 
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out the radioal Kantian view ot thought and experience, and hiB 
corresponding causal doctrine, by a survey ot the "Transcendental 
Deduction ot the Categories" and the "Second Analog." Chapter 
III will be the critical portion of the study. In the course ot 
the critique, the opinions of leading Kantian commentators will 
be weIghed. 
PrIchard, for example, insists upon Kant's subjectIvism. 
Does this subjectivism invalidate the whole Kantian argument tor 
causality? Was the historical evolution of Kantianism trom Beckep 
Kant'. Fichte-izing di.ciple, to aegel an indication of a tatal 
flaw in the Kantian argument tor objectivit'1? What about Daval~f,. 
statement that Kant'. post-Critical work was a continuous ettort 
to resolve the problem of the ambiguity ot the objeet,6 
But Kant's subjectivism i. onl1 the less important part 
ot his theol'1. Is his causal doctrine without flaw when viewed 
in the light ot h1s phenomenalism? Are Smith and Paton justified 
in accepting for the most part this phenomenalist position in 
their c~.ntarie.,7 A.a.Ewing oontends that Kant's argument. 
for causality, though in themselves too bound up with the system 
I 
S R.A.Prichard, Kant's Theory ~ Knowledge, Oxford, 1904 • 
6 Roger Daval, ~ MetaphyslQue ~~, Parie, 1951, 18 
7 N.X.Smith, A aomment~ to Kant's Critiiue or Pure 
Rea.on, seoond edition revl.ea an~nIirgea, lew Yor , l~o;-H:J. 
'aEon, Kant's Met§?hlsic .2! EX2erience, New York, .L936. 
xiii 
to have given general satisfaction, can be re-stated in a way 
acceptable to all schools of thought.8 Is it true that it is 
not the doctrine but only the method of transoendental idealism, 
i.e., the method of proof by appealing to the possibility of 
experience and knowledge, that torms the real presupposition and 
basis of the Kantian deductIon ot oausalIty,9 
~ Among those who profess realism, Marechal interprets 
Kant's transcendental method of analysis as a stUdy of the imma-
nent and objectivating activity of oognition. Is he going too 
far when be finds parallels wIth the epistemology of St. Thomas? 
These important points will be discussed in Chapter III. 
A word on the literature related to the present study. 
With the excepticn of A.C.EWing, no one has singled out the 
causal aspect of Kant's doctrine for speoial study, though its 
importance invites the attempt.10 Smith's and Paton's commentarie. 
are $xcellent for a study of the criti~ue as a whole. 
• 
/ Marechalls 
8 Alfred Cyril Ewing, Kant's Treatment £! Causality, 
London, 1924, 96. 
, 
9 Ibid. Mar.ohal seems to agree with Ewing when he 
writes! "La arrr£que Kantienne rut destructrlce non pas en raisoD 
du prInciple methodologlque." k! Point ~ De~art ~ l! Metaehl-
sique, ParIs, 1949, V. 594. 
10 The present study differs from that of Ewing In 
several important rsspectsl it emphaaizes the impact of Kant's 
Humean presupposItions on hIs causal teaching; it atudiea Kant 
frOM the viewpoInt or a critioal realism. in oontrast to Ewing'. 
phena.menaliam; it disputes Ewing's contention that Kant's argument 
tor causality oan be suitably re-stated without essential ohange •• 
r 
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monumental-work has mal2l' interestIng and valuable 001'l'lD1enta. It 
i& •• peciallr helpful to one acquainted with scholasticiam 
because ot its trequent contrasts and comparisons ot scholastic 
and Kantlan philosophy. Frichard we found to be a most acute 
critic ot tant's subjectivist tendencr. Of the remaining books 
in the bibllograPD7. thoa. of Adamson, boutroux. Oaira, and 
Watson deserve speclal mention. 
In a famous passage in the Prolecsomena .. ltant acknow-
ledges his debt to the past: 
It we begin with a well-rounded, although undeveloped 
thought, bequeathed to us b7 another, we -7 well 
hope as the fruit of oontinued meditation to develop 
it f'ul'ther than the keen-sighted man WhOUl we had to 
thank tOIt the flrat spark of this llght.:l 
What. tben, were the influence. upon !ant and what was 
the evolution of' the problem which he~ tvied to solve? Without 
denying other le.8 1mportant 8ubsidial"1 il\tluenoes, we shall 
lIalt ouraelvee to a dieousalon ot Locke, Berkelel, and J!\D'1e 
amons the emplrict .. ,. and ot Lelbnlz and Wolt'.t _ong the 
rationaUs's. 
A. THE BRITISH 1D!PlItICIS'l'S 
JOhn Locke, 1n :reaction to nee.aPt •• ' theor.y ot innate 
ide.8, maintained that the human knower has no Ide •• except those 
obtained tlutoup '.lUIation and reflection on internal operationa. 
1 IJaanuel Kant j Prolelomena to ~ .Puture Matameie. 
with an Introduction br Lewls V.ecli, I'8wYOiil[, 195I, 8 l ). 
The nuaber. in the parenth.... are the page nuabera or the Acade~ 
edition. tai". Schrlrten, 8d. Xoen1al lche ¥reusalacae Akadem1.~ 
Berlin, 1 -1908. . 
1 
r 
2 
With Descartes, however, he made the fatal ste, ot Betting up 
idea., not things, .s the immediate object ot knowledge. Further 
mor., while admitting that the mind knows universals, Lock. denie 
it the pow.r to know natures of real e.s.nces througb abstraction 
Th. only •••• nc.s man knows are naminal. The real .s.enoe is al-
w.,s an unknown substratum, the unseen statue beneath the accid.n s 
which olothe and conceal it. 
Knowl.dge was thus limit.d 07 Lock. to accidents and a 
presupposed aubstanc. about whioh we know only the bare fact of 
existence. But even wi th regard to the aocidents, only the pri-
mary qualiti.s, such as form, ext.nsion, and motion, exist as 
such in the obj.ct. The so-oalled second~ ~alitie., 11ke colo , 
taste, and sound, are purelJ subj.otive reactions of the peroi-
pient to the primarJ qualitie.. Ion. ot the aocidents flow trom 
'. 
the nature ot the .ub.tance. Th.y are imposed on the substanc. 
bT an arbitrar,J tiat ot th. divine will. Without mants b.ing 
8.DJ the wis.r, the deity could replace the unknown eubatratum 
with another, the accid.nts remaining the same. Accidents thus 
tell us abaolutelT nothing about the na_ure ot the sub.tance 
which supports the.. Quite 10glcallJ, Locke denied all but 
hi8h11 probable knowledge of .cientitic laws. Por scientific 
lawa are grounded in the natures of things whlch the mind, accor-
dlng to Looke, oan never know. 
Looke'. aocount of causality 1a perhaps the least 
aatlatactor,J part of his philosopbJ. In introducIng the concept 
) 
ot cauae, ae apeaks aa though causality were a possible object ot 
perception, like oolor or shape. Yet Locke insiats on the my-
aterioua and unknowable character ot the causal nexus. Since we 
can only obaer.,e aenaible "'1deaa" or qualities in external object. , 
a power like causallt, can only be known as the potentialit, ot 
producing changes in these sensible quallt1es, a mysterious some-
thing that can be described in terms ot ita ettects. Actually, 
Locke makes causa11ty a relation, thus remov1ng 1t trom its 
proper categorr ot actlon and passion. 
As regards the principle ot causalit" Looke tries to 
prove its va11dity b1 the argument that 1t 1s obviously impossibl. 
tor noth1ng to produce something. But as Hume was to point out, 
Locke can !ssume that it an event is not caused by something it 
muat be caused b,. noth1ng onl,. because he assumes the universalit., 
ot the causal principle. But it is just this universality which 
Looke is trying to prove. 
Looke's basic Cartesian assumption that ideas are the 
immediate object ot knowledge was accepted without any reaerve by 
his .uccessor, George Serkeley, Par le •• conservative than hia 
conceptualistic predecesaor, Serkele, went on to de~ the exiatence 
ot univeraals even In the mlnd. Moreover, a.elng that In Locke'a 
doctrine ot aubstance aa an unknown substratum la, a tlne arsu-
ment agalnst tne rlsing tide ot materialism, Berkele,. denled not 
onlT the capacitT ot the mlnd to know material aubatance but the 
very existence ot matter. Matter In its verr concept is pasalve 
4 
and material'!. Therefore, it oertainly oannot oause the existence 
of spIrItual Ideas In us. fteallt1 was thus reduoed to spirits 
and ideas. And sinoe the mind does not perceIve sense objects 
but only its ideas of them obtained through sensation, Berkel.,. 
saw no reason tor admitting the existence of sensed objeots out-
side of perception. TheIr!!!! ~ peroipl. 
As regards cauaalitr, Serkele1 assumed the prinoiple 
that everr change must have a cause. But he denied that causal 
oonnection between pbJsical phenomena the nature of which Locke 
had alread, asserted to be unknown. Berkeley thus made another 
step in the direotion of Burne. His philosopbJ left in existence 
onlJ spirits and their ideas. How the latter cannot have cau.al 
etticaoJ. Por, sa,.a Berkele,., an 1dea cannot have an7 qual! tie. 
be70nd thoae ot whioh we are conscious. And we are not conscious 
of oausal atfialencT In our idea8. Ideas are, of their vel"7 
nature, passive. Since we must suppose~ however, that the change. 
In our ideas have 80me cause, we must conclude that spirits are 
the cause •• 
In dealing with the material world, Serkele,. subst!tute4 
for Locke's relation of cause and e'fect the relation ot "sIgn" 
and "thing signified." Thus "the fire which I see is not the oaus 
of the pain I sutter upon ~ approaching it, but the mark that 
torewarns me ot It.,,2 
2 A Treati.e Conoemine the PrinoiE1e. of Human Knowlec~&~ 
I, 6S, The Work. of George Berk.l.y,-'dtt.~ br Alexander Oampoell 
~ •• A'" "fiYf"ft,.tt 1 onl T 2ql~ 
s 
We tlnd br ,experlenoe that Ide.1 luoc.ed eaCh ether In 
such a regular manner that we mar trame laws of nature and uae 
the •• laws tor predicting tuture eventa. Thi. orderly lucc •• slon 
however, 18 ntt dependent on anJ causal influence ot ene Ide. on 
another but Is dependent only on the direct will of God. Batural 
8clen08 thul consists In the reduction ot the man1 observed 
.equenc •• to a tew 81mple an.d univel's.l laws of sequence, not 
explicable further except b1 aD appeal to divine etticl.nt 
causa11 t1_ 
At this polnt David Hume entered the philosophical 
Icene. The ataie had been well prepared tor bis entrance, .a-
peclally regardlng o&ulalltl.3 Locke bad denied the capacity ot 
the mind to know natures and had .sorlbed causation to unknown 
powera. Berkele7 bad then denied that such unlmowable and Imper-
ceptible powers could be real qualltl •• and reduoed all material 
c,uaatlon to tne activit1 ot spirlta. Huae, more rad10al17 
• 
l The sU1.\'.l.Ul"7 or Bume'. phl1oaopbJ In 1me text above 
deals prlmarilr with it. negatl ve aspecta. The tpadltional but 
now le.. t&Yol'ed Interpretation holds that Hum. eontr1b~ted 
nothing posltive to pb110sopbr but .ere17 reduoed tbe prinCiples 
of Locke and aerkele,. to their absurdity_ A strong new school, 
consisting or men like Ralph W. Ohuroh (I-e's Theoli ot the 
l1nderstandlni. LondoD, 193~) and Hormanemp SmItE li.Pm'oso 
01 DavId Bume, London, 1941) iuiats that Bume mad. Impor an 
poslilve contrIbutions alao. Eapeolall1 signifioant contri"butl0 
are his tbeOrJ or bellet o.s.d on the prtmaoJ or r.eling (derived 
trom Hutoh •• on) and his teaohlng on the principle of assoclation 
(derived from Hewton). In our summar" atter re.lew1ns Bu.e's 
oriticism of causalitJ--a oritloism so signifIcant tor Kant--we 
shall outline Bume's theory ot bellet In 1ta applicat10n to 
oausalit,._ This positl.e complement to advera. crlticlama of him , 
6 
logical or"'logioally more radical, tightened the Gordian knot 
tied by predeoessors. He d1rected his main attack against 
causality, realizing all the while its importance for our know. 
ledge of the phTs1cal world.4 
In his argument, Hume made two basic assumptions. 
1) the Cartesian one, already subscribed to bJ Looke and BerkeleJ 
that the idea was the tirst thing known, and 2) that every simple 
i48a corresponds to an impression whose characteristics are torce 
and vivacity. 
The warp and wool ot the two Humean assumptions were: 
1) his phenomenallsm, bJ whioh he denied the intentIonality ot 
sense and intelleotual cognition and made perceptions instead of 
things the oomplete obJeot ot knowledge; 2) his sensi.-, by 
which he denied that the intellect can know anything which is 
not explicItly perceived by the external or internal senses; and 
3) his pSJchologioal atomism, bJ which he held that "whatever 
objeots are ditterent are distinguishable, and whatever objects 
are distinguishable are .eparable by thougbt and imagination."S 
4 Se., tor example, his Treatise ot Human Hature, ed. 
L.A.SelbJ-Bisse, Oxford, 1946, I, 111, 2. For lint, too, as vlll 
be ••• n in Chapter II, knowledge of objeots depend. on causallty. 
The Aantian argument 18 ba.ed on thl. central tactl we have kno v 
ledge ot objective sequence. His question 18' what makes this 
knovledge ot objective aequence possible, The anawerl cauaallty, 
wh1ch is thus as real as the objective sequence it conditlona, or 
makes poasible. 
S Treati.e, I, 1, 7 (18). Numbers 6n parentheses 
refer to pages in Selby-Bigge's edition of the Treatise. 
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Thrust into such unfavorable soil, the objeotive vall-
d1t1 ot unlversal principles of knowledge, as well as all knowled e 
ot supra-senaible objects,wal imposslble from the beginning. 
First principles, which are seen b1 the mind to follow upon real 
beiDg and are therefore universally applicable to real beings, 
are valueless for Hume because, acoording to him, real beings are 
unknown. aupra-.enaiole ~eings are unknowable bedaus. on11 sen-
sations can be known. Valid .olentific:laws are impossible 
because the natures upon whlch the, are based are unknown. All 
substance, whether material or spiritual, is unknown beoause 1t 
1s not given immediatel, in sensation. All that man can do 
legltimatel, is to aftlr.m his own .ensations. Anything beyond 
that ia invalid. Hume'. psychologioal at anisa, a.gai D, makes 
impos81ble &nJthing like the factor of implication, ot causal 
connection. A world of discrete particulars •• vera an, necessarr 
connection between thiDga.6 
6 "As all distinct ideas are •• parable from each other 
and as the Ideas ot cau.e and eftect are evldentl, distinct, ttwi 1 
oe eas7 tor ua to conceive an1 object to be non-exi.tent this 
moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the dl&-
tinct Idea ot a caus. or productive principle. The aeparation, 
theretore, ot the Idea ot Ii. cause t~om that ot a beginning ot 
existenee, i.plainly possiole to~ the tmagination; and cons.quan -
11, the aotual separation ot these objects i. so fa~ possible 
that it implies no contradictlon nor abaur41t7J and is therefore 
incapable ot belng refuted b7 anr ~eason1ng tram mere Ideas, 
without whlch it Is Impo.sible to demonstrate the neeessitl of a 
caus •• " Treatise, I, 111, 3 (79-80). TWo .erious flaws 1n the 
passage are the contusioa of the 10g1cal with the real world and 
the absence of a notion of relat1vwa. one thing wh1ch ot Its 
8 
On such So :foundation, Hume now proceeded to e onstnuct 
his doctrine of oausality. His entire investigation was a seare 
for the impression from which the idea of causal connection 
arose. His treatment of the subject in Book I of the Treatise 
of Human Nature can be divided into four parts. 1) an attempt to 
-
show that the prinCiple of causality 1s neither intuitively nor 
demonstratively certain; 2) an attempted reduction of reasoning 
on particular causal laws to constant association o:f impressions 
and ideas in the imagination, owing to constant conjunction 1n 
past experience; J) an attempt to reduce the necessary character 
of causal connection to an acquired impression or propensity to 
pass from an objeot to the idea of its ·usual attendant, the 
feeling O~ beliet accompanying this propensity 1s misinterpreted 
as representing a real necessary connection in the object itself} 
and 4) a oorresponding theory of belief, Humets important positiy 
oomplement to his oriticism ot causality. 
Tho first part is of special interest because it was 
nature has a rapport tor another. 
R.B.Bobart, in "Hume Without Scepticism," Mind, London, 
xxxix, July, 1930, 273, states that Hume's "Whole diiCOierrft 
about cause and ettect comes to this, that fta proposition mar 
1mply another proposition, but a thing cannot impl,. another thing • 
A reflection ot Huma's attitude is found in the .tate-
ll'lent which helped to start :ttant on his inquirr. tt'Jiow do we know 
that beoause oDlthlng 1s, another thing muat b.," Versuch •• n 
Begriff der Neiatlven Grossen in die Weltweiaheit ElnztitUhren-
(on legame guantl!S.s" r¥t1IS"Cm:inen, Iiaaeiiie ff, 202. 
TliI's Is taKen up n Sipter I, PP .31 - 'f' . 
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the allegetl discovery of the synthetic character ot the causal 
nexus which started Kant on his Oopernioan revolution. "All 
certaint7," says Hum., "arIses from tho oomparison of ideas, and 
from the disoover,; ot suoh relations as are unalterable, so long 
as the ideas continue the aame. ft7 Or, in other words, certain 
lmowledge is found only in what oan bed educed trom the principlGl 
of contradiction or intuited via the relations ot resemblance, 
proportIons in quantlt1 and number, degrees ot &n1 quality, and 
8. 
contrariety. Now the prlnoiple whatever ~ ! beg1nnins h!! 
also a cause or existence does not imply any ot the relations 
-- -------
necesaary tor intuitlve certainty. Therefore, it 1s not intui-
tivel1' certain. Nor i8 it daMonstratively certain. For it the 
principle that everything which has a beginning must have a cauae 
is to be proved, its opposite must be shown to be selt-contradic-
tory. But that cannot be shown.9 For to imagine the etfect as 
ocourring without the cause is not a oontradiotion sinoe the 
.trect certaInly does not include in itself the cause or vice 
veraa. 
Hume oriticizes the arguments used b1' contemporaries 
to establish the 0 a.u.al prinoiple. The first ot these argument& 
was that eve~y change must have a oauSe tor otherwise somethIng 
7 Treatls., I. 111, 3 (79). 
8 Ibid. 
-
9 See footnote 6 on page 7. 
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would be cauaed by nothIng or by Itself. The second a~gument 
was that all the points of apace and time belng unlto~, a caus. 
i8 neces.ary to detePmlne an event to happen at one moment and 11'1 
one place :rather than 8 t sane other tIme or place. Hwn. points 
out that the a~guments p~8up~.8e what ther set out to prove. 
Por 1t the cauaal prinCiple i8 dented, the conclusion Is not 
that things ar. caused by nothing or by them.elves but that th-r 
are not cau.ed at a11.10 
Hume next expands h1s 8 tudy of the causal principle 
by an examination 01' oar realoning about partlcular causal laws. 
"Why do we conclude that such particular causes must neceRsarll7 
have euch particular ettects, and. whr do we torm an interenoe 
1'I'om ane to anothel"'twll 
Every interence must beg1n wIth some impression since 
it cannot besln trOll nothing or go on ind81'inl tell". In reasoning 
concerning caus. and ertect, the ~nd always gpes tram the pre • 
• ent impression to the Ide. ot the absent but correlative Object. 
There are then tbP.e thinss to expla1n, "Pirst, the o~lginal 
-
Imprea81on. Seoondly. the transition to tbe idea or the connecte 
oause or et~eot. Thirdly. the nature and qualitIes or that 
Ide •• "12 
-
10 Treatis., I, 111, 3 (80-81). 
11 Ibid., I, 111, 3 (82). 
12 Ibld., I, 111, S (84). 
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Rega~dlng the tiPlt ele.ent, the origlnal 1D1prea81on 
11 an Inexpllcable datum to~ H ... e. WhAtther it comes trOll the 
object, the mlnd, or God i. an appaztent17 ll'l8oluble question. 
A8 tor the a.cond element, the tpanlltlon or lnterenoe, 
Bum. aaaiR reters to tbe pr!noiple tbat what Is distingulsbaale 
11 separable. On this ground there Is no implioation betw.en 
13 the impression ot an ettect and the Idea ot • o.uae. For the 
ide. assoolated wlth the impressIon D11gbt be displaced and another 
lubstltuted tor It. R ••• on Is Incapable ot aD1thlng like the 
rational penetratIon ot esa.n.os wbich might reveal the necessary 
conneotlon ot one thing vith another. 
Sino. the cauaal interenoe Is not d1800vered b1 reasOD, 
It muat be experientlal In nature--a oonolualoD. partloularlJ 
Ilgnlflcant tor lant. Experience glv •• U8 the conatant Co~UDO­
ilon ot repeated events. Thus atter innumerable Instanoe. ot 
tlame In conetant opdered conjunction wlth heat, v •• all the cne 
~au.e and the other ettect. 
But experIence ot 1ta nature can Intorm UI onlJ ot the 
past and pre.ent, not ot the future. How, then, justify the 
eau.al interence trom past to tuture exper1ence' 
Hume answers that a presumpt10n Is added to t he data 
ot experience: the future vlll be contormable to the past.14 10 
1) Treatls~, I, 111, • (86.87). 
14 1214.,1, 111, 6. (90). 
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"logloal r.ason" can be ottered tor the presumptIon. Thus In all 
reasonIng tram experIence there Is a step unsupported by &n7 
argument, which makes anything lIke true causal interenae impos-
aible. The imagination, not the understandIng, habIt and not 
reason, custom and not evIdence, are at work. The nature ot the 
transItion or interence tram past to tuture experience 1. sImply 
the work ot assocIation of perceptIons In the Imaglnatlon. 
But the conscIousness ot necessIty in the causal con-
nection stlll remaIns to beexplaine4. "What Is our Ide. ot 
necesaity when we sa1 that two objects are necessari17 connected.' IS 
Hume'. dlttlculty oan be expre.sed thus. W. ascribe real exis-
teno. to the objects ot our impressions, not ot our mere Idea •• 
Yet we have no ~ediate impressIon of the nece.sity in tee 
causal conneotlon. Wlq, then, do we thtnk that It 1. real and 
objeotlv.' 
Hume'. answer I. brIefly thl1'. The Impre.alon corr •• -
. 
pondlng to the Idea ot neces.ity results from the trequent repe-
tition ot constantly conjoined events. 81 this impression the 
mind Is determlned to go trom a pre.ent object to Its usual 
attendant. Thi. impres.lon ot determinatIon la the source ot 
nece.slty.16 Or In other words, through cu.tomar7 tr.n81t~on 
IS Treatl.e, I, 111, 14 (155). 
16. IbId., I, 111, 14 (156). 
1) 
between two assoclated objects, the connectlon between the. 
become. 80 torcible, vivid, and lively a. to .eem an impresslon 
and not merely an 1dea. The customary trans1tlon betwe.n the 
resembling instances thus produces a new impreaaion In the mind. 
"Necesaity, then, ia the ettect ot this observation Cot resem.lln 
Instance.) , and Is nothing but an internal impreSSion 01' the 
or a d.termination to carry our thougbts trom one object to 
another. ft17 
Bume adds that this internal necessity 'a conjoined 
with thlngs. 1S Juat a. we link secondary qualitles to objects, so 
we suppose necesslty to be 1n the objects we consider, not in the 
mind that considers them. Actually, nece.alty, instead ot being 
an objective donnection discernible by reason, has became a 
psychologlcally de.ermined bat 10g1cally unjustltlable proce._ 
whereby we pa.a tram a pre.ent object to the Idea ot Ita usual 
attendant. 
The teeling with which the latter 1. regarded i. oalled 
bellet.19 This aubject brings ua to one 01' Hume's important pos1w 
17 Treatl.e, I, 111, 14 (165). 
18 Ibld., I, l1i, 14 (16·7). 
-
19 On thi. polnt that a principle llke causality in-
volve. beliet rather than knowlidge, Bertrand auasell makes a 
rather startling comment on Kant's philolopbJ. It true, it would 
brlng out even more the klndred (IIlement. in Hume and Kant. Rus-
.ell lays. ~That prop081tions may acquire truth by belng belleved 
[00n8tltute~ a large part ot Kant's Copernican Revolution." 
Philosop!l ~ Leibniz, London, 1937, 14. Rus.ell admlts the 
tive contri~utiona to philoaophr. The Humean theor1 of bellet 
may be summarized thus. Belief does not consist In the addition 
of anJ tresh idea to that already entertained b1 the mind.20 It 
names the manner In whlch the mind apprehenda an object aa exla-
tent. It involve. three condition.* a preaent impresaion, a 
livel1 idea, and an aaaociation between them. It ia derined aa 
ft a li ve17 idea related to or as.ociated with a pre.ent impreaalon "2] 
To believe in an Object aa existent ia, then, to accord it the 
aame value as the accomp&n7ing aense impreasion. The latter i. 
of its nature sutfu.ed with the reality reeling. Bellet ia thua 
a certain feellng with lh lch the idea i8 conceived, a reeling 
best described as a more v1vid, lively, foro1ble, tirm, .teady 
manner ot conceiving an object .a existent.22 The idea aohieving 
unorthodoq ot the atatement. But hia g rounds tor it would aeem 
to repay investigation. See the Orltique ot Pure Reason, trans. 
N.X. Smith, 29'~I have found it nece.sarr~o-aiiJ knowledge in 
order to make rOGa tor t alth." Italic. inC the oJ:'li1nil. Kant 
1. here referring more £0 the practical reason. That Kant would 
deny speoulative reason the knowledge ot principles applylng to 
phenom.na i" ¥ha~ .Rueaell muat prove. 
20 Bume U.t1nguishe. between conceptual content and 
belief-qualit1, • ramiliar dlchotomr with parallela In the 
a~holaatic diatinotion between concept and Judsment, esaence 
and exiatenoe. 
21 Treati.e, I, 111, 7 (96). 
22 Ll/1d •• Appendi>: to Book III, (624). 
-
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the status-of belief haa been ushered, aa it were, into what we 
believe to be an external world systeM of continuing independent 
bodiea.23 Upon entrance into that system, it i8 enlivened 
through its relation with the naturally live17 and forcible im-
pression that customarily precedes it.24 From the impreasion, 
the idea borrows its belief quality or vigor. Thus we believe 
not only in existing bodies but in their necessary connection 
also. 
In the psyohology of habit and belief, then, Hume 
found the explanation tor causality. But in the process what 
had become of oausality? Causality was now a question, not ot 
necessary connection in objects, but of an instinctive response25 
to the fleeting, discrete, but customarily conjoined phenomena 
that make up the systematio cOherenoe of perceptiona we call 
experience. In Hume'a phenomenal world, causality, tar trom 
23 On Hume'l theory ot the external world aee Treatile~ 
I, iv, 2 (181-218>1 allo H.H.Price, lume's Theo17 .2! the Externa-.! 
World, Oarord, 1940, espeoially 11-31. Hume maXi I mucn-or 00-
nerenoe as well as ot constancy as baaes ot our beliet in an 
objective world as oppo.ed to purely subjectIve phenomena. !aRt, 
agaI~made nece •• ity the main criterion. His vindication ot 
causality depends largely on the argument that the distinction 
between the subJeotive and the objective already implies real 
causal nec.asit,.. See Chapter II, PP.'i.-G.'1and('7-11. 
24 Treatise, I, lli, 7 (97) and 10 (119). 
25 "Experlmental reasoning • • • i8 nothing but a 
species ot 1nstinct or meohanical power that acta in us unknown 
to ourlelve •• " Hume, An BnqUi~ Concerning Human Understanding, 
Chioago, 1935, IX, 113:- s •• a~o Treatl •• , I, Iii, 16 (119). 
16 
sbowing ant objective and necessary connection. can 0017 polnt 
to t be s tat1atlcal tacts, this or that haa happened so lU.Dy' tim.s 
In the past and so it can be b$11eved as more or leaa probable 
tbat, given a similar cause, a simllar event w111 happen again 
1n the tuture. 
This.desplte the objections or his common 8ense26 and 
despite the tlaws 1n the argument27 was Hume's philosophical 
posItion regarding causalit7_ 
B. THE RATIONALISTS 
In turning trom the British empiriolsts to the rationa-
26 "I dine, I plaT a game ot backgammon. I conver •• , 
and am merry with rq friends J and when after three or four hours" 
amusement I would return to these speculatIon" the,. appear so 
cold, and strained, and ridioulous, that I cannot tind it in mJ 
heart to enter lnto the. ~ tarther." Treatl.e, I, lv, 7. Aa 
h1a letter ot Bebruar1, 1754, to John Stewart shows, Hume never 
denied causalit,._ He denled on11' that our bellet In causallt1 
can be logically JU8tl.fied. See The Letters of David Hum ... ed. 
J.Y.'1'.(lrels, Oxford, 1932, I, 18,.--.. . -
27 Thus it ma,. be pointed out that unusual rather 
than usual occurrences 1mpr1n~ on our minds the consoiousness ot 
neoesslt71 that the judgment ot causal connection which must be 
distinguished, it on17 as a psychological fact, t:rom the mere 
teeling of it, implie8 a 87ftth.aia ot perceptions, this s7nthesia 
is not possible for a mind that is itseli' nothlng but l::1. 8 eries ot 
separate perceptiona, as we usuallJ look at an Object at discon-
nected momenta and not continuously, the number of times in which 
we oDaerve the ettect wlthout the cauae 1a probabl,. much greater 
than the number ot times we observe both; again. we often know 
the connection between a caus. and e ttect through a aingle instan • 
80 that no habit has been formed by nepeated experience of con-junction; same things, such aa da7 and night, are always tound 
conjoined without our ascribing any connection of cause and 
eftect between the •• 
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lilt philosophy in which Kant was educated2B a new atmosphere i. 
at onoe evident. Though we are primarily concerned with the 
rationalist view of causality, some prefatory remarks on the 
rationalist logtc and theorl of knowledge are in order as they 
were in our study of the causal doctrine of the British empiri-
oi.ts. Hume's contention that experience cannot by itself jus. 
tify general prinoiples by any process of induction forms a 
brIdge OYer which we c~m pass to the viewpoint of Lelbniz. 
For Hume, induction must be regarded as a non-rational 
process of mere instinctive anticipation, "the tendenoy to expect 
repetitions of what has repeatedly occurred."29 Foreshadowing 
Dt!r~eY" s naturalistic, instrumental view of thought, Hume t s 
epistemology considers thought merely as a practioal instrument 
for the convenient interpretation of human experience, for the 
expression ot "a comfortable feeling of of-course-ness."30 
Thought h_s no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind. 
In hts logic, again, HUlTle treats the fundamental principles of 
28 Martin Knutzen, who had effected a oomprmdse 
between Wolftlan ~atlonallam and pieti •• and who tried to harmo-
nize Newton and Leibniz, taught Kant a Wol£fian version ot Leibniz 
29 .D.B.C.MacNa'bb, "Hume on Induction," Revue Inter-
nationale de Philosophi., Bruxell •• , VI, 10. 20, Fa.clcUl. 2, 
1952, 19~ .. F11. 
)0 a.a.Prioe, "The Permanent Signifioanoe of Humets 
PhilosophY'," Philoaopar. London, XV, Januarr, 1940, 22. 
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human expe~1ence as purely 87nthetical judgments In which no 
necessary relation between subject and predicate 1s discernible. 
For Leibniz. on the contrary. thought is self-leglslatl e. 
Sense experience reveals reality only in proportion as it embod!. 
prinoiples derlted trom thought itself. "Knowledge of the nature 
ot things i8 nothing but knowledge of the nature of our mind.n)l 
Consequently, all princ1ples are analytic. As sueh. the, can be 
justified by pure thought. 
Leibnlz' phl1oaop~32 was a continu1t7 of tne rationall 
movement st§rted by Descartes. To .the Cartesian principle of the 
rationality ot the real, L.lbniz joined the two postulates ot s*b 
atantlal dynamls. and the monadology_ The wholl, intrinslc 
" aotlvlt7--"1.a monades ntont polnt de tenetres par l.,quell.a 
quelque ohos. y pulas. entrer ou .ortlr~33_-of these microcoams 
tundament~17 eons1ats in the spontaneous settlng forth ot obsour 
representatlve atate. or perceptions, eaoh monad representlng the 
-
31 Gottfried Wllhelm von Lelbnlz, Nouveaux E •• ala, In 
Lelbnlti! opera Philosophica, ad. J.E.Erdmann; BerlIn, 1840, I, 
211 6. Se. a ao telbal. tne MonadoloSl and Other Phl1oaophioal 
Writings, translated 61 Ao6ert Latta, LOndon, 192$, 234. note 49. 
Xn hi'Eure refeNnc •• , ErdJIlarm t S work wtll be referred to as 
Erdmann and Latta's book as Latta. 
32 The following summary tollows in great part Marlena '. 
analysts in La Polnt de oepart de la M'taphlslgue, Jrd ed., P&»ls 
1944, III • .21'=35. - - -
33 Erdmann, II, 70>. 
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totality or the un~verse from its own point of view. Only in 
spiritual monads do j;hese vague peroeptions34 approach the region 
of apperception, that is, the lu.--ninous region of clear thought. 
The process of cognition in experience35 thus .. [holly consists in 
devfllopment from the confused to the distinct uithout passivity 
striotly so-called and without oxtornal aoquisition. 
In this rationalist conception of cogn1tion, so radi-
cally innatlst, pure sensation can only be a confused state of 
an innate idea. The vague peroeptions became obJeotive knowledge 
only through analysis whioh clarities the peroeptions and makes 
them distinct. Now analysIs Is had by maklng JUdgments, by the 
attribution of predicates to a subject. And every true judgment 
Is founded upon the 10g1oal identity, whether to~al or only 
J~ Por Lelbnlz, as tor Desoartes, peroeptions and 
ideas are not essentially distinguished but only gradually 
ditterentiated. 
3S Por Hume experience consist. in the systematio 
coherence of our perceptions of fleeting, discrete, but custo-
marily conjoined phenamena. For Leibniz, again, experienoe is 
the harmonious and pre-established development of the monads 
trom yague to eyer clearer peroeption. At the stage ot apper-
ception (clear and distinct knowledge), experience reveals the 
Belf-evident nature of the innate idea8. These latter are thus 
said to be a resuttot experience, even though that experienoe 
is purely internal. Thi. experienoe, though lnternal, i8 objec-
tively real tor it consists in a representntion ot the whole 
uniYerse 1n aooordance with the pre-established har.mony between 
sUbstances. Human knowledge is thus at once a priori and a R2!-
ieriori, innate and experientiall Latta, l26~ -
20 
virtual, or"the predlcate .1tD. the aUbJect.l6 BYea In emplrlcal 
(Lelbn1z calla 'he. oontinaent) Judgmenta, an Intelleot whioh 
could penetrate to the bottom ot the 10glcal subject would aee 
theree the predioate.'7 
The log10al IdentltT ot all true Juclpent., even ot 
tho.e con.emins oontinge.t "truths of tact," point. to tbe tirst 
ot the two tuDd .. ental and irreducible principle. ot the Leibn1-
slaa 10110. !hi. 1. the priuiple ot oont.a410t10n, whateva. 
~pon aul,._la imp11e. & oontra410t1on 1n It. denlal le tna. But 
_lnee, in the ca.e ot eontlnpat truths ot tact, on17 the 1J:Ltla1te 
analy.l. possible to God oan .how the denial ot tbe propo.ltlon 
~o Involve a contradlotlon, another princlple ls nec •• saP,J, ~ 
prlncipla ot .urticlent reason. It ma,. be noted that the root 
.eanlng ot Lei'bni.' prlnolple ot aurtictent re.son Is to be tcuad 
.n the 10aloal postulate trGm wb10h his whole phil.sopa, tollows 
~. a eOJl'olla~f •• er,r true proposltlon 18 eIther to~all,. or vl.-
~uaUJ 14entioal, tbat 1., eva., tPQa propo.lt'_ .ust 1a it.el1' 
··)6 tAu all '.ue propoaltlou aft tore Lelbrdz tunela-
llental17 ua17'10. live", ,.edloate 1. aom.ellow contalned In the 
.ubJeot. 
)7 ·Verl'ata. contlnsente. intlnlta Del anal,..1 IDd1-
~.nt, qua. aolu. Deus t.anslre pote.t. Unde ab 1,.0 1010 a prlor1 
~. o •• t. oOSDoacuntur • • • ,al.lque lunt ORne. qua. voco Yerlta-
e. taotl." De Selent1& Un1val'.all •• au aalouio Phl10'O*hl~ 
~&aann. I, r.r; I.a alao Xilia, ,o:or--aaa Dot. on pase o. · 
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be demonstrable bT a reduction to a £o~allr identical proposi-
tion. The principle or suffioient reason atfirms this rightful 
l'educt1billtJ.l8 
Each or tne •• two principles i8 conoerned with a spe. 
olal kind ot truth. In thoae ca.e. whe.e the truth tollows tro. 
the law ot contradlctlon, we have neoes.arr truths or rea.on. 
The.e tl'Utha are .xp •••• lbl. In analrtlcal prop081 tiona. In 
tho •• ca ••• where the truth doe8 not ao follow an~1n tact,the 
oPP081t., .a tar aa tinlte lnt.llisenc •• are concerned, Is po.-
.1ble,we have cGQtins-nt truth. ot tact. fhel' are expres8ible 
onl)" l.n p"po.ition. wb1ch Kant was to call erathetlcal. 
!he eld..enc7 or oU%' aa.ent to oontingent truths i. 
explaln.e4b1 the prlnc1ple ot auttlo1ent .eason. Eve17 ob J.o' 
known mua' bave Ita Intell11lble .eaIOR, tt. ratIonal Ju.tttl~ 
cation. fbi • .atloaal Juatitioation of the attrIbute. ot &DJ 
subject 1. the-- 6 ••• n •• from whioh .•• ,. _anate. It" tb1s es.eno. 
1. the infinit ••••••• , it 18 Ita own juatitioatlon. PoP 004 
1. 14.nt10al17 \h. pJ,eu,,,,. ot ••••••• and of exist.no.. It It 
1. a 8N&teet •••• M.. tMIl 1 ts .utfiolent Nason, both •• regaHa 
1ta po •• lbl11. al thi. OJ' tbat tJ'P. ott •••• n •• and l.tl .. t1.1al 
p.al1aatlen through extateno., Iluat ultlllatelJ 'be • ought 1n an 
13S. 
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exempl~/ and efficient cause.39 This cause is no creature for 
according to Laioniz there is no tr~lsitive causality among 
finite monads. The sufficient reason lies in the universal cause, 
God, who willed that out of all tho logically possible worlds, the 
best one .hould exist.t~O Actually existing finite beings and 
their states or attributes, e.g., that I am sitting now instead 
ot standing, are what they are not because their~posite is selt-
contradictf)I7, but because anything different llould be incoIllpa ... 
tible with the goodness and wisdom of the deity_ In another 
world system ot possiblea--a system which has not been chosen by 
God beoause it was not the best possi'bl .. one·-I may have been 
stadding now instead ot sitting. But in the world whioh God did 
39 Laibnia, Origination of Things, Latta, 344. 
Kar'ohal points out a .erious difficulty involvea In the relation 
between the Lelbnizlan principles of contradiction and of suf-
ticient reason. On the one hand, no object is a rational object 
exoept in so tar as it i8 identical with itself or not intrin-
sically oontradiotol"'1_ On t he other hand, no objeot is a rational 
object except tor its sufficient reason. But in finite objects, 
thes. two rational exigencies exclude one another .ince the sut-
ficient reason ot a finite ea.ence is e xtrinsio to it. The log!-
calconclusicn, then, 1. that either every finite objeot is 
essentially uninnelligible and lrratior~l, in opppsltion to the 
general postulate ot rationa11sm that the order of being and that 
of thougnt are parallel} or that the sufticient reason is funda-
mentally identified with the finite object. Inthe latter eaae, 
the rationalist postulate would be safe but the question aris •• 
whether Splnoza's monism would not be the result. See Point de 
Depart, II, 2.3-26. • -
40 This Lelbnizian doctrine ot optim1sm involves that 
of oompossibility, that is, in the best possible world demanded 
by God' IS wisdom all the best possible essences which ean exist 
side by side must necessarily exist. See Monadologr, nos. 53 ... 55, 
Latta, 247-248. 
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as a matter of fact creat., Hia goodnees and wisdom demand tha~ 
I b. si.ting here and now. thus the wo~14 i& ultimately-and 
essentIally a systom of tinal cause., a system which 1. the ex-
pre.8ion ot an all-powerf'ulWl1l whioh knows and decr ••• tbe be.t 41 
A turthe~ diacuasion ot the relationo! the possible 
to the actual and ot the sufficient reason of essences and or 
act. of existence will t~ow mol'. light on the preceding matter 
as weU aa Intro4uce the Lelbniziandoctrine ot causalit,.. 
The po.slble tor Leibniz is that which does not impl,. 
a contradIction w.n.n it is conceived bY' the mind. In God, this 
pos.ibility.t being that ot It nec.ssarily existing b 8ing, 1nolu4e. 
nec •• sarr existence. As regards other beinga, the·in~lnite per-
tectton ot the divine 8.S8nee demand. that eve17thing which 18 
not tntrina14al1Y' eon. tradictory and extrinsicall,. contl"'adlcto~ 
(through laok of compo8s1bi11ty) be a possible term ot tne crea-
41 Latta, lOT. Seo Bu •• ell, PhilO.op~ of Leibniz, 34. 
"The law ot aultlclent reaaon, aa appliea £0 ac~aY-.iI8t.Dia, 
reduce. Itlolt definitely to the alsertlon of tinal cause •••• 
In ordor to inter actual exllten.e • • • the notlon of tbe aood 
mUlt alwaY'S be emplOY8d. ft 
Latta, 238, note S9. polnts out an Inoon.lstencJ whioh 
ar1s8s regarding the inter-relation ot Lelbnlz' two fundamental 
principl.a. Oontln,ent beinga are sa14 t 0 demand an etfioient 
cause as the1r suffioient reason. then Le! bntz &petAka ot the 
.utfle!.nt realon as 111ns In the order ot tinal Gau.... Appa-
rent17. the etticient and tiaal cau.e eamb1Be4 make up the 
luttlelent .eason. leither ls enough b7 It.elt. 
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tiv. act.42- Otherwise something extrinsic to Gtd would. hold th. 
divine omnipotence in check. ~h. divine I.sence is thus the 
.f\mdament. the Grund, of the possibIlIty of .very finite object 
which is not logically self-contradictor,.. 
What Is the relation of these possible finite essences 
to actu$lexUJtence? Unlike God, theyao not; of themselves 
Involve.n.o •• sary and actual existence. Why, then, do they .:118,,1;:;1' 
in plaee ,ot till eternal vold,4) 
. The suffieient reason for the existence of finite 
be1n~8 la. accorling to Leibniz. the cre&t1ve wl11 of God. But 
the actlvlt,.ot the divine w1l1 must also have e. sutric1.nt 
reason. !his reason i8 nothing other than the exigenc7 tor 
existence which 18 the propel",. of ever)". poss1ble being or tUBsaaoe., 
W. D'JUat observe that frO:';i the very tact that there 
. . 
42 . Latta, 243. not. 75. oall. the r.lation ot God to I 
the otb.r monad. "the orux of Lelbniz' pb,llo.op!l7." Le1bnlz wlshed 
to maintaIn both the In4iv1duallt7 ot the monad. and the els.niial 
unit,- ot d.pendent Ol-... tues wlth 004. fhus he .peaks or the 1110-
nael. aa b.lns "cont1nU&l. tulgurat1ou" of the d1vInit7 (Mona4olo-
If:l.,no. 47, Latta, 24). th ••• tulpntions are appax-.ntl1y a . 
irddl. te~ ,.tw •• n el-•• tlon and .manatlon. A tulguration ma7 b. 
d.sorib.d .. a po •• ible e •• ence tending to realIze 1ts.lf In 
aotual existence, yet requiring the wl1l of God to s et it tr.e 
from the countera-aotll'l8 influ.nce. of oppo.lt. po.s1b11itl ••• 
Glven God'. choi.e, the .xi.t.nce of the monad ari.e. 801.17 fro. 
the liberating of It ••••• ntlal activiti... This .&ho of the 
•••• • ••• ntia. theory and a lack of a doctrine of analogy con-
tFrDute to Lilbntz l p~obl ••• 
4J W. have already aeen that th.ir existenc. as thi. 
or ~hat particular t7P. of ••••••• ls due to the doctrin.. of 
optimism and co.po •• lbll1t7. 
exists something rather than nothing, it follows 
that in pO.Bible tbinS., or in possibillty or 
eBsence itself,there i8 a certain need of exis-
tence or, so to apeak, a claim to .• xlst J ip.a vord, 
that essence of itself tends to exlstenoe.44 
teeordlng to Kar •• ha14S the passage means that the 
world, conSidered in itself, oan without contradiction be thought 
as not e xistlng; and. that the d ivlne power, also consldered in 
itselt, is free to create or not to oreate. But the pas.age 
also means that the world, oonsidered in relatlon to the divine 
perfection, demands exl.tencs. Por the infinite wisdom of God, 
proposing to Itself the greatest good, cannot remain Indlttepenu 
to the aot of creating. 
For although the,world 18 not metaphysically nece.-
8.17. 80 thAt 1t. oPPOlite iavolv •• a ooatradiotion 
or 10810al abaurdity , it 18 nevertlleltUJIPh781oa11r 
n8 ••• sU'1 or '0 cta,erained that 1 •• ,. ~p •• l te 1JaYol ye. 
1mpel'tection or moral absurdity. And a8 pOlllblllty 
1. the prinoiple ot e.lenoe. so perteotion or degree 
of essenoe (througb which aore things are compo.alble 
the greater 1t 18) 18 the prlnc1ple ot ex18tenoe.46 
44 Brdmann, I, 147 J Latta, 340. the latter points 
out that po.alSillE, or potentlality 1a never an empty capacitJ 
fop Lelbniz. It la alva71, In however ... 11 a degree, a tendency 
to realizatlon, which Is kept baok only bJ other sim.ilar t enden-
ciel. Optim.iBm and compo •• ibi11t,. ar. the prinoiples aooorttng 
to v hioh Gee! dec1des what tendencies are to be actualized. Latta, 
240, note. 64 and 67. 
, 4S POint!! Depart, III, 26. 
46 ErgT-' I, 148 J Latta, 342. See 
nOI. S) an • Latta. 241 ana not. 65. ala. the Monado-
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An infinitely wise being, then, seeing that combination of' pos-
sibilities which constitutes the best of all possible worlds, 
necessarily cl'eates that universe as a C onsequenoe of Hi. wisdom 
and not because of til lack of liberty. By means of this conoep-
tual bl"ldge, LeIbn.~.z passes by pure .! Eriori thInking from the 
logioally possIble to the actually existing. Pure 10g10al 
thinking be60mes an 1nttrument whereby ultimate realIty can be 
defined in a valid manner.47 It unoovers to us what no experiOD.o 
can reveal. the Wider universe whiohe1:ists eternally in the 
mind of God. Pure"thought is essentially speculative and meta-
physical. 
~ing to the rationalist doctrine of oausallty, we 
Qan see trom the preceding pages why l'ationallsts in general tria 
to make causality til sub-spacios of the logical relation b9twe~n 
ground and consequent. It was only natural for a philo8ophr 
which 1nherited such Oartesian problems as the mind-body relatldo 
and whioh stres.ed the rat1ona11tr,y of the real to turn to the 
logic ot the possible. In order to find there some parallel to 
47 See the pasaage in Bume t 8 ~u1!2 where he d eplcta 
a belief, fals. as taxa aa Hume himself 18 concerned, but the 
truth for Leibnlz: "Bothing ••• mal seem more unbounded than 
the thought of man, which not onl,. escapes all hUJ:1&ft pover and 
authorlt1. but i8 not even restrained within the 11Ddta of natue 
and. reallt7 ••• What nevel' was seen, or heard ot, JIll., 'Jet be 
conceived, nor is ~thlng beyond the power of thought, except 
what implie. an abaolute contl'adlctlon." !nQu1rr. II, 1$. 
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.' the world of actual existence. 
Thus Lelbnlz, though he cannot be accused ot the exe.a-
sive l'atlonal1stla formalIsm of Wolft, ultImately rounded the 
ea.usal concept upon a real connectIon, not among the mutuall,. 
independent and self-fulfIlling monads, but among the thought,s 
of God. The testimonJ of experience notwithstandIng, my WIll-act 
is not really the cause of the elevation of my a~. By a harman, 
pre-estab'11shed from eternIty bY' Ood among the best posstble 
beings,the two actIvities are synchronized without any real can-
nection.48 
As tor the c~usal princIple, teIbnlz, writing ta De. 
BOS,fUll, says that a power of determining oneselt without any 
cause implies a contradictlon.49 In another letter to DeVolder, 
he says that to conceive the ossence of a substance, nwe pequi" 
the conception ot a possible cause; to conceIve its existence w. 
48 "We may indeed say that although this body may not 
be an effIcient physical cause of these effeots, its 1dea is at 
least, 80 to speak, their final, or, if you 11ke, archetypal 
cause in the understanding at God • • • in an ultimate analysis, 
the agreement of all the phenomena of the various substanoes come. 
only trom thIs, that ther are all productions ot one and the same 
cause, to wit, God." Letter to Arnauld, Die Fnl1oaophlsehe 
Schrltten yon G.W.Le1bnis, edIted by C.G.~arat, BerlIn, 1875-
18~O, tt, OS; - -
49 Gerhardt, II, 42il. 
28 
require the conce~tion of an actual cauae_"SO Now it Is a rund~­
mental docttt1ne of Lelbn1,; t phl1o.!ophy that a.1l the px-ed1.c8.t •• 
of ~ gubj~ct must be included in the notion of that sUbject. It, 
then, to conceive any actually exIsting fin1te object, we must 
oonoeive its cause, the causal principle 1s necessarily analytiC. 
Afte%" Leibnlz, v101rt deseJ"ves mention since it was 1ft 
h1s ph11osophy that "ant was educated. The Wo1rrlan philosoph,., 
though modelled on that of Lelbn1z, toned down or el1minated the 
most. ol'iginal and striking suggestIons of the latter, like the 
dootrine of the pre-established harmony. Wolff defined cause as 
"prlncipium aotual1tntla" with "prInclpIum" understood al logioal 
ground.S1 He explained partIcular causes as those thIngs ~om 
which the et~ects might be logically deduced.Sa He allowed the 
pre-establIshed harm.ony to f£11 into the background, practice.ll,. 
confining it to the relation between soul and body, whereas 
Leibnlz had postulated it as true for all the monads. Woltt al-
lowed real interaction between physical objects, at least as a 
more probable hypothesis. He also attached more ~portanoe to 
the prinoiple of contradiction than to the prinolple of suttIeien 
reason. He made an attempt to prove t be latter trom the r orlllfU" 
br arguIng thatnothing, ainee it has no oorr •• ponding notion, 
$0 Gerhardt, II, 22$. 
Sl Ohrlatlan W.l~~, Ontologla, 881. 
S2 Ibid., 870-880. 
-
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cannot be said to cause or account logloally for something without 
contra.diction.53 This is practically the same ar~i.UUent aa t.b.a~ 
used by Locke and haa a1read1 been discussed. It ass~es that a 
change must be cauae4. The cause is eIther 80mething or nothing. 
Since nothing can be a oause only at the cost ot selt-contradlctlo~, 
the argument concludes that something must be the cause. But 
that a change must be oaused is just what the argument was IntendeJ 
to prove. 54 
Por Woltf', the notions or suftioient Peason (Grund) and 
of oause (Uraache) are convertible. Echoing Descartes, Wolff' thus 
. . 
made God, whose divine essence 1s its own suf'f'101ent reason, causa 
I 
~. In all being the logical reason (loglscher Grund) is the 
ontological oause (ontologi8~her Grund, Ursaohe) and Ule cauae 1s 
the logioal reasoo. 
This excessivel1 rationalistic viewpoint was fleroel1 
attacked in a lecture delivered at Koenigsberg by tne anti-Woltti~, 
protessor, Crusiua.55 Cruaiua denied the convertibi11ty ot the 
53 Ontol06ia, 50-70. 
54 Hume'. refutation, seems purely verbal. .For 
nothing to be a cauae i8 the same as a.ying that there is no 
cause. Thua it the d.il,emma read: either change has or haa not 
a cause, Hume would not have found it so aasJ to refute. 
55 If one may judge from Kant 1 s inaugural dissertation 
at Koenigsberg, the Nova D11uoidatio, this leoture of' Crusiua 
made a profound impressIon upon film. 
l 
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.' 10,1.al pea.on and the peal ca.e hllPkllchkelt •• JI"fUl4). Be aa1D-
taineet that the 10110al rea •• ot an ob jeet do.. not alva,. • 
• xp.e •• It. oau.e, although knowledge 01' the oaue ot the 0'0.1 •• ' 
n ••••• arl17 tu.Jm1ah •• tbe lo.loal pealon ot the ObJeot.S6 In 
hi. lova Dlluoldatl0,lant 'Would .&7 the .... thins when, .ub.tl-
tlltina tor the notion or suttlelmt peas. that ot Aete .. inlq 
"alOn, he voul4 diat1np1ah the anteo04 •• t "eterm1n1q ... a •• 
(patio •••• n41 .!!! ti.~l! t".011 tbe con.equ.nt de'ers.11l1ns 
.eal .. (ratio ooeo._ .. 41 ) _-'1 
.AR4,..t, Kant was not a Whol17 ta1thtul exponent of 
Cl'U8i u. • thoup. he diatinguished oause and. 10Sloal. ".8on, he 
held on to the a.at twl4a.mental plnelple or patlonal1 •• , the 
principle whio ... duo.. all l'atlonal j •• titleatlon u1tl_'.17 to 
•••••• aJlf 14eatlt,. Aooopdlng to Lelbn1., ... we have a.en, the 
.u~J •• t of a true jud ... nt oontalna La Ita late11111ble aot •• 
... tldq whloh 1& bo\h the exi.en.. ot the predioate and the 
exolulon ot the ocm.tNdlotol7 of the lattep. AnalJ.i. of the 
lubje.t alone ... tuas. •• the Ntlonal juatltloatlO1l ot the pre-
41oat.. Con •• quent17, the truth ot an objeot suppose. ne.e •• arl 
th. 14eftt1t7 ot, M. oj •• t Vith 1ts .xp~a1n1n, "a.on, with 1ta 
)1 
logioal giound. .Kant would never abandon this Lelbnizlu con.ep-
tlon ot the "pure ratlonal" reduced to the "pupe ",17tl0."$8 
"o.nla nost~a ratloc1natio in praedloatl oum aUbJeoto, vel tn •• 
vel 11'1 nexu apectato. 14elltitat •• detegen4aa "solvitv."S, 
But '10 maintaln ,hat e.,.er7 :rational dlellon.trailon ls 
had b1 anal,.sls, op that the 10gloal peaSOn 1. Identified w Ith 
the object whose ground 1'1 18 in oonsciousneas, ..... to be 
ent1"17 ap1nst the t h.sl. ot O:rua1ua, namel,., that the Gaua. 
ot an objeot 1"u:rnlsMa Its logio.l Na.on. In taot, •• t ..... 
to have .eJecte4 Cl'U.tlua altos.th.%' a ahort 1tb11e late:r when he 
1.14 that 1me oause, 1.e., the ontological rea. on extpina!. to 
tbe ... eo., 1. net -17 not oOllv.l'tlbl. w1th the 10poal :reasoa, 
but can n ... r be 14.nt1fi.4 wl th 1 t • Pol' the los10a1 peason d e.l 
wIth the Identl'7 ot an obj."t and Its expllcatlv. Naeon. .A. 
oaus., on the other hand, 1nvol.,. •• the oppos1tlon between an 
.rre.t and Ita , __ loal pl'1n01pl.. A ... us. 1& b7 deflnltion 
som.thing o1;he.-.t, 4D4.pea.-than tM • tt •• t. 
Thia HlU.l'Jc60 plu Bua.'. upaent top the s1D.thetl0 
8 ' , S I ....... hal, .It!. 'otnt !! Delart, Ill, )). 
S9 J. •• ~ D11 •• 14a'1,~1 ~45 ••. X, )91 • 
.£; ... ,:. I , 
vO .... obal oalla 1t ·~eui-.~~ ..... pr8m1a .. 4801al •• 
4e 1. phil ••• phie art t1qu.· Point de De." XII, 33. the whole 
pa •• a.e In whloh the ~lr oo.ups Ii .{ . lioani in view ot 1[an' • 
lateJl Cpitloal teaohing en oau8alltl1 "I ••• very well how a 
oonsequent is d.duoed fpa. ita ~ound acoopdlng to the law of 
14entlt" nam.1" beoauae it 18 41800v.J'ed through anal,.s18 ot 
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nature or causality eventually led Kant to the perplexina problem 
ot the synthetic,!, EJ:lI0ri.61 At the t 1me Ktnt made the remark 
(176), he anowed tbat thoulB he was a convinced ratio~al18t who 
believed 1n t he value and nee •• al t, of anal,.81., he waa neverthe-
le.. tree ot tbe illuaion wnleh decelved both Lelbniz and Wolrr 
as to' the tranlcendent i.,ort or the pur-lJ anal,t1e method. 
coneepte to be contained in tne ,round~ ThuB neces.itr i8 a 
around ot i .. utabil1tJ, oomposltion a around of dlvi.ibl11t" 
intlnitl a ground 01: omai •• lenoe, etc., 8lld I oan 01e&1"17 under-
Itan4 t hi. bond ot unloa between poW1d. and aonleq uent, • iDee 'bu 
oonaeq_nt iSI-eallr l~nti.al wtth part or the conception or tbAt 
pound, and inaa.uGh. _ it ia alreaq Gonuined therein ia p •• lto, 
with the ground aecord1.n; to the law or Identtt,.. But hOlf aome-it',1 oan tollow fNm 10_ thln, el.e oihe",i.e thaD'1ii i'iioR"iio. ~ne-liw or laen¥ll!, £6at l.-.emeISln, I anourd~i. to &i •• 
• ao'iTiaTl'o"iiie. I 0& 1 £6i -tIP.1 ilii4 0 iroUid th..-rolI'ia~ 
iiiUnd. Seoa,ui""Tta relatloD to tkw cenaequent is 10gloal, 1 ••• , 
oan be olear-lJ reasl1 •• 4 a. tollo_ina tro. the law ot identit,. 
the .econci 1dndo~ g1'Ound I oall the aotual lP'ound, beeauae, 
wbl1e thi. ~l.tlGD beloDS- to ., true conoepta, there 1. no 
Ju4pent po •• ible about 1 t. nature. Ji.v v1th "lard. to thi. 
ontol.si.al "a.oa C ... iual srou.n41 and Its bond vi th a real eon-
.equent, he ... 1. the .!ap1e quatteD I uk. how ... know that . 
b ....... _ one th1aa la, anothe. thiq auat be' 'eptl.en Gl'oa •• n, 
li!4em1e II, 202. Itall •• not in the origlnal. 
a.e pp.fO--YOl.ot the pre.ent .tu47 where it i. ahowa how 
lant t • recognitlonot ~e taot that the cauaa was etwa. Andere. 
and hia pe.sl.tent a.ceptance of the rationali.t principle or P 
14entit,.aa the 801e .0 ... tor .cientific Jud .... '. intenaitte. 
t~ problem ot the 8Jatb.etic III il'tortebeQUeaUbe4 at. b, hil 
phi.10.ophieal progenl tor.. .e ana: tbnl •• 
6" In It. hi.tOI-lo context of caUlal!tr, the ppobl_ 
oaa b. put thUl. Bow can we la'1 that all thinsa aust have III oaUI4 
when DG .. ount or ana17al. oan .how tha" Be.i4e., auae has COD-
clua1v.l,. proved causalit, to ba synthetic. Is the .7Uth •• la due 
.8r811 to cuatoDl8.l'J coniuctlon, •• Bume clai •• 4, Ia the vaunted 
neel.sit, and universal t, or the principle purel,. subjective' Or 
1. tne oauaal 8Jftth •• laQbJ.etivel,.. validated, 1.e., ow1l'lg to 
lomething.pecial about the tblaga we know and the waf we know 
the.' 
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In the preceding pages we have dealt with oertain per-
tinent dootrines ot the empirioist and rationalist .chools of 
the 81gb'aanth centUX7' •. The empirIcists maintained that a111de. 
can. be accounted tor b7 aensa impressions. Tha aauaal Ilonoept 
was thu. p educed to the peroeption of mere S uCla.saion and :the 
caula1 principle had no objeotive universallt7 and neoess~t,.. 
~ It vas rounded on an inltinotive :-.spo~e, acoompanied 'b7 a 1" •• 1 
called: belie1", to the cuatoma:-i17 oonjoined phenomena ot s ena. 
experIence. the rationalilts, wMlerightl, Npu<l1ating the prtil 
clp1. that all 1dea8 oan be accounted tor 'b7 aense Imp.N.slOllI, 
tailed to realize the neoeasit,. ottbe~plrioal element tor ant 
real, aa oppos.clto pUt-el, tormal.knowledge. In teloniz" banda. 
the cau,a.l oonoept and prIncIple b.~_epart 01" a 87st •• 'ot pOI .. 
• 1ble.vbare pUt-a thouabt and Ita prlncipl •• held 8wa7. fne 
teaob.1na ot Lelbnta, protound in 08:-taln reapects I was .na&eJ'toio 
at84 01 Weltt into ~. ro~al18tl0 rationalism that Kant was te 
combat. lot that Kant ever wholly abandoned ratlonalisa. Undep 
aua.'a devastating attacks and 1118 own phil •• ophieal study, he 
M)uld'rleld certain points, such as the analytlc nature of the 
eauaal principle detended 07 rationalists. But the conotant 
recurrenoe of the t el"ll ·poealbllit,." .1n hia philoaopllJ' aarka 
lant ••• ontl~.d belief in the Lelbnislan view ottbougbt. !he 
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we GaD hop. to achle •• b,. ~ea8on, when all the material and a881i~ 
tanoeor exper-Ienoe a:re taken .w..,.."02 Obviousl,. that i8 posslble 
on17 by.eans ot an a prio~l, purel,. oonceptual method. But Kant 
depapts fro. the e.t:rem. ~ationallst posItIon when he denie. that 
pure thouSht by ita.lt amount. to knowledge. Yet lant 1nalsts, 
as will be polnt.d out 1n therollwwlng ohapt"er, that only througt 
pure thousht i. knowledge po.aible at all. 
JrwIle and Lelbnlz are thus the two p~otagoni.t. that 
dwart all other. on the eighteenth centurr philosophioal atage 
prior to iant. !helr competing claims were the cue for the lat-
ter·. .Dt~ano.. Bach .ailltaineet hi. view of the f unctlon ot 
thought. Thought'" ala1m_d .II.ume, la a practical instrument ro~ 
the cODY.nient Intel"P"tat1on ot our human experience. It has no 
objecti •• or .. tap~.lcal valld1t1. Thought, Inslsted Lelbnlz. 
legt8late. ut"enally. reveallng the wider universe of the 
eternall,. po •• lble and, prior to all experienee, determining the 
lunda .. ntal eon41tlon. to which that experienee must contora. In 
log1cal teNls, .. e held that a .tundam.efttal principle or exp.r1.nc~ 
like oausallt7 1s • 87ftthetlc judsment 1n which no necessary 
connection between subject and predicate 1s discoverable and 
whi.h ccn •• quentlr caanot be justified elther ~ prIori or b7 
-
62 Cl-ltl~"., A xiY (11). The letters A and IS In rut~e 
l'c.t'erene •• to t6erltlque wlll indlcate the firat and second 
editiona r •• pectl.eIi or-Ene Oritique. The numbers in parenthe ••• 
live tbe pates 1n '.X.Smith'. ~ran.lation. 
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expe:rienoe. Lelbnlz held that sueh principles are analyt1c, 
either formally or at lea8t virtually founded on the 1dent1t7 
of Bub,Ject and pl'e41eate. !'heJ can there tore be Juatitied b7 
pu:re thought. 
fhe pr~bl.m of lant's Orlt1aue, broadly stated, con-
slsts in the alta_nation an o:ri tleal .stlaata ot 
theae two opposed Vi... . . . ~atlonall8t by e4u-
eatlon, temperament, and oonviction, Kant's probl .. 
was to :peoonol1. 1Albn1z f vIew of the tunctlon of 
thougbt with Buma's proof of the .ynthetic characte. 
ot the oauaal principle. Be strive. to determine how 
muoh ot t..lbnlz. belie:r in ill. legislative power of 
pure thouSbt can be retained atter full Justice hal 
b.en done to a_ •• s damagIqcrltlo18.. the tUn-
damental prInciple. upon which all experience and 
all knowle4g_ ultimately r.at are !lPthetI~ in nature. 
how i. it posaible that theY' shouldaIso tie a prIori' 
Such 1a \he p.obl. that vaa ltaBt t. tro\lbloua lnherl-
tance tt-a b,1* philosophical present'ora, Bum. and 
Lelbnla.o,J 
What vas .lant t. an.wer to the problem inherited trOll 
the two .tre ... ot "plrioi'. and rlltionali •• , In the next 
chapter, ve ahall .e. h01f )tan' anawered the probl. ot the 
87ft'hetle ~ Erlor! 1a .e,.rd to ~ p1'tae hi.torieal and logioal 
lnatanoe ot the .,..'11.'10 .! 21"1 •• 1, p.bJ'aloal • auaa11t,.. 
6) Salih, Omaeft'i_ij' xxxiii. Ita11cs 1n the 01'18111&1 
S •• alao ibid •• App_JlHz II, :r -606. 
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CHAl"1'ER I::: 
PHISICAL CAUSALlf! IN XAIT'S 
OaItIgn 01 mE REASO. 
Historically, ca~ality was part ot the larger probl .. 
ot the 8ynthetlc ~ 2rlorl which resulted in Kant's mind. trom the 
rusion of t.he Leibnlz1an view or thought and Hume' s analysis ot 
causali ty. The following pages Will therefore briefly trace 
Kant'. reaction to the general problem of' the synthetio ~ prlort. 
Attention will then be tocussed on physical causality, the prIme 
historIcal and logIcal example of the synthetI0 ! prlori. ThIs 
latter section will be divided Into two parts: Kant's treatment 
of the causal conoept or categor,y In the "Transcendental Deduo-
tion of the Oategorle8;- then his treatment of' the causal prin-
ciple in the "Second Analogy." 
A. to PROBLEM OP 'lBB SD!HETIO ! lUORI 
Hum. awakened Kant t r011l hls dogmatio slumber 'b7 ahowlq 
him that the prInoiple ot causality 1a srnthetio, not analytiC a. 
LeIbnlz and Wolff' had held. Hume further claimed that the on17 
rea111 truittul judgment5 a~. arnthetle ~ E •• terlo~1 judgments. 
AnalytI0 judgments are mere tautologle. and so of' secondary 
value. They can only clarity the existing content ot knowledge, 
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never extend it. 
Whether 1t \-Ia8 by means of Beatt1e t s criticism or b,. a 
rereading or the En~uirzl that Kant became ao~uQ1nted with Hums t • 
argument for the sy-nthetic nature of' the principle of' ctLusallt7 
and the correla.tive Humean view of thoueht. that acquaintance 
came at a significant moment in Kantts philosophical development. 
As early as 176), Kant he.d been seeking waya to tree metaphysics 
from the contradiotions with which it Has fettered. The tamous 
letter to Marc'us Herz., da.ted Februa17 21, 1772. shOl<rs that this 
independent metaphJslcal re8e~rch, predominantly rationalistic in 
tenor, graduall,. revealed to Kant a serious dift"iculty in the 
rationalist theory of thought. This was the mysterious character 
1 Kant, it is general11 argued, could not have been 
acquainted with Kuma'. Treati.e of whioh there was as 1et 
no German tr-ansla t10n berOl~e 11~O. Therefore, his r efer-encss 
to Hume must reter to the latett wottk the Bn,Ulg, ot vh1 ch 
Sulzer's translation appeared in 17S4-6.vanlnger (in his 
c:omm.nta~, 344) .etends the theo1'7 that Kant became aequal. nted 
with Hum~s destructive analysts ot the causal principle through 
.eattie'. B.S~ OR the iature and Imautabll1t~ ot Tttuth, a 
scathing denuri:litlon ot lUme'a-irgument In ~e~reaiI8e. 'eattle'. 
esaq was ttJan81ate4 lnto a.raan around Baa,er, rt12, the t 1_ 
when lte.nt's wr1tlniS seem to indicatesom. knowledse ot the 
Treatlse. Pollov1ng V.lbina •• , .orman Xe.p Sa1th bolda that 
lant was a omehow aC:"i,uainted, it on17 through .seattle, with BUJIle'. 
Treat i ••• But; he 84m1t. aa ~obabl. th. t~ that 8 Hr.8dl .. 
or Eli. lniu1!2 in Sulzer t. tranalation or e. recalling ot 1 ts 
ar~.n£ suggested to IAnt the central probl.. ot the tirst 
Critlgue. See Smith, aommenta£l, xxviii. 
r 
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of ! prIori knowledge2 of the Independently real. Thus, granted 
that HU1I1(1tts empirIcal analysts of causalit1 and his oorreeaponding 
theo~ of thought greatly In~luenced the development and formu-
lation of Kant's Critical problem--ohne Bume keln Kant--Hume's 
-..-. ------ ----- --
influence should not be divorced from Kant's Ot~ profound 
questIoning and study.) 
The letter to Harz olearly shows that Kant arrIved or 
himself at the problem of the objective validity ot thought, at 
least in Its first form.4 The:re Kant speaka ot t wo poas! hle 
kinds ot intelligence, an intellectus archetl2us, or creative 
intellect, on whose intuition things themselves are grounded; 
and an Intellectus ectlPus, or passive mind, whioh derive. Its 
conceptual data trom the sensuous IntuItion of things. OUr 
understanding is not the tiret kin1 of intelligence s inoe ltd 0 •• 
not cause the object by representing It. Nor Is the object the 
cause of the Intellectual representations. Hence the pure eon-
cepts of the understanding, Kant goes on to say, oannot be ab-
stracted from t he data of the senses. They have the1r origin 01-
2 !be ba.l0 •• aning ot the Xantian a fr1or1 18 that 
\J'h1oh 1s independent of experience as regerds crt gIn and .-.Ud1t7 
It •• alld c~lterla are neee.altT and unlveraalltT. Ita OPPOSite 
1s the empIrical. For more en the Kantian a Rric.rl, s.e SlI1ith, 
lomaent!£l, 54-8, or Paton, Kant's MetaPal,Te ot ~e~leDo., I, 1lt-~O. - , -- - -
3 S.e Aloia Riebl. Del" Phll0S0ahiSChe !rlticismu8. Leipzig, seeond edition, 190~,-Y; 308; an Iuguato ouzzo, lint 
!~eor1:.tloo, TurIn, 1924, 13. -
4" S.ee Smith, Commentarit. 46. 
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.ouroe 1n the .oul. Bow Kant a.k. ~.1t the turthe. que.tlon, 
one wb1ch he admit. he p .... d over In the !!!! DllU014at1o,S 
.ow eaR ,uoh ~ep.e.entatlon •• wh14n reter to an 
''OJeot and Jet are not the .e.u1t ot an aftectlon 
4ue to that object, be po •• lble' I bad maintained 
that the .ense pa,H,entatlone repre.ent tbing' a. 
th.,. .ppear, the lntll.l •• tual ... p.r •• entatlon. thinga 
aa the7 are. But how then are the,. thin,. S1 y •• 
towa,lt •• , b7 the aazmer In Wb10h the,. att •• t us, 
And It ,ueh int.lle.tual "presentationa are du. to 
ovoW 1_8" aotl Y1'7, wlumo. c •• a the al1"8 ... nt 
Wh10h the,. aM .uppo •• cl to have vlth objec'., which 
,.et are not *help '"4u. ••• , .0" ..... i' \hat the 
ax.1 ... ot pue poa.on about tbo.eo'Ojo.'. aP'.' w1'1l 
... ·l&.tto", . vb..n 'bhl. a ...... nt hu not been In 8.aJ' 
v&7 .... l.t.a Of .xperl.nceft> 
What rlpt, III otur vord., have we to think that concept" 
wh10h a. ! 11'10p1 orl",,, h_ wlt111n, aN valldot the Incl •• 
,.n4entql'eal t 
It should b. Doted that knt. d •• pl te b.1, doubt' and 
41ttl.ultle., ••• '1" d.nle4 the ! »1"10.1. OIl the oontrU'J', he vu 
oonvlno.ct tbat the arow1ns .uooe., ot the oonte.pora17 pbJ",loal 
and .athematl •• l ,ctenee, va. the ... ,ult ot their !. Rrlerl natve ~ 1 
S Witten 1n 1110, .111, opu.oule JUJ'ka the bepnnlD1 
ot Kant'. ¥Pe,'Una witA the probl .. ot how the ,u'bJeetlye ooa-
41tloDl of our oepitl0. are l'e1a1;.4 to objeotlve 8.,er1e •••• 
6 Quoted. b1 Sal'h, C ... n'!!'l_ 220 .• 
7 s •• the Prefac. ot the •• CORd. ealtlon ot the arltlqu~. 
This aa.urano. of the val1dlt7 ot ~e ~ Erlor1 In aoienoe an4 
mathematics led him to In •• attgat. Ita poa8ibl11t7 in m.taplQ'al •• 
ala.. y.t that assurance dId not remove the question how the 
1 Irlo~l was po.alble. 
Swept along b)" the two a treams ot h18 own stud)" or the 
paradoxloal ~ Epler! and BUme'. argument tor the synth.tIc nature 
ot the cauaal prinel,l., Kant Immediately found hlm •• lt in 7.t 
d •• per vater.W.11 oould be ret.r to Ruma aa rousing hi. tr_ 
M. dogmatlos1UDlb.r. l1p to th.n,all .7nth.tio judgment. were 
oonal.dere • .! poet.rlo;pl, or .plriea1, vAlle mal),,'loal Jud .... '-
were r.8U'4 •• ! 21'108. Karlt • a Cplt1 •• 1 ppob1 .. uo.a tr_ tlle 
all ••• d dl ....... 17 ibat the ! p.10zt~ .8D4 the apt_ttc 40 not 
exclude OIl. aDOtMr. Bot 0Dl.7 1 ... priDe!pl. like the .au.al 
axl_ 0\)v10-.17 .! e;plorl' but ala., ...... pPOY •• oonolualve1J 
d •• pl'. rational1a' 01a1m" it 18 I,.tbetie. POJ!'t In It theM 
..... to be DO ...... tlon ot ..,. kind betwee. the a ub jeet (the 
coneeptton ot •• veat .1 lometbing happ.niDS in t1l1_) and ille 
pred1 ... te (the eonoept1 ... f another .vent pp.e.dlns It aa an 
or1g1natlns o.US.). .An4 7et we do not •• re17 .aorlbe the pradl-
oat. to the .ubjee1; but ..... 1'1; that the,. are neoe •• ul17 oonne.1;e • 
ht pan'ed tha' the tun4amental prinolpl.a upon whioh 
aU experienoe and all Imowleds_ ul'i.ate17 :r.at are aJ'l1thetI0 ill 
llatUP., how can thq 'be ! 2,,~oPl alao' Bow explain their .. pPanrl -
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.' 17 eontradleto17 nature' What 18 that "x,· that third something, 
b1 which, Independent17 of partlcular and continpnt sense expel-i. ~ 
en.e whlch can nevep give the univeNality and nee8881t,. that 
oharaoterlze the !. E~10P1,9 the synthesls ot 8ubjeot and ,"4108ta 
In .. s,nthetlc ~ Erlor1 prOPo'ltlon'!S aohieved,lO 
lant's probl ... wal Intenslfled because he clung to the 
ratlonallat prlne,lple or Ident! tr as the sole nol'm for •• lentlt10 
Juclpenta ,11 alm", at the 8ame t1me abandonlng.. .s we have ••• a, 
the rationalist doctrine that the Haloau •• ot an objeot a4 iM 
.utti.ient Ol' 10g10al "a.a ot the objee, aN 148ntlo&l. A •• u.. 
18 br dat!altiall .om.tlUng other tlum Its ette.t, PNm1 ••• ct KIult. 
Thus In pPopo.tttan. that Inyolve4 a causal 1"81atlO11, lant coul4 
not call'll,.. the J'atlonall.t pl'lnclpleot ldentlt7 to explaln 
the o onna. til ton., ot subject au p1'e410ata,. ret he cletended agalu, 
luae the raal OODbe.tlon betw.en the subject and prettl.at., ev •• 
thoup he oould not anal,..e the ecnn8etlon In the subject. Up. 
what bast., t~n. ooa14 the subject aDd predioate be joIned In 
proposltlons ot this sort' 
Kant .toJlmulate4 hi. d.11emma 1n the opuacul. !9. •• et1". 
9!&!t11l' -Wlth .eaar4 to tb1. ontololleal 1"ea80n and ita bond 
wlth .. Hal consequent, he.e 1. the slmple question I aut how ... 
9 !hIs ls a rua ..... ntal p1"e.upposltlon, 
17 examined 81 ther 'b7 B.e or 07 ltant. S.e 8a1 th, 
XXX111, 21, S99. 
ne.8. luttle18 t. 1 
O ... enMI7. 
10 Crltlq~,.A. 10-B 14 ($1) ~ 
11 See .... ohal. lolAt de t>Cltpan. III. ),3. 
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veknow that bedause one thins Is, another thing mUlt be,·12 
Wbile not agr.elng with Bum.'. ooncluslon that tb. 
llnldng in the case ot causall.ty sprang trom an 1nner habit 
topged by experienoe.· knt paid Ilume the cOD1Jllment that he had 
•• en the .problem ot the arnthetlc:l !. pl"ljClpl_ thouSb not in 1ta 
unlyeps.l1t1.lJ Had he 40ne 80, he would haYe llraedlatel:y pecog-
nlzed that 'PP8 .. thel1lat1oa and soience validly involve an a 
-
pr1o!'! .7ftth •• l. no 1 ••• than metaphysio.. aertain17 "hl.[Jl'WD.e.-a 
goo4 aen •• would haT. eavea him,,14 tfa. denying the posal'bll1t)r 
ot mathe .. it.al &ad p.,..loal .clence. ltaDt makes use of" his 
ow "1004 aerule" and \lIlln!'aal grup o:f the problem po.ed b1 the 
.,.n~b.etl0 !. 21"1,01"1 t. examine the .!. EI'10r1 jUdgments ot ma.thematl( I 
and .cleno., whos. 'Yal1dlt,. wa. top him unQuest1on&bl.,15 to ••• 
whether •• cb judgaenta oannot have a alm11ar va11dlt,. 1n .etapbJ-
12 AJca4em1e, II, 202. 
13 q,rltl!\!!_. 10 (SS). 
14 Ibit. 
If On thi. aattep er the va114ity ot the. ynthetlc 
! Erlort in sol.nfu~ and aathematics, Kant waa perhaps too .an-
~n. and overat.pl1t1e4 the case. 8clentlst. and mathematlcl ... 
do emplOJ' a Erler1 aeil:t.od.. But they diaap •• among th •••• lv •• 
aa t 0 the Tmp;'t ot the a fri op1. flhu., It 1 t 1a tl"U. that "Jtarl" I 
Crltioal probl •• tlrat b.l~a. with thla presuppositIon ot valldlt, 
tot the ay.ntbetie a p:rlorl 1n solenoe and mathe.atlc.l and doea 
not exl.t aave t hpwp. It" (bith, ooaaent!:fl' 477), then the 
aope aautl.us sclentifio att1.u4e or toaa7~ke8 some ot ~. 
wind out ot Iant'. lalla. 
l 
a1cs. 
In the Prol.gg~ena, there occurs .. other Interestlng 
passage 1n ~IOh Kant attrIbutes to Hume a part1al insIght 1nto 
the general problem of the 81nthetic .! priori. 'the pas.age 1a 
worth quotIng in full, 
Row!a 1 t possible, sa78 that acu.te man, that When 
a conceptia given me, I can ,ob.,on4 It and oon-
nect It "With inotMr whS.ch 18 not contained 1n It, 
in 8uch a lU.Mer .. s it the latter 'teoes.apill be-
longed to the tormer' Wothing but experIence can 
furnish ua with such oonneotions (thus he conclude, 
trom thed1tr1cultr which he took to be imposslbl11t7.), 
and all tbat vauted necesaltl or, what Is the .... 
thing, knowledse assumed to be 1 friorS. i.nothlng 
but a lonl habit ot aeoeptlng .omethIng aa tJtue. and 16 
hence of mistaking 8ub.1eotlve nece.slt" for object1ve. 
Kant, who held the objectIve neoesalt,. or the s1nthetlc !. 21'101'1, 
was all too conscloua of the etrect of Hume ts ugument on .clenoe 
and mathematlos, no l •• s than on metapbJ8Ic.. Be set out to 
explaIn and establish the natupe and objective validlt,. of the 
synthetic !. 27101'1, with speelal rererence to e au.alit,.. 
POl- about twilv8 1eare, Kant wrestled with the probl ••• 
In 1780, teal-tul lest an untimely deatb--he was tittT-six ,.ear. 
o14--ahould overtake him in the mldst of his labors, he set down 
In the all too briet pel'1Gd of 1'1 ve to 8ix months the thought. 
that had occupied him top more than a decade. Thus was born the 
~ritigu. !! ~ Reasoft. 
In the work, lant develops a complex theory of cogn1tio 
16 Akadem1e, IV, 277 • 
. 
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in anlvel' to the tamoua .entral que.tlon. how aN synthetIc a 
-
21'101'1 propositions po,.lble' In the Pretace he glyes an impor-
tant clue. 
lji)taaon hU 1n.lght onl, into that whioh It produc •• 
anel' a,lan ot Ita 0VIl, and ••• 1t ... t !lOt allow 
1t •• lt to be kept, .a It were, in natuN 11 leadlJl8-
atriasa. but .ut 1 '.elt ,bow the ..,. wi 'h ,1"lJ101,l •• 
ot Ju4pent b ••• ct upon fixed lawl, eona tn.lnlna na tuN 
to &1ve .aw ... to que.'lema ot .eaa.'. own detep-
ainIne • • • Reaeoft, hol41na in one band 1 ta ppinelpl •• , 
aoool'41natCl which alone oonoordant .,peuaoe. o. be 
a4m1tte4 u 4tClulvalent to lawa, anel in the othe .. band 
tba ezpe.~t wbi.h It ba. 4e.i •• 4 1n oontor.m1tT w1~ 
the.. pnne!,l •• , .. , app:roaoh nature in 0l'48r to be 
'aqbt 'b7 1". Xt .. , ne'l bowver, 40 •• in She 
Obaraoter ot a pupil Who 1 .tenato .v.~th1nl that 
the teacher ohoo... to la" wiet an .,po1n'.4 Jv.4se 
Who oOl1p.l. .the V1 tn..... tg ana .. J* qUI.tlona vb! ell 
be bluelt baa toat.llate4e1-, 
lant 1. h.N .em ....... "1~ HUOll 1n Ita applloatlon to .xpel'l-
ellO.. Be not.. that ~" 1. auoh 1n all iaquil'le. whloh cannot; 
be _tl01pat.ct !. l1'1ert. -.Iaaon • • • auat approaob nature 1. 
01'4e:ra t. ... • ..... .,. 1'.· &aD, *118 l11d.'a the !. 21'101'1 or 
e.n..- p.il_lta'a 11k. Wolrt. lu' in a. tal' U 1"8UOI1 410-
•. t.. Sbe que.tlon. l' alao 410'.'.. tbe to~ or the anaweP. 
a.I..on. lant augp •• a, 1. oono ..... with the prlnGipl •• OJ' ooa-
41tlou a •• oNil1a to wbl10h Shin .. oan. b. UIl4I"'oo4. ~ •• p.la-
01pl •. 8 O •• on41tlona aN aot a'.temente about ... nat\U'e of 
ob J •• t., but p.lnelpl.a or th. poaaiblll t7 of .xp •• lenol. In 
other 'tif'Ot-c1a. "UOI1 II not; • _*b04 ot ob ••• viq obJI.t. a. the, 
•• allJ' exta' but Ie 41 .. 0'l.r .on ..... 4 -17 with the va, we 
17 £ritlg_. B xili (20). 
4S 
., 
understand objects. Compromising the principles ot empirici .. 
and ratlonnlistn, Kent SA1'S that reason in its sl'eculatd". or 
theoretical use is legislatIve for objedts ... ,.e., but on17 withlD 
the danaln of possIble, t.e., emplx-1cal, mowledge. "!hue the 
order and regular! t;r in the appeattflnc es, which we entItle natur:!. 
we ourselves Introduce. We could never t1nd them in appearanc •• , 
had not we ourselves, ot- the nattnte of our mind, ora1gtnall,. •• , 
them there ... 18 
'!hIs new att1tude towat'd reason 1. ltant's Oopern1caa 
Re'V'01utlon. Copernlcus ~vet-s.d the usual viewpoint em the aotl0 il 
ot the heavons or sugi;estlng that the eaJllth moves a.round the s\U\ 
and not vice versa. So alao Kant propo ••• to explain the appU-
catton ot the mind' • .!. 21"101"1 prlnciple. to objects by ."'Igeatifta 
that ob3ects conto~ to the mind and not .10e y.r8a.19 Beholns 
hle r.ma~ in 'h. lettep to Her., Kant belle ... that there i. 
e. !!!. ~41~ between the Intelleotus eetl,E!!, or· p ... l ve m.n4, 
IUGh aa the English 811lPl:rlclatl l:wd dereneSed. anet the tntell.o1nla 
u •• tze., or ore.tlve 1I11nd, ot Le1bnls. And where ... euller 
thinker. had held tbat bJ thought ve get fro. bow things appeap 
to how they are, Kant holds that "e get tl'ODl hew things appeal' 
to how the,. wl11 appear. 
18 CrltlD!' A 126 (147). ItaUcI 1n the ori,inal. 
19 p14.,. ul (22). 
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!be pUPp.se .t tbe ~ztltlque 1. to' .pp17 the Copernican 
aevolutlon to .. tapbrat.a. lant hoped 1n thla .., to' o1arlt,r 
the naturo and cap •• tty .t the human Intelle.t in Ita .neoretloa1 
u))Oot.20 ae al •• hoped to show, b7 a .tud1 .t the ooultlema 
.f kDovle4ge, the 00300tl"e yallit7 ot the ..,atbetto A erlo~ 
principle. ot knowl .... , tau. br1ns1ng about the oonstructl. 
ot an 1mmanont (aa opposed ,. & tranloonden') aetapbf'aioa. 7:b.ua 
,he 0.1'1 tlgu 11 nO" & ltOJi'k on ps,.ch.olo81 dealing with the aanner 
in Wbioh ~ raoul'i.a vopk. Emt t. toouaa1aa at'entl. on _ 
.plat_clopoal pl"obl_. what Is 1 t that Uk.. CUI" expeplenoe 
obje.tt"e, tbat la, the knowledge ot obje.ta !netepen4ent ct c:ntP-
U 
•• 1 ...... 
20 '.r l:an:t 'hi. upect of the Dd._ 18 Interior to Ita 
practical or _ .. al ... peot. "I bav. found It n. ••••• a17 to UDJ' 
mowl .... In order t. aake r0C8 tor taith." Srltl<tu. B XU (29). flill •• ~ \he orla!nal. fbi. oomplete dlcholom,US.twe.n tbe 
theoretical and mo~ .apecte ot human lnt.ll •• tu~ act1v1t7 1. 
one of the root. of Kant1an agnos'lele. But Mazteohal bellev.a 
that tMe agnutlol •• oan b. ayo14ed even wl$hln ltaDt-•• ,..t8Jll 
and atanlns .tPoJa hilt'. pztlnclpleat. Such an attempt 1. Marechal. • 
theo..,. ot the .t1nal ._1.. ot tb.e lntellect. a..hlat 4. ~ 
~, V, .33. Pa'. al ....... U8b or ... _latlon '.i"eerG 
apii'ulatlYe and pMotical "aeOll' "I belleye It Is ot areat apoS' 
tanoe to ••• opt.. that aU OUl' wl1110g, and •• peclall1 oU!" DlOl"al 
W1111q, 1$ cond1tloned bJ' thoupt Ott reallonl but I .t1D4 l' b.a..P4 
to or.41t that the oonneotlon bet.een reason and action 1s so 
.xternal ae It 18 OaaBonlJ 4 •• cplbed to be ••• It s .... that 
Apl.totl. va. rllbt. wb&tOY~ hi. error. ot 4etal1. in epeaking 
ot?'pOCtlP~O'LC; .a op£I<TII(OS" "ou~ .1' :f£~lS blO("~'1rUul.· J! 
Deteno4! .!! •••• on, LOn4on" 19$1, 16. 
21 Smith belt.v •• that even ttlousb ltant eUmina.es as 
non-•••• ntial to the .ent.al inquiry ot the Cp1tique all P87cho-
logloal questions pertaln1ng to the mental powers, atat.ments •• 
to their conatltutlon are atill impl1.d and lnvolved 1n hia 
opiate.o1ogioal der .. e of !. iptori knowledge and ordinary expe.1 
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A"brief summa17 of the theory of knowl.dge22 pres.nt.d 
in the Critlg.ue will show Kant's answer to the problem of the 
synthetic ~ Erior1. 1) In thft absence of intellectual intuition, 
human knowledge presupposes the reception of data. 2) The 
immediate elements of this sense reception are only crude repre-
sentation., not as yet objective knowledge. ) Only the ~ ertori 
synthesis of these crude representations constitutes them into 
objects in and for consciousness. This 8yntnesi. ls effect.d 
according to formal conditions of unity, the form. and eat.gorle., 
23 through the schemata. These latter are transcendental functions 
of the imagination which m.diate the functions of perception and 
und.rstanding. The categorical synthesis refers the objects or 
appearance. to the supreme condition of unity, the transcendental 
unity of apperception. This form of selt-consciousn.ss (self-
22 See the tigure on p.137 of this thesi. showing the 
logical element. postulated, by Kant tor ~ erior! knowledge. 
23 The schemata have not as 1et been tully evaluated. 
B .It.8mi th, Comment!!7. 334, declares them to be an unwarranted 
tertiwa <l1!ta. EliIng, Xant s Treatment of cauaaliti' 61, thinks th ~t 
Elie s-nera ettect ot Ine .chematI.m Ia~o dlmI.I. the importance 
ot the cat.gories. In tacti aal. Ewing, "It ia the sch.ma (not 
tha cat.f0r,), the validity ot whioh i. proved in the .eoond 
Analogy_ For Daval, La ~eta<h1~iq~ de Kant, 8, the sohemati.m 
"eonstitue bien la ole~4e toute 1a phl!o.ophi. d. Kant." For 
Paton alao "the chapter on Ichematism i ••••• ntial to an under-
standing ot the Critical philosophy." lint's Metap~.ic ot E~eri~ 
enee, II, 21. But h. admit. the gr.at ttlcu!tIes nvoliid n 
YOIIold.ng Kant's acoount ot the 8chematlsm. Ibid., II, 50. 
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.' identity) is the nec.ssar" correlate of consciousness of obJeots. 
Cogita, ergo res sunt.24 4)~. oategories are thus susoeptible 
ot a legitimats, objeotive U8& in so tar as tney enter into the 
constitution of objects of experience. Otherwise, they are empty 
torms of our understanding.2S unable of themselves to represent 
any object whataoever.26 5) Besides the categorical 8ynthes1s27 
~here are certain metacategorical principles ot unity, the 
~ranscendental Ideas of God, the World, and the Soul. Being above 
sense experience, the.e ideas can tind no corresponding content, 
rhus, despite the1r subjective necessity,28 they have no objective 
24 ~ile Boutroux, La Pb1loso~h1e de Aant, Paris, 1926, 
~4. The torm ot .elt-ldentity-r. iieate more-fUlti 1n the dis· 
~us.ion of the "Transcendental Deduction." See Pp.St-Llot this 
~hes1s. 
25 "Thoughts without oontent are empty. intuitions 
~lthout conoepts are blind." Critique, A 51, B 75 (93). 
26 The Aantlan theory ot the cat8go~, or concept, i. 
who111 oonoeptualistio one. Unlike moderate realists on the 
~uestion of universals, Kant gives the categories no foundation 
n reality (nowmena). They are wholly a 21'101'1 and the subjective 
ronditions ot the knower. Bence Aant'.-pro1)tem. ot determining 
~ow subjective conditions of thought oan have objeotive objective 
ralidity. The only objective validity that he can--and fInally 
~oes--give them ia that belonging to a~p.,~anee8. 
27 Paton, Kant's MetaSRIRiO of Exeerienoe, II, 44, 
otes that this 1s no£ ane or a ole series of syntheses tak1ng 
lace at different time.. There is only one synthesis which 
ombines the given manifold in one time and space. But that one 
yntheais has different aspects and imposes dIfferent characteria-
les en the objeots combined. 
28 The mind is neoessarily impelled to these ideas 
o complete its synthesis ot experience. 
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use 1n the theoretical order. 6) Negligence of the.e Orltical 
rule. leads to the "Paralogta.," the "Antinomies J" and the 
"Theological Sophistries" of pure reason. 
Such was Kant's solution of tho problem of the synthetic 
~ er10rl which Hume's analJais ot caua.lit,. plus Kant'. rationalia 
view of the rwtctlon and nature of thought oreated. In an In-
tere.ting pas.age ot the ~rol.gam.n., Kant evaluate. hi. solutlon: 
fhis complete (tnougb to its originator unexpected) 
solutlon ot Bume t • problem rescues tor the pure 
concepts ot the understandIng theIr ~ *~lorl origin 
and for the universal laws of nature tell" valldltl 
as laws of the understanding, Jet in such a VaJ .s 
to llm1t the1l' use to experlence, beoauae t hell" pos-
sibllit.1 depends solell on the reterenoe ot ~e under-
standing to ~erl8fto., but w1th a oanpletell rever •• d 
mode of conneotion whIch never oceMrred to Bume--the7 
do not deriye rr .. exper10noe, but experienoe derive. 
from th_.2'1 
Nature, 1n other wo1'Cla, 1n i t& uni vera.l contond t,- to law, I1U8t 
be sought in the condi tlone ot the posalbll1 t,. of exper1ence 
which lIe 1n the .enslb111t,. and the understand1ng. 
In this wal Kant eatablished rationa11sm upon a new 
and altogether novel basta. Like L&1bnlz, he st111 belIeved 1n 
and emphas1zed the importance or the .! pt1or1, but now it waa an 
! 21'101'1 Which could net be sh.own to be more than relatl ve. 
Hume'. argument tor the 8Jnthetlc oharaoter or the princIple or 
oausa11ty oonvlnced Kant that the ~ priori baa no inherent 
- -
29 Akademle, IV J )12. 
( 
so 
ab,olut. content t~oa Wbich clue. b.a~lns on the .uppa-a.natole 
oan be obtalne4.It 1, thue Incapable ot a LeIbnlalan Ind.pen-
dent or .etapbJ.lcal proot. It 1. In.tead ~elatlve to an e~epI­
en •• whlch 1. capable ot f1elding onl,. appearanoe.. the.! 2Jlior~ 
1 .... tr10t17 taotual a. the experi.noe whieh It oondition •• 
the .isnitle .... and .oop. ot thla eoaolustoD om 
ha.J'4l,. be ezagp,.atl" ••• With 1t the _In oon-
"qu.ne •• o.t Jtan.'. Orltloal teach1ng are 11,,11.-
'0.lub17 bo.4 up. AI ,~~Elno121e. wh10A l1e at 
tbe bul. of our }m'iiil:.~ are 'HGelIo, ih.e-y tii .... 
• 0 In'Erlii8ti .1.e •• 11;J', and'OirmY po..... me 
'is.oluEe au£hOn_z; "'_Ol'l'DR !! tKhl1iZ !§! 'iii101lall.t •• 30 
lot la4uoe4 r... or intuited In ...... expepienoe, tb. ••• 87Jl-
tbetio ~ 1~10~~ pr1Relpl.. are imposed upon experi.n.. b.J the 
mind. Although aao),tlb •• to huaum "a80n, th.,. oannot be .bo'Nll 
to b. 1Dherent17 rational 1n the ~atlonali.tlc ab.olutl.t •• a.. 
ot that teN.. tb., oan be e.tabll.hed 01117 .s brut. oondltion., 
v.rltiable in tao., though not demonatrabl. In pw-. tbeorr. 'A.,. 
are eondltlonl of know1na .. n •• experienoe. 'thus, thq appl;y 
to t h. lmowl.qe ot appearanc.. a.n4 aN neve. lesl 'bla'el, appli-
oable In the d.clph.rlng or ultimate ~eallt7. Without 1Dbe~ent 
oont_t t thq &1'8 valld -17 Wi thin the realm of • ena. experience 
Where the oontent 1a .uppll.d b7 the manitold of. xpeJileno •• 
The,. are o Oll. eq uentl1 \1881... tor t be eon.truetlon of a •• taplQ'-
aloal tm..o17 ot tb.1ng' 1n Ul .... l.... !helJ'1' nec.aalir, m01'.over, 
1s extr1n.l0. the,. oan be poatulated onlJ It" and 80 long a., 
-
';1 
.. 
the ... urrea •• , aotual or at l.a.t po •• lble, or .enae .xperlen •• 
i8 a._.04. 
thUti tar kat'. dootrine ln the Crttlg:"" J!E. lV! ba .... 
u. been p1'e.ente" a. an auwer to the goneNl probl_ ot ~e 
'ptmetl0 ! 21'10:.1. fU Pl'obl_ muat now be 4ellm.1ted to oaua-
11t." Ai.torl.aU, U14 10110&111 the •• t "'p~iant exaaple ot 
tbe qntiletl0 .! 21'10ft. alD.e I8J1t" vlrull.atlon ot th. ,1'ln-
el,le 1. ba.e4 upon the .oneep' 01' oateaoP,1 ot oauae, \he lao7-
.1nth ot the "ft-an •• en4ontal Deduction ot the CatoS01"i.', tt wh .... 
IaDt ... 1. vith tbe obJ.otiy. va1l411, or ~. oategol'l •• , ~t 
tir't b. 'NY'1' •• 4.31 JIv1ll1 and 'a'o. rill be 0Ul" APiatlne.)! 
I. !JIB !ftAI'SODDlIftAL DBDVOtIOI OP fBE CADGOltIBS 
~ ·' .... oen4.niat D.ductlon ot the Cat.sorl •• • l ) 1. 
31 Jaith, O_entarz, x1lt--xx1v, d.r.D4a Taib.i .... "" 
pai.h-vork theoJ'7 a.ooRIi. 10 "hiGh the "tran ••• dental D.duo-
tl •• "l •• baat, .~~.'1' ot ..auaol"lpt. wrltte. at v.piou 4at •• 
throu;bout 1769-1780. • •••• It. oontra410tlona and 1.oon.l.t •• -01.,. 'aton ,t .. -.17 48D1.. 'A. tb'OJ7. a •• hi. 1. l)eteao. ot .4 
a.a.on, 69-90, ... lU ..... t'~ NetapbJ.lo !£ !!I!rliicu" I, 01-49\. 
32 Bw1q, J~'" ba •• ent .t CaQal.lt{j 40-71, 'atoa, 
hD.t'. ",ap)g-.lo..!! SXM.l ..... !, Ji;S'7";SIi. Di hi. th.ela, 
idSer EiiiTolt." 'IDA ... ua.a. 01'd8" ot bat" ar .... t. a. tound. 
1n .1'AeJ' tb. ti •• , .r ••• oad .4111GB .t the O .. ltlque, ~. 1011-
oal or4e.. ot the ar ..... ' ... rglnS f,pam both .ati!ona vll1 b. 
P"' •. 
.» the "banl •• ndental Deduotlcm." tall. uad. ... the 
dlvl.lon ot \be O.l'll-~ oall84 the ·,.ana •• n4ental Anal,,! •• " 
The eub-t1tle .flit. 11.1.108 1. "An&17t1. ot aonoeptlo .. - 8tR •• 
lt olal.1 to di •• o.e. aal .ln41.at. the .&11d1t7 ot \h. o.t •• orl ••• 
It 1. 41.ttnguiahe4 tJt_ the ...... 17t10 ot ht1noipl •• ,· Whish alaa 
to 4a'e1"ll1n. the \18e ot the oatesopl.. 1. Jud.pent. JIoP' vl11 
b ••• id a'bout the latt.p when the "Se.on4 bale .. " le '.e.,.4. 
r 
.' perupa ~. heaPt ot th. Orl,lill.. thia w1l1 be ... a SOH 
oleuq 1t one .. e •• ll. that the GeJ'!JUn rat10na11.t. and. the 
h&ll.h .p1rlo1 ••• hat tail.4 to expla1B the ."e'1!7 po •• 1bl1U~,. 
ot aoqutl"lnS tI"e.h knowleda' ..o,po •• 4 to partloul.1" unoonn •• te. 
exp.rienoe. • I'h1lo.opbJ' ••••• el lneapabl. ot &nJthlna othe". tbaa 
tONUlating anal,.,!. 3u4pent., vh:lch weI'" oon.14."..4 nothlns 
aOl"8 tban 'autolog1 •• , or ot In .... nt1118 IIJ'Dth.tlc 3u4 •• nt. 
which ., ••• d unJWltltl.ble. P.bJ.lo.op!q va. blook_d "7 oontl"a. 
41ot;lona at '.'l'J 'tuN .. bad no all.p.. ot a .ethod which 
could '1"0.1 ... ." •• a po •• lbl. ehano. ot pr0sP.... No .. o."."., 
philo.opher. talle. to ,up,l,. a ratlonal Juatltloat1on ot .ueh 
fundamental be11.t. .. the eXi.tenoe of a world ~d.pen4.nt ot 
the ln41 vidual con.ciouan.s. 01" t he '1'lnol.1. that every ,117.1 •• 1 
ohlm&- au.t hav. • •• ue.. • ..... '. theol'J ot oausaUt,. had. ut'.r17 
4.tlat •• all .uOh .""" •• t Justltlea'loa. BYen .erkel,,.,. 
argumen' top a d.lt7 01' .p1rlt va. wlthout 10110al Juatltl.atloa. 
That ap~n' al.o p •• supp .. e4 tbe prinoiple of caueallt7, a 
pplnclple prove. b.F .... to b. iDcapabl. ot .e.onstratlon b7 &Dr 
known •• t1\o4. How, ... , Juatlt;r the tund.am.ental pr •• uppo.l'lcma 
ot .01en.e and or41na.J7 lite, Bow sf..e _.e explanation ot 'he 
\Ul4oubt •• lac. tba1; we diatlnsutah be tv. en the subjecul "Ie and 
the obj •• tlve, b.'veen the .pher. of our teeling_ and lel ••• and 
the world of Obj •• '" lD the unl.".r.a1 darkne •• , lant" Oritlque 
otteN4 a albae%' ot hope. It ola .... 4 to juatlt) in eme .tpoke 
the tun .... n'al pre.uppo.ltloft&ot .oleno. and OPdiD&P,J lit. aa4 
S) 
.. 
'0 41800Ve%- a 'otall,. new .ethod 1n ph1lo.opAJ I a .. thed. o1*leb. 
1t would be poaalble i 0 PJtov. a a,.8te. ot real17 arnthetlc .! Pl'lQlt 
pr1nelpl... ot thl ... tbot th. toundation 18 th. tI!pana.endental 
])ftdueilon ot the Oat.&O.l ..... 34-
KNit'. ma1n taak 1. to a:t:aow that a cat.gor,. 11ke that 
of o&\1.8e,); which 1. a tON of aJl1tlwala belonaing to th. pUN 
u.nct.r8tIU141n~h hal an obje.tlv. value. l'h1a explain •• xp.~l.nc.J 
nothing .1.e ct.... Pol' 1 t la the n8.8.8.17 expl'e8.10ll otille 
unit,. o~ thO\J.8b,16 Ua pela'lon to th ... n1tolcl ot aen... Without 
the oate.o.,., the lUJ11tolct Gould not 8i ve r1s. to tho oonaolotla-
n ••• ot the wo.14 of objeot •• 37 Without the .,ntbe.' • • tt .... 4 
l4 Ib..'e,. "MM •• nelentalti 1. prbaar1q 0.pl0704 "1 
lut to .e .. thokaovleclge ot the aature and condltlon. ot ow:-
a 2pl0r1 .oPt'lollot obJe.t.. Po ... eoond.aJ7 .ean1np ot ~e 
te ... , ... ' a.itll. C~.ntm, 14-16. 
)$ Aoiual17. the pUl"e oatesol'1 pertalD1na to 0&.&11t7 
1. thatot eO\Ul4 .cd o •• efUlillt. When the pupe oat_,,01'7 1. 
appl1e4 u.4pe.ir'lol •• 10 t •• orNapcm41ns aoh_, that 01' ..... .. 
aar,. suece •• ion, it b •• ome. the schemati •• d oate8017 of 0 .. 118. an4 
ett •• t. lut hat ,.neraU7us.. tM. term tor the .0b_atI •• 1 -
ca;e,017 even when he ... rera to the pure oat8gol7. fhua in the 
It.etaplQ'.leal Deduotl0 .... the oat.gol7 "op1ve4 tl'oa the h7Potile. 
tleal t.... ot Judament i. oalle4 b,. antic1patlon, not tbe cate.GI1 
ot ground and oonaoqu.nt, 'Out the oat.sOl'J" ot oauae and erre.t. 
Kant t a usa,e i* tollolle4 1n the great •• pap, ot th1. theal... %11 
Ohaptep III, the critiqu. ot Kant'. clODtpine ot oau.a1it, oalla 
tor- great.r ppe.laioa.. POP aore on thi., se. Paton, Kant' a •• ta-
&al& .!! !!pepl.no.; II, 41. . I. -
)6 xut has jut .13.0'" 1n the ",panac.ndental Ae.the-
tle" that apace and tim., the a tr101'1 toras of. enaibllit,., ape 
the nec ••• arr condltiona of InTu lIon and ao are objeotlvel,. 
va11d tor appe~anc.s. Bow h. wants to .how that the oategorl.a 
are the nee •• aa..,. eODdltlo~tor thlnking the object. 
31 "!he object1ft ... a11411;,. ot the categorie. a. a 
~Jllol'l oon.epit. Nst. th.ntoN on th. taot tbat •• 0 tap .. -the 
S4 
.' by the eat.go~ie8, 1n other worda, ,he consc1ousness to wh1ch 
imPNsslona ot senae .ou14 st". l"1.e vould be 01117 a .oatterect 
and uneonne.ted one. There would be a BUIl.an wor14 ot rle.ting, 
isolated impression. in whlch the ao-call~ knower vaa himselt 
but a bundle ot per.eption •• 
But a tl'&n8cen4enta1 deduction ot the oategorle. pre • 
•• nts a problem whioh va. not present in the deduotion ot the 
tOl"ll1. neces.ary tor Intui tion ot ap'pearance.. The foraa of 
.pace and t1ll.,a.,1 knt, nece •• arily relate to objects aince, 
onl,. throuF them can objects appear to ua in pSl'ceptic>n. fhe 
oat8gov1 •• I' howen" j do not reppesent the condltlona ua4er wh1* 
obJ •• 's ape gl.en 1m 1ntuit1on. .."p"01.e1,. be.au. the o.t •• 
aor1.s ha .... _thilll to 40 vi tb an ob j •• ". being g1 ... en, there 
leema to be no reUOD vb7 given obj:ec:ta ~ul4 contoN to th_. 
, ' 
Inaninter •• tlng passapltant 01 te. the o •. usal catego17 
a8 an examp1 •• ~X:; aignln.. tor him the ."nth •• i., wher.o,. upon 
.omethins, A."oMtlt1ng quite 41t.t'e.M11t, I, is posited acool'dina 
to a rule. Jow 
It1s not manite.t ~ fiIrlort vh1 appearanoe. should 
contatn an,rtbinc ort • Hnd (exp4tl'ienoaa camot 
be Cited in Ita proof, for what hal to be established 
1a the objective .al141t7 ot the c~cept that 1. a 
Epiorl hand 1 t 18 there tore a ,ptGP1 4oubt.t'ul whi'thez-
aueli a coneept be not perhap.-a eogelher -»t7, anel 
h8:". no ob j.ot anJ'where amonS appeaz-ance •• )0 
tors ot thousht 1. concerned, throush thea alone 40e. e&paz-ienoe 
beco.e poaaible." C:r1tltue, I 126 (126). See alao A 97 (1)0). 
38 • 90 •• 12) (~). 
r 
.' Kant goes on to p01nt out that the J-egularlt7 among appeuance. 
1n experience cannot glve rise to the causal concept. the con-
cept must either be grounded coapletel,. ~ pr1o~1 1n the under-
standing, or must be entirel,. given up as a phantom of the brain. 
To thesynthe.is ot oau.e and ef1"eet there belongs a 
d1pl t7 whlch cannot be emp1rIcal17 expressed. namel,., 
that the .treet not on17 aucce.cts upon the cau •• , bj~ 
that 1t is posited throuse 1t and arl.es ~£! It. 
Kant here talls back on hls Buaean presupposition that the un!-
versalit7 and necea.1t7 vhlch characterize the ~ prlori concepts 
can In DO va,. be explained b,. recourse to experience.40 "The 
unfolding ot the experience wherein the,. are encountered 1. not 
their deductlon; It la cm17 their illiiatratlon.n41 
Locke and .... cont1nue. Kant, ta11e4to appreclate 
thia to the tull. Com1ng Up01'1 pure concepta 01" the understandlna 
In .xperlence, the tormer deduced the. trom the experlence In 
whlch he tound the.. fiuwougb. the., he tb.en 111081oal17 trtedto 
uri ve at knowledge whIch taJ- tranlc_nded experience. Kuae. 
agaln, did not reallze that the underatandlna Itselt m1sht b7 
means ot the.e oon.ept. be the a uliheJ- of the experienoe In whiob 
obje.ts were pre.ente. to 1t. !hus he derlved the concepta tPQR 
exper1ence, l.e., fro. a eubjecti"e necesllt7 born ot habit. anel 
-------)9 01'1t1su., A 91-. 124 (125). Ita11c8 In the orlginal 
40 1Jp1cal stat .. ents of this presuppo.llilon are, "All 
necesalt,., wl~out exceptlon, 1. srounded In a tranecendental 
condltlO1'l.tt .l 106 (US). "The oonoept ot a caUBe 1Dvolve. the 
character or nece •• lt" which no experlence can 71e14." A 112 (1) )~ 
r 
,6 
declar.d tliem. total17 confIned to e,xperI.no.. Like Locke, aUDle 
deatrQ1.d the A 21"101"1 nature of the concepts, th.~ebl contra-
dicting what was for Kant the 1ndisputable pr •• ence of the a' 
-
,21"101'1 in pur-a mathemat10s and general ph7alca. 
To Bum.e" who had spoken ot the succession of rep~esen­
tat1on. a8 the only datum In our consciousness of causalit" Kant 
tries to .how in the "transc.ndental Deduct10n ot the Categori •• " 
that, 1) mowleds_ 01 aucces810n 1Dlplie •• elf-identity; 2) kl'l9w-
ledge ot auoe ••• lon tapll •• knowledge also of objects; 3) s.lf-
Identit,y and knowl .... of Objects lik.wi.e impl1 one anotherj 
4) un!. t7 1n both dependa on necessa.PT lava of oonnectlonJ and;) 
thea. law. are therefore the Ind1apenaable oondltiona tow 111oh, 
all ob jete:i.or ,experl.nce mua t cont_ •• 
4.41sousalon of these varloQPo1nta-·th. fou.th and. 
f1fth will lea4 .1nto the "Second AM.IQ&T"' vliflre tbelv1ll,.~ 
, ! :,' , ..... : . 
full, d.velopM ... it111 bJtlng out Katl\'apoal tlon regarains .~he 
" • '" '. , :'1";';' '(., j; 
objectlve yal141t7 of the cauaal concu~P. and the universa11tr 
,'-; , 
and neoo •• l" of the eaual p:rlnolple •. 
Awoen... of a manifold In t11l10 18 bnt I a pr1ma17 dat_ 
'J .' , 
ltant reallz •• emat no one ean .81"101311 doubt whether sOIIleth1:as 
exlsts. the very doubt 1s something. Por .lant. too. there is 
undoubtedl,.' sucoe.sion in our cognitive exper1enoe.42 But aU .•• ea-
, , , 
, ' , 
42, Iaplled here 18 the lfumean atomio tneol7 of p.~.p­
tion aa oppo •• 4 to Gestalt pa7cholog or the soholastic tbeoJ'7 
ot forma. 
r 
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slon impl!es plurality, a manifold intlme.43 Consciousness ot 
succession, then, means cansciouanesa of a manlfold in tlme. 
)low we cannot be consclous ot a manifold 1n time a. 
such unless we combine and unlty in thought the .uccessl ve con-
tents ot conscious .. a •• 44 por this a thPe.told. synthesis 1. 
neceasa17.4S Pirst, trun~. is the syntheSis ot apPl"ehenaion In 
intuit1on. It deals With the pure or~ 2rlor1 manifold round 1n 
individual apace. andt 1me., 1.e., given.!!!!, weaN conscloua 
ot abe together. !hen there is tn. 8Tf11;heala ot l"8prQduetlon 1n 
- . 
imagination. It erteeta the pure synthesi. of the slv.n mal¢told 
'or we oould not be conaclous ot abo together ltb1 the time we 
-
reached b, we tor got a. lIaoh peroceptlon _U8t ... eoall the pl"eced111 t 
- - '" 
ones. Bence the need for thi. second .7Jlthe.la. the thlJ'd a1D-
theai8 i. the ..,ntheaia ot recognition in a oancept. In It, t~ 
under8tandingbJ.1lings the synthesized manifold undeJ.1l a conoept1on, 
43 !he p •• ol.e meaning ot -manifold in time" 18 a d1t-
fioult question. Doe. 1t involve consoiousness only of physioal 
objeots or alao the eoncoaitant oone.louane •• ot a eltt 01" 1. it. 
1n keeping with IAntt. peppesentationalist (medium ~aod)POsltion 
inherited trom Deeean.e, conaoiouaa ••• at a ii@I:to of per •• p-
tions aUGe.e41ns each ether 1n t1me' This l .... ':yte. 1. suppor-
'.d bl Ewing .. the view upheld -b7 general conalderation both .f 
the text ot the tJllanseerulental d.duc tl on 'And ot the main prin- , 
<sipl •• of the oritioal phil.oaoplq." .. antta Treatment or Cauaal1tl 45., · . _., - -
44 Oriti9,\\f, A 97 (llO). , ' 
4$ 499-10) (lll-3). fillsa.ction oonstituteathe 
chlet part ot the "aubjective deduction" Which waa emitted .a non~ 
.a.ential in the a.cond edition. The subJeotive deduction seek.t~ 
detel'lUlne the subjective oonditions lIh10h are neo.asarJ to make 
knowledge po.sible. It i8 to 'be aoted 'that there are not three 
Ivntheses here taklng nlace at difterent times, but one quthesi. ~~\: ." ..... '1 A... .~. 
r 
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by means or Its pure or !. prior1 conceptions, the oategorie •• 
It would be usele.s to r.member,!, #Of we were not oonSOiOU8 ~t 
1 t belonged to the SaJ'fte process a. B..~o go on oountinlh we Jl'U.$t 
be aware that the various un1ts belong to a 11~sl8 proo.s., abo4. 
etc _ 'Ibis is ettectedb,.tha,third synth.a18. wi tb., the oategorle. 
serving aa the principle. ot unity_ ~I \hreetold sJnth~lls 
showa how,all oognition, even it thlll opject ot oognition be a 
plurall.,ll1!o.l ••• con.ciollaneaa of, _related d1vers,ltT(Wli,t7 
Ir1 the next atep, lant sbo"s. how, to .be oonsc10ua or 
artathin, u o on.atltutH. by a relat$.M.of d1vers. el •• enia.,we 
muat be eonlcrlout-, ,ot theaeel_ntl.s~ t.d. i.8.,. thq-..1i 
j , ',' , • 
be i~ a .in~#i .,U-1dentlfled co.olouanes •• 
The tb;ol,lght that th,e representa$i(ma given in, intui. 
tion one and all belong to me" 1s therefore equivalent 
to the.t hougbt that I unite them,.in one .elf-conscioua-
n •••• ~ can at least so unite them, and although this 
thou;ht1~ 110t Itself the con.cioUlln •• a ot the IHthe.lla 
otth. l'epre,8ntatlons, 1t presupposes the po.srItE,. 
ot tbat. .• ptht 81a. In ot.b.er lfo1"4., on17 in 80 far as 
I oan gl'aaJ> ~ man:11'old 01' tb,eiJ.epr8.ent.tIons 1n one 
con.o1.ousne •• , do I call them on. and all mine. Po~ 
othe",1 •• Iahould bav. as many-colored anT"arver.e a 
lelt •• 'Illav. ~".entation. ot which I am conscious 
to.,.elt.~ , 
, ' 
fhi. unitT an4.1alt-14entlty addat, .the .• flua ot repX'esentat1ona 
is call~4 by Kant the t~oend.n'al unitT ot apperception. It 
1, to be noted tha.t th1. 18 not theempiX'leal conaolouan •• s nor-
-
46 Orlt!g.ue, B 114 (lS4). ItalIc. in the original. 
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.' the noumenal ego. It is the purely.! E:rioz:i logical f orm of the 
unity of the ego which 1. required for the unitY' of experlence.41 
Thus tar, lant bas proved his first point, namely, 
that knowledge of succession implies selt-identl:tY'. or the 
transcend,ental upity ot apperception. He has not as yet men-
tioned an object ot knowledge. Th.ts 1sthe ,second maIn point ot 
the "Transcendental De4uctionn and introduces the 80-called 
objedtive deduction.48 
We have •• en how knowledge ot JUGcelsion involves 
knowledge of a related diversity_ Bow this knowledge of a 
related diversity has the note of necessity. For example, the 
dIfferent :representations of the ehanglng posit1ons of a ship 
tloating downstream follow a definite and necessary sequence. 
The representa~lon ot position a lower down the.stream follows 
that of pos1tion A. Bow an object, or the objective, i8 pre-
ci8ely that whioh compel. us to think about it in a certain way. 
The Object 18 viewed as that which prevent. our 
mode. of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary. 
47 B 133 (153), -Pol' the empirical consclouane •• , 
which accompanies difterent representationa, i. in its.lf divep •• 
and without relation to the identity of the subject." By the 
transoendental unity of apperception, agaln, 1s meant, not that I 
merely accamPanJ each representation with consciousne.s. but that 
It I conjOin one repre •• nta1don with another. and am oonscious of 
the 8rnlbes18 ot tbaa." Italios 1n the original. 
"Apper<)eptiontt 18 a term 'borrowed tJtoa Le1bn1z Who used 
it to designate consc1ousnes. ot objeots and oono01ll1tant selt-
consciousness. 
48 unlike the subjective d.du~tlon, the objective . 
deduction deal. with objeotive va11dity, not with psycholosical 
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and which determines them ~ triOri in same definite 
fa.ahion. For in so far as t e'1 are to relate to an 
object, the'1 must nec.a.arily agree with one another, 
that is, must posaesa that unity which constitutes 
the cone.pt ot an object.49 
Kant has thua proved his second point, that knowledge of succes. 
aion implies knowledge allo of objects. 
But if knowledse of objecta carries with it an element 
ot neceaaltJ, then there muat be some tranacendental condition to 
explain it. For "all neoeasity, without exoeption, il grounded 
in a tr .. acendental cond1tion.">O This brings Kant to the proof 
of the firat halt ot the third major point of the "Tranacendental 
Deduction", knowledge of objects implies aelt-identity. For the 
transcendental condition ot knowledge ot objects 1s none other 
than aelt-identitJ 'or transcendental unltJ at apperception.>l 
~owl.dge oonslata in the determinate relation at 
given representations to an object; and an ObJect 
1a that 1n the concept '. of which the manitold o? a 
given intuition ia united. Now all unitication at 
repreaentationa daman!s UnitJ ot conscIousness 1n 
the aJntheais at them. ConsequentlJ it i8 the 
unity at consoloulness that alone conatitutes the 
relation of repre.entationa to an obJeot, and there-
tore their objective validity and the tact that theY' 
49 A 104-105 (134-135). 
>0 A 106 (US). 
51 WhY' not some other transcendental condition? Kant 
would probably replr that, a8 was shown in the first main part 
ot the deduction, aelt-identitY' is the transoendental condition 
whereby the manitold i. not only syntheaized through categories 
but is alao reoognized aa part of one and the same .consciouaness. 
In a fleeting, atomic,conacieu.nesa, th.~e would be no relating 
of the manifold in time--and 80 no knowledge of objects. 
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are modes of knowledge.52 
But just as knowledge of objects implies self-identity, 
so vice versa self-identity implies knowledge of Objects. For 
self-identity i8 possible only because it is conscious of accom-
panying given representations and, more importantly, of synthe-
sizing the manifold through the categories for one and the same 
consciousness. "For this unity of oonsciousness wouldbe impos. 
sible it the mind in knowledge of the manitold oould not become 
conscious ot the identity ot the function Whereby it synthetlcall 
combines it in one knowledge."53 ot itself, selt-identity (like 
the forma and categorles) is an empty and purely formal trans. 
cendental condition.54 When, then, there exlsts selt-identity. 
there must also exist the synthesis ot a manifold through the 
, 
categorie •• But as was. hown in the first and second points of 
the deduction, synthe.is of a manifold through the categories 
involves consciousness of objects. Selt-identity thus im,lies 
knowledge of objects. 
The fourth main point ot the deduction, namely, that th 
52 B 137 (156). Itallcs in the original. Kant.s 
position in the tirst edit10n 1s not as olear. In A 104 (134) he 
se.ms to say that the objective in experience is determined by 
the non-empirical objeot. Then in A 106-7 (135-6) he argues that 
the transoendental unity ot apperoeption acoounts for the neces-
sity involved in objectiv1ty. In A 109 (137) he more or less 
unites the two pos1t1ons. 
53 A 108 (1)6). 
54 Thus 1n a later passage Kant speaks of it as "thing 
that thinks," "a transcendental subjeot-X." A 345-B 40) (331). 
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unity involved in both our knowledge of objects and in self-
identity depends on necesBarr laws of connection, follows f~o.m 
the p~eceding three and directly brings up causality. Por of the 
laws of combination or neoessa~ connection, causality is the 
most imporlant. Of the seve~al lines of approach possible in tht. 
sectionSS we shall conoentrate on the argument which i. intro-
duced in the secondedltion of the "Transcendental Deductlon"S6 
and developed in the "Seoond Analogy." 
The point of the argument Is that all jUdgment57 and 
cognition imply a distinotion between the objective and t he sub-
jective. Kant suggests that this objeotivity implied in judsaent 
would be impossible without principles of neoes.a~ connection. 
Thhs in the judgment "bodles are heaVT," we do not assert, says 
Kant, that t hat the representations of "body" and "heavt" neces-
aarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition. We 
55 Ew1ng, Kant's Treatment ~ Causality, 53, gives thre~. 
56 B 141-2 (158-9). 
57 In this passage Kant defines judgment aa "the 
manner in which given modes of knowledge are brougnt to the 
objective unity of apperoeption." The copula .erves the purpose 
of distinguishing between objective and subjeotive unity. Be 
defines objective unity aa "the unity througn which all the 
manifold given in an intuit10n 1s united 1n a concept of the 
object." It must be distinguished from the subjective unity 
"through which the manifold of intuition for such (objectivel 
Oombination 1s empirically given." B 139 (157). 
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assert that they belong to one another tt..!!! virtue !:.!. ~ neces-
!!£l unltl of apperception In the synthesis of intuitions, that 
is, aooording to principles of the objeotive determination of 
all representationa."58 
Thus to 8a1 "The body ia heavy" is not merely to 
state that the two representations have always been 
conjoined in mJ perception, however often that per-
ception i8 repeated, what we are asserting is that 
they are combined in the ObJ~ot, no mateer what the 
state of the subject mar Se. 9 
This remark indicates that objectlvity implies necessary deter-
mination in the knower's experience Independentl,. of t he rep •• -
sentationa of the manifold, which are merel,. the knower's aubjec-
tive states. Since It foreshadows the "Second An'logJ" the tinal. 
proof of the fourth maln point of the deduction must walt W'ltll 
the treatment ot the "Seoond Analogy." 
The same is true of the flfth main point: the neces-
sary laws ot connection are the indispensable conditions to which 
all objects of experlence must conform. But the direction that 
Kant's proof will take in the "Second Analogy" can now b. pointed 
out fram the following passage in the "Transcendental Deduction 
of the Categories." 
The order and regularity in the appearanoes which 
we entitle nature we ouraelve. introduce. W. could 
never find the. in appearances, had not we ourselve., 
or the nature of our mind, originally set .them there. 
S8 B 142 (1$9). ItaliCS in the original. 
Treatment !! Causalitl, 54, sa1S this refers to the s. 
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. 
For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, 
that Is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the 
connection of appearanoes; ana such synthetic unity 
could not be established a priori if there were not 
subjeotive grounds of sucn unIty contained a priori 
in the original cognitive powers of our mina, and It 
these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are 
the grounds ot the possibility of knowing any object 
Whatsoever in expe60enoe, were not at the same time objectively valid. 
Kant's an8wer in the ·Second Analog" to Hume's challenge ot 
causalIty will be tounded precisely on this indispensable 
objectlvating role of the mind in its consciousness of objects. 
The vindication ot the categories in the "Transcenden-
tal Deduction ot the Categori.s" can now be summarized. Starting 
from the fact that we perceive a succeeding sensible manifold, 
we find that the thought of objects involves a synthesis ot the 
mAnitold according to neces8arr prinCiples, t he categories. To 
deny, theretore, that the manifol. i8 so connected b.1 the cate-
gori.s is implicitly to deny the tact that we apprehend objects. 
Either accept the onlJ POIslble6l explanatIon ot the taot or 
deny the tact. Aut 4.e&ar aut nullul. We oan also start from the 
- - ...... ;;.;;;;.,;;;.;;,;;. 
equally obvioua tact that we must be aware ot our own identity 
throughout our apprehension ot the sensible manifold. Here again 
is involved a combination ot: the manitold according to the 
categories. Kant b.1Ie~.s that he h~s now established the exil. 
60 A 125 (147). Italics in the original. See also 
B 166-1 (173-4). 
61 That Kant's 1s the on17 poscib1e solution is ot 
Course dIsputable. 
r 
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tenoe and ~bjeotive validity of the categories.62 
C. THE SECOND ANALOGY 
We have dealt with the "Transcendental Deduct10n ot the 
Categories" at length because it is the basis ot the "Second 
Anal~gr."63 This latter section tram the viewpoint of logic i. 
as interesting and important as the seotion just discussed. 
Historically. it ia even more ao. For it i. Kant's answer to 
Hume's denial ot the objective validity ot the causal principle. 
Hume had maintained that we can never be conscious of anything 
but mere succesaion; Kant hopes to prove in the "Second Analogr" 
that consciouanesa ot auccession is only possible through con-
sciouanesl ot a nece.aity that determines the order ot the 
62 Se. A 128 (149). 
63 In it. clear.at meaning the term "ana18SJ" •• ems to 
mean the tollowing tor Kant. We have in the law ot cauaality 
something in experience which, though not identioal, i8 parallel 
with the logical relation of ground-consequent in the hTpothetlca judgment of tormal logic. Thus the connectlon ot reason and 
conaequent in the pure h7pothe~lcal judgment, when applied to 
auc~eaaive events or change., appeara a8 their nece.sary •• quence. 
See A 181-B 224 (212). ' Paton note.: "Kant is not arguing tbat 
because we must be able to judge any object under the torm tit A, 
then B,- there tore every object must be goveraad by the law ot 
cau.e and ettect. (Such an argument would be manitestly invalid 
8ince the hypothetidal form of judgment involves no reference 
to time.) on the contra17, the hypothetlcs.l t orm or judgment 1. 
for him an empty rorm awaiting an object; and what we now have to 
prove 18 that all objects given to us under the forms or space 
and t1me must have a charaote~i8tic whioh enables them to be judged by the hypothetIcal form of judgment. That cha~acterlatic 
1s necessary successIon, and the proof of necessary succession 
must be a proof independent of the form of judgment." Kant'. Meta 
8ic of E erienoe II 223.·· -
r 
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succesaive events. 
The importance of the "Second Analog" may be the reaso 
whr Kant has so multiplled the prool's. He glves no less than 
slx separate arguments.64 It seems best, given the limits of 
the present studT, to take up the central argument which Kant 
gives In the proofs. In the spirit of Paton, an attempt wl11 be 
here made to present the Kantian argument in as favorable and 
consistent a llght as posslble. Inesoapable proble.s, 800ted 
interpretationa, presuppositions, alleged een:ttradiotions, it 
mentioned at all, will tor the most -part be relegated to tne 
tootnotes. From these the more important objections wll1 later 
be resU1?rected and added to other diffioulties in Chapter III. 
patonts comment should be kept in mind throughout the followlng 
pages, 
Untortunately there is a real diffioultr In under-
standing some of Kant's statements and a stlll 
greater d1ttloult7 in understanding the relatlon ot 
bis statements to one another. To un87l1'1pathetI0 
oritl0. It mar easily .e .. that he 18 one ot those 
ph110sopher. who conceal the weaknes8 ot their argu-
ment under a alOUd of word.. I be11eve, on the con-
trar,r. that hi. obscUDity i8 due to the tact that he 
1s 8truggling with new and difficult thought.. I 
believe also that, even it he is in error, there ls 
.mueh in his view that 1s worthy ot se.ious consideration.65 
64 The arguments are, 1) B 232-4 (217-19); 2) A 189-19 , 
B 234-239 (219-222), 3) A 194-5, B 239-240 (222-), 4) A 196-9, 
B 241-4 (22)-$), $) A 199-281, B 244-46 (225-6), and 6) A 201-21 B 246-7 (226-7). Paton, Kant's Metap~.io ot ~erienoe, II, 224 
believes that the arguments Involve a evelo-pm.n: of Iaeas, what-
ever m&1 be thelr dates ot composition. 
65 laton, ibid •• II. 222. 
r 
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The starting point of Kant 'a analysis is our conscious-
ness of an objective order in time.66 When we apprehend any ver.y 
large object, such as a house, though we do so by successively 
perceiving the difterent parts of it, we never think of regarding 
theae successive perceptIons as representing anything successive 
in the houae. On the other h@nd, when we apprehend successive 
events in time, such as the successive positions of a ship 
sailing downatream, we do regard the succession of our perception 
as repreeenting objective auceession in what is apprehended.61 
Kant use. these illustrations to make olear the fairly obvious 
tact that while in oertain easea the order of our perceptions i. 
aubjectively initiated, in other cases we apprehend the subjectiv 
66 A 189-194, B 234-239 (219-222). 
61 Paton, Kant·s Metap~sic of Experience, II, 239, 
regards this as a crucIal statemin: on tne part of Kant, one 
which it is "absolutely vItal not to miaunderstand • • • Kant is 
not arguing from the observed irreversibility of M7 sense-
perceptions to an objective succession. He is on the oontrary 
arguing trom an a •• wned objective succession to t he irreversibi-
lit7 of M7 sense perceptions. Be is not aaling that I find I 
cannot reverse the order of my sense-perceptiona, and then conclu 
that I must be dealing wIth an objective auceeslion ••• Kant 
starts with the assumptIon that we are aware of an objective 
auccession and asserts that, if so, our aense-perceptlons must 
occur in a partloular order." See alao ibid. 239, note 3:-wr-am 
not denying that on Kant's vIew the irreViriibility of our .enae-
peroeptions may entitle U8 to aasert objt ctive succession, if we 
already aSlume that we are percei.ing objects whose atates must 
be either successive or coexistent. I de!l'1 o!:lly that such an 
observed irreversibilit7 can by itself give us necessity." Italic 
In the original. Prichard, however, disagree. and argues that 
Kant is prooe.dinf trom awareness of the subjective to knowledge 
of the objective. This 1s the central matter on which my inter-
pretation d1ffers conSistently trom Prof's.or Prichard's penetra-
It 
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order of oUr perceptions as corresponding to, and explioable 
only through, the objective sequence of events. Consequently, 
Kant feels justified in taking as fact that we can distinguish 
between subjeotive and objective succession, i.e., between 
sequences which imagination can contro168 and sequences which 
are given independently of us. This fact affords a precise 
manner of formulating the problem of the "Second Analogy": how 
is consciousness of objective change, as distinguished from 
subjective succession, possible' 
Formuaated thus, the problem demands careful definition 
of the ter.. "objective." 
[~ is a question for deeper inquiry what the word 
"object" ought to signlfJ in respect of appearances 
when these are viewed not in so far as they are 
(as representations) objects, but only in so far as 
they stand for an object.69 
To apply the illustration mentioned on the preceding page, the 
house as apprehended i. not a thing In itself but only an appaar-
ance for the mlnd. What, then, do we mean by the house, as dis-
tinguished traM our subjective representations of it, when that 
house ia nothing but a complex of representationsf70 The questi 
68 See. 201 (226). 
69 A 190-5 235 (219). 
70 A 191-B 236 (220). In a ve~ subjectivist line, 
8eems to equate that whioh appears in consciousness with the act 
being oonacious of it, "The appearances, IDso far as they are 
objects of consciouanesa simply in virtue of being representation , 
are not in &n1 way distinct fromtheir apprehen.ion." A 190-B 235 
(219). Prichard, of course, inolude. the passage in his attaok 0 
r 
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.. 
and Kant's answer to it are stated in the subjeotivist fashion. 
To eontraat an objeot with the representations through which we 
apprehend it is posaible only if thes. representations stand unciel 
a rule whioh neoessitates their oombination in some one partiou-
lar way and 80 distinguishes this particular mode of representa-
tions from all others as the only true mode.71 
Kant means that objects and objeotive succession, being 
in space and time, are as much in oonsoiousness as are subjective 
states like feellngs and representations.72 Both are alike 
objeots of consoiousness, using the term "objects" in the moat 
general sense as anything present to our oonsoiouaness.73 The 
diffioulty i4 that if all objeots alike are in consciousness, how 
do we distinguish--that we do distinguish is a fact--the a equence 
of our subjeotive feelings from the sequence of real events, The 
old distinction, that subjective sequenoes are in the mind, and 
objeotive sequences are outside the mind, does not hold. The 
origin, therefore, of our distinotion between the subjectively 
and the objectively successive must be due in the one case to the 
Kant's subjectivism. Se. Chapter III of this thesis. But may 
there be a groping for a representationalist version of the verbum 
here, Or is Kant trping to say what scholastic philosophers mean 
when they say: senaibile In actu est sensus in aotuJ 1ntelligibll. 
in actu est intellectus in aotu1 
71 A 191-B 236 (220). 
72 See A 197-B 242 (224). 
73 See page B7 of this thesis. 
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presence ot a :rule compelling us to combine the events in some 
particular order, and in the other to the absence ot such a rule. 
The mind, far from s imply analy~ng what 1s already given in our 
knowledge of objects, as rationalists claimed, must make that 
knowledge ofobjedts possible. Application of a rule is the 
method. Apart from such a rule we would never distinguish 
objective trom subjective sequences at all. At most, we would 
hav. a play of representations which came and go.74 We would 
have no knowledge of objects as connected in ttme. 
Our apprehension of the house, for example, may proceed 
in any order, from the roof downward or vice versa. Since the 
order may always be reversed, the mind is not compelled to regard 
the order ot its apprehension as representing objeotive sequence. 
In our apprehension ot an event B in time, however, the represen-
tation of B tollows upon the representation ot a previous event, 
A. We oannot reverse the order. The mind is compelled to view 
the order of Bucce •• ion as necessitates, and therefore as objec-
tive.75 
But is there not here merely a necessary order of 
representations? No, for not only would that be a contradiction 
74 A 26a -a 247 (227). 
75 Paton considers the proposition that objective 
suocession must be n~cess,ry succession as "the inner core of 
Kant's argument." Kant's Metalhzsie ~ Experience, II, 273. 
See also ibid., 292. 
-
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for Kant (the purely subjective would be obJective because 
objectivity, Kant has just shown, implies necessity), but also 
it was shown above that representations following a definite 
order stand under a rule which distInguishes this particular 
mode of representations from all others as the only true mode. 
In other words, Since events A and B are only appearances to USI, 
the, are in this case identical wi th the representations of A and 
B.76 Such an identification would, of coul'se, be impossible if 
A and B we~e considered things in themselves. Kant readil, 
admits thia.77 
Kant' s a.rgurilent hfire, it should be noted, bears a 
resemblancf:"l to an argument alrea.dy seen in the discullsion of the 
"Transcendental Deduction. tt78 There he asserted that when we 
have knowledge ot an object, r.ece88ity i8 always impli.d. The 
object is r.ga~ded as that which prevents our cognitions from 
being arbitrary or which imposes upon our cognitions a necessary 
synthetio unity. He then argued that we are concerned only with 
our own representations and that the concept of the object is 
simpl, the concept of the necessary synthetic unity of represen-
tations, a unity which has for its necessary transcendental 
condition the transcendental unity of apperception acting througb 
76 "The succession or perceptiona and the succession or 
events are in this case not two successiona, but only one. I can 
se. no other way or interpreting the argument." Paton, Kant's 
MetaeAT-ie £f Experience. II, 264. Priohard disagrees. See db. II • 
17 A 190-B 235 (220) • 
.,A lit , I\. 
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the catego;les.79 
Kant would have us believe,then, that the order of A an 
B is a necessary o~der not in the sense that A must always pre-
cede B, or that A 1. the cause ot B, but that the order,it we are 
to apprehend It correctly, must in this particular case be con-
oeived as necessary.SO In other words, the sucoession need not 
be conceived as a causal one, out in order to be conceived as 
objective succession it must be conceived as rAndered necessary 
by connections that are causal.8l 
79 "In so tar as they [our representatlona] are to 
relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another 
that is, must posse •• that unity which con.titute. the concept of 
an object." A 105 (134). See Paton, Kant's Netaphysic .2!.Experi-
~, II, 265. 
80 WhJ necessarf' "Such thinking may at course be 
tob.cure'; perhaps we snou d say that we ~consciously or uncon-
sciously) 'assume' or 'presuppose' B nece~sarily tollows A." 
Paton, ibid., 228, note 5. Paton obviously is proposing a solu-
tion he-nImSelt does not accept. For him, no doubt, B nece.aaril 
follows A because apart from our consciousness of it, it simply 
does not exist (for ua). In other words, Kant is conceraed with 
th$ conditions of experiencing events. This, as will be brougnt 
out in the text, involve. one common homogeneous time. This ttme 
ia continuous and irreversible. Now we could not, says L\&nt, 
experience events in such a tIme unless appearancos conformed to 
necessary succession. See A 199-200, B 244-245. 
81 Though the example presents a difficulty for the 
Kantian categor,r ot causality. we can illustrate the above state-
ment as follows. One event, the lighting of a Cigarette, 1s fol-
lowed b7 c other, a peal ot t nunder. Now through exp eri.nce we 
learn that the first event is not the CQuse of the .econd. Yet 
we know that the sequence is objective. That can be the only 
reason for its irreversi.I11ty (this 1s Patonts view, i.e., 
irreversibility ~r~sume8 objectivity; Priohard's is: irreversI-
bility eroves ob actIvity. Depending on which view is taken, Kant 
beoomes a pHenomenalist or a subjectivist). Being objective, it 
r 
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Having in this general fashion shown the bearing of 
Kantfs analysis of objective experience upon the problem in hand, 
we can proceed to deyelop from it his proof of the principle of 
causality: all alterations take place in conformity with the law 
of the connection of cauae and effect. The schema of causality 
is necessary succession in 'time, and it is through thiS, its time 
aspect, that Kant approaches the princiPle.82 ae Will show that 
is, on Kant's principles, necessary. As such, its necessity must 
be due to the schematized category which deals with objeotive and 
necessary sucoesslon, aamelY,oausality. More will be said about 
the peculiar nature of Kantian oausality in Chapter III. 
82 Se. A 199-201, B 244-246 (225-226). ~Kant'. doc-
trine of time forma a strand Which runa througn his whole dis-
cussion ••• but it finds its clearest ••• and its most dif-
ficult,expression in the special argument which deals with the 
oontinuity and irreyersibility of time." Paton, Kant's Metaill'g-
sic of !!perienoe, II, 273. 
--- -- The roIe of time in Kantts dootrine of oausality is 
briefly as tollows. Our perception of suooession must become a 
conception of sucoession beoause one without the other is no 
knowledge at all. Row the pure conceptions or oategories ot the 
understanding are entirely heterogeneous to empirical intuitions. 
But in all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the per-
oeption ot the object must be homogeneous with the conception, 
In order, then, that the oategories can be applied to perceptions 
there must exist a third and mediating factor, homogeneous with 
both. (The phantasm presents a not altogether dissimilar 
problem for the Thomistic theor1 of ideation. Ita clasalc solu-
tion is the agent intellect). This homogeneous factor i8 the 
aohema, a generalized form of temporal existence. Time, aa a 
torm a Erlor!, is homogeneous with the a Erlorl categories of tn. 
understanarng. As a form ~ senSibility, Ii Is homogeneous with 
the appearance. in sense lnasmuch as every empirical intuition 
occurs in time and lasts throughout time. Consequently, a 
category of the understanding 11ke cause can be applied to appear 
ance. through one of the.e transcendental functions or qualifi-
cations of time called sohemata. The particular schema involved 
in oausality is that of necessary succession. 
r 
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a necessart ti.e-order in the appearances Is the condition ot 
a necessary rule ot apprehension.83 
To be conscious or change, says Kant, we must be 
conscious or an event, that 18, or something as happening at a 
partIcular point In tIme.84 The change, in other words, must be 
dated. It cannot be dated by rererence to time In general (time 
Eer !!) sInce we are not conscIous or time in general.85 Time 1. 
not sa.ething that can be observed but a torm that comes into 
knowledge only In relation to known objects. The change, then, 
83 Paton, Kant's MetaFbl.ic or ~erience, II, 238, 
admits the ambiguity 01 ihi pErase ficonO[t~ of a rule." Be 
thInks it means the transcendental schema. "It Is ••• the 
transcendental -Oke .. ot relatIon [necessary successIon Is the 
schema ot relatIon tor causality] which Kant must show to be 
present in o~ect., it he is to prove the truth ot the AnalogIes. 
Indeed, he haa to show that an object exists as an object only 
so tar a8 there are present in it the transcendental schemata." 
It is per.naps tor this realon that EwIng, Kant's Treatment ot 
causalitS' 61, belIeve. Kant proved unlversall£y and necesslTy, 
not or t e category, but or the transcendental schema or nec.s-
sarr succesalon. 
84 For Kant an object may be laId to exIst and so to 
be a real or actual object only It it has a determinate position 
In one common .aBogeneous time (and space). The same doctrIne 
applies to the case ot change, or successIon, in the object. It 
a succession is Objecti __ , tn.n tn. changes must have a deter-
minate position in one common homogeneous time (and space). See 
Paton, ibid., II, 273 • 
........... 
85 B 234 (219). 
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must be dated by rererence to other events. In this case the 
events are preceding ones,86 in contrast to which the event in 
question is apprehended as change. But according to the resulta 
of our analysis of what constltutes objective experience, the 
event can be rlxed in its position in objectlve time only if it 
be conceived as related to the preceding e vents according to a 
necessary law.87 And the law of necessary oonnection in time i. 
the law of causality. In order, then, that something which haa 
ta.ken place may be apprehended as having occurred, that is, as 
being an objective chan .. , it must be apprehended aa necea.arilT 
follOWing upon that which precedes it in time. And since neces-
sary sucoession in time is the schema of causality, the objeotive 
change--any objective ohange88 •• involves causality. All altera-
tiona, then, take place in confor.mity with the law or the connec-
86 That there must be precedlng events Is insisted 
upon by lant. For othe.rwise there would be an empty time. But 
"an event which should follow upon an empty time, that is, a 
coming to be preceded by no atate of things, Is as little capable 
of being apprehended as empty time itself. Every apprehension 
of an event Is therefore a perception that follows upon another 
perception. n A 192-13 237 (221). 
87 A 193-B 238 (222). 
88 Kant proves the universality and necessity of the 
causal principle in his system precisely because he limits him-
self to appearances, 1 ••• , objects which can exist for us in 
consciousnesa only it our mental forms have been applied to them. 
All objective sequences, then, must be causally connected because 
WIthout the causal category they-srmply would not be objective 
aequeneea. 
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tion of cause and effect. 
Experience itself--in other words, empirical knowledge 
of appearances--is thus possible only in so far as we 
subject the succession of appee.rances, and therefore 
all alteration, to the law of causality, and, as like-
wise follows, the appearances, as objects of experience'8 
are themselves possible only in confommity with the law. 9 
The prinoiple of oausality thus oonditions consciousne. 
90 
of Objective succession. No~an Kemp Smith points out that 
Hume, in asserting that we are conscious of the succession of 
events, had admitted all that Kant needed to prove the principle 
of causality a8 he interpreted it. Kant's contention is that the 
apprehension at change as change, i.e., a succession of eventl, 
presupposes, and is possible only through, an application of the 
category ot causality. The principle of causality is thus appll 
cable to everything experienced, for the sufficient reason that 
experience is itself possible only in terms of it.9l This con-
clusion finds ita most emphatic and adequate statement in the 
passage of the Critique entitled "Methodology", 
Through concepts of understanding, pure reason does, 
indeed, establish secure principles, not however 
directly from concepts alone, but alwa~s only indirect-
ly through relation of these conoepts to something 
altogether contingent, namely, possible expertence. 
When such experience ,that 1s, sometHIng as oBject 
89 B 234 (2+9). 
90 CommentaEl, )69-371. 
91 Kant's proof of the principle of causality is thus 
a particular proof for the fourth and f1tth main points of the 
"Transcendental Deduction." See pages'I-,f. 
o~ possible experienoes) is presupposed, these 
principles are apodeictieally certain; but in 
themselveB, direotly, they can never be known a 
friori. Thus no one can acquire insight into -
he proposition that everything which happens 
has a cause, merely trom the concepts involved. 
It is not, theretore, a dogma. although trom 
another pOint ot view, namely, trom that of the 
Bole field of its possible employment, that is, 
experience, it can be proved with complete apo-
deictic certainty. But though it needs proof, it 
should be entitled a principle, not a theorem, 
because it has the peouliar oharacter that It 
makes pos.ible the very experienee which is its 
own ground o~ proot, and that in th1S9~xperienee 
it must always itselt be presupposed. 
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Summarizing Kant's central argument for the objective 
validity, and hence the universality and necessity, ot the prin-
Ciple of causality, we see that it deals with the connection 
between objectivity and necessity. Kant starts with consciousnes 
of objective sequence in time, a point which he l~d already 
established in the "Transcendental Deduction" and which he 
proved independently, but with special reference to causality, 
in the "Second Analosr." He then asks how can we be oonscious 
of suoh sequenoe and distinguish it from the merely subjective 
sequence of our perceptions. The distinction cannot lie in the 
actual order of our representations. For these are always 
successive, whether they deal with objective or subjective 
sequenoes. yet there must be some distinctlon_ tor conscious-
ness of objective sequence as distinguished fram purely subjectiv 
92 B 76$ (592). Italics in the original. 
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sequenoe is a faot. On further study we find that whenever we 
regard two events, A and B, as o'bjectively successive, the order 
in which we perceive A and B is irreversible. Whatever the sub-
Jective factors involved, our experience of A and B must have 
this order. Sinoe A and B are nothIng for us apart from our 
experience of them, thia is the same as saying that A and B are 
connecte4 b7 a necessary law of the mind such that under given 
conditions B can only succeed N'and not vice versa.93 
In what sena. has Kant suooeeded in proving causality? 
In answering this question, we must remember that Aant accepts 
much ot Hume'8 oriticism. The principle that evel'1 event must 
have an antecedent cause i8, Kant concedes to Hum., neither 
intuitively oertain nor demonstrable by reasoning trom more ulti-
mate truths. It cannot be accounted for by analytiC thought. 
Like all synthetiC judgments, it oan only be proved b7 reterence 
to the contingent faot ot actual experience. Kant thU8 admitted 
that, sinoe the oauaal connection 1s synthetic, we can have no 
! priori inslgnt into the connection between particular causes 
and eftects. But he dittered vitally fram Hume in that he claime 
to prove the general prinoiple of oausality whereas Hume held 
such a proof to be impossible. Universality and necessity simp17 
93 A and B have a noumenal eXistence, Kant would say, 
but the nature of that existence Is for us unknown and unknowable 
For all practical purposes, then. A and B can be treated wholly 
trom our knowledge ot them as appearano •• , presclnding tram theIr 
unknown na. ture as noumena.. 
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could not be explained by experience, .dume had maintained. Kant 
tried to meet this criticism by showing tha.t while particular 
experienoe c:mld not fOI'm the basis of the proof of anf strictly 
necessaryprlnciple, yet experience in general, 1.e., experience 
considered under the important aspect of experienoe of IUl o'bjec-
tive order in time, could do 80. For what is implied in all our 
experience must be admitted to be necessary. Without it there 
could be no experience of the ~nd we know. 
It can no longer be said, as the empiricist doe. 
8ay, that we cannot go beyond the general proposition, 
that all the events we have known were uniformly 
sequent; for a8 no sequinOi could have been known 
as uniform apart frum the ac£!vlty-or-lntiIligence, 
SOrDne ~ ~ known a~4uniform except in relation 
to the aame activitf. 
Secondly, Kant never attempts to explain the nature 
and possibIlity of cauaal connection from the natuz-e of the event 
themselves. For him no analrsis of effects will show whf the. 
muat be preceded bf cauaes.9S 
Thirdly, the principle of causality, as deduced by Kant 
and shown to be necessarily involved in all consciousness of 
necessary sequences, ia the quite general principle that every 
event must have aome cause in what precedes it. What the cauae 
may be in each special ca.e oan only be discovered through 
94 John Watson. Kant and His English CritiCS, Glasgow, 
1881, 225. Italics in the orlginal.---
95 See Critique, A 207-B 2$2 (230). See alao Chapter 
III tor the role neoessary oonneotion playa 1n Kantt. analysis 
of causali t • 
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experience or study. These particular causal lawa are discovere 
from exper1ence not by means of the general prinoiple but only 
1n acoordanoe with it.96 
Causality, as proved by Kant, has lost a good deal of 
the content which it has in ordinarr usage. What Kant 
proves is Simply that all succession is necessary--the 
cause of an event 1s that event or events on which 1t 
succeeds necessarily. Se makes no attempt tp prove 
causallty in the sense ot dJnamic activlty on the part 
ot the cause or ot intrinsic logIcal cormection, but 
tends to relegate the intrInsIc connectIon or dynamio 
activIty to the noumenal sphere. Cause and ground are 
very sharply distingb1shed, the ultimate logIcal ground 
ot a cauaal connectIon is for Kant to be found in the 
non-temporal.97 
Consideration ot these and. other poInts will take up 
our attention in the following ohapter. 
96 For diffioultles regarding knowledge of particular 
cauaal laws In Kant's system, see Chapter III. 
97 Ewlng, Kant's Treatment of Causalit! 102. Smith, 
Commentary, 374, auggesta the so-caIlea-phenomena fat view ot 
lantIan cauaality. According to thia view, causality is not a 
mere analogy of logical relation of ground and oon.equent. It 
ia the representation ot genuinely dynamical activities in the 
object. apprehended. These objects are part of an independent 
order wh1ch~in the form known to us ia a phenomenalist transcript 
ot the deeper real1ty ot the ~own and unknowable thing In 
itself. But Just what it means to have a world which is made 
up on17 of appearancea that somehow dis,lq real efflcac7 or 
dynamica15uaality ia hard to aee. SmIth himself aa.lta--and 
the ooncesslon is generally interpreted as weakening his theor,r 
(see EwIng, ibId., 173; Paton, Kant's Metaphlsic ot Experienoe, 
II, 282)--th~he vIew of cauaalIty outlIne above Is on17 a 
poaslble development of ~nt'8 philosoph1 whloh receives no 
quite definite ~o~ulation In the Crltlgue. 
CHAPTER III 
CRITIQUE OF THE KANT IAN DOCTRINE 
OF PHYSICAL CAUSAL~TY 
"Cont~a~iwi.e," continued 1'weedledee, 
"it it wa. so, it might be; and if it were 
so, It would be; but as it isn't, it alntt. 
That's 10glc." 
Lewi. C~roll, ThroUSh ~ Looklns Glass 
Tweedled.e'. attltude t owa~d logic may quite reasonably 
be one's flrst reaction to the preceding pages. Lumberlng under 
the weight of its architectonic and the difficult problem with 
which it is struggllng, the Kantian juggernaut presents an over-
whelmlng spectacle. But the following pages will show that the 
Kantian argument for causality ral.es theoretical difficulties 
no less stubborn than those whioh it attempts to resolve. Perhap 
not all involve contradiotions. But the,. do point up inoonsls-
tenoies or ambiguities whioh it is the duty ot those who support 
Kant to resolve or to explain. These diffioulti.s will be treat. 
under two beadings, Kant's subjectivism and Kant's phenomenalism. 
A. KANT' S SUBJECTIVISM 
Among the diffioulties under whioh Kant's doctrine of 
81 
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. 
the causal ooncept and principle labors, ane ot the oh1er ls Ita 
more than ocoa.lonal subjectiviSM. Thl. subjeotivis. plague. 
lant even in the aecond edit10n of the Crltique, written preo1sel,. 
to counter-attaok the charges ot Ide.ll.. hurled against the 
flrst editlon. Thi. subjeotlvl •• caused Kant to develop a twotol~ 
vlew ot that most paradox1cal element 1n the Kantlan system. the 
objeot of knowledge, 1.e., the phenomenal object (appearanc.a) 
present In oonaclo'usne... When the sub.1ectl viet tendeno,- 1. 1n 
the ascendant, he resaNs all appearanoe., all emplr10al objeot8, 
as repre.entatlons or modlfications of the 8 enalhI11t,-. The.e 
modification. a~ •• rely aubjeotlve. When, an the other hand, 
hls thtnklng Is dominated b7 the phenomenalist tendeno,-, appear-
anoe. aee. to sain anextstenoe independent of tne individual 
mind. l 
The roota ot Kant'. subjeotivism la7 in oertatn un-
warranted pr.suppo.itions whioh ~t borrowed tram the age. Pirai, 
there vas hia representatlonalls., according to which Ideas and 
peroeptiona, not th1ngs, 1f tnte held to be the immediate objeot 
ot knowledge. Knowledge ls vlewed as a process entire17 internal 
to the In<11 vidual Idnd, and as oarrying U8 ,further on17 in vlrtu.e 
ot same additlonal supervenlng pro.es., tnterentlal, conjectural, 
1 See Smlth, Oommenti¥1t 83. Paton, ltant t • MetaFAO 
of Exeerienoe, I, S83, preters ~oall the two tendencles A rans-
Oinaenta! Id.allam" and wemplrlcal reallsm." 
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or instinctive. From the subjectivist, representationalist 
point of view, the various synthetic activities described in 
the preceding pages orten seem to be nothing lea8 than the 
cognitive processe. of the individual mind. The given manifold 
consiats of the aensations aroused by material bodles acting 
upon the special senaes. Part and parcel, ot course, of this 
denial ot the mind's intentionality is the Lockaan pre.uppositLo 
ot the unintelligibility ot real substance. This, again, was 
due to the presupposition of senslsm, namely, that eve~thing 
had to be known torma1ly by the sense8. A tourth presupposition 
was the atomic theory of sensation (in contrast to the Gestalt 
theo~ or the soho1astic theorr ot torms).2 According to thla 
theory, objects .re to be viewed as compounds ot succe.ding 
representationa, each ot which haa its place in a temporal 
sequence. The.,atlal world wblch we come to know consists In 
a multiplicity ot related elements. The isolated data ot sen-
sation oonsequently have to be combined somehow and untfied, 
it we are to know the world. 
Owing to these presuppositions, Kant got on the sub-
jectivist tack that so imperils his causal doctrine. In his 
doctrine of inner senaeitor example, Kant formulates his positl0 
2 See ~enry Baboock Veatah, Intentional Leiie, New 
Haven, 19$2, 81-11$. 
J This dootrine plays an important role in lant's 
causal doctrine sinoe it involves the achema of necessary success onl 
.' from the extreme subjectivist point of view. He does not draw 
any distinction between representation' and its objeot, between 
inner states of tne selt. and appearanoes in space. All repre-
sentations without exoeptiD~, he sa7.,4 are states of the inner 
sense, modifioations of the mind. Some exist on17 in time, 8a.e 
exist both in apace and in time. But all alike are modea of tne 
identioal 8elf, mere represen.ationa (bl08s& Vorstellungen). 
Though appearanoes may exist outside one another in spaoe, spaoe 
itself exists only as representation "in us." But if ,pace is 
in us and if appearanoes are in spaoe, then appe8.Panee. must 
also be in us. Previously, in. treating space, Kant said that 
"what we call outer obJeot. are nothing but mere representationa 
of our sensibility, the form of whioh is apace.nS 
In an interesting and import.nt se(~tion on "APpearanoe 
and IllusIon" (Brach.Inuna and SoheIn)6 difficulties ri.e once 
again from Kant'a subjectivism. "It would be mJ own fault, it 
out of that whioh I ougnt to reckon as appearanoe, I made mere 
illuaion.n7 Well and good. But how distlngulsh the two' What 
we pr6dloate of appearanoes, Kant answers, oan be ascribed to the 
objeot itself. Thus when we say that a rose is red, we ascrlbe 
4 A 128-129 (148-149). 
S A )0 (1.3). 
6 B 69-10(88.89). 
1 B 69 (89). 
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redness to the rose. But 
What is illusory can never be ascribed. as predioate 
to an object tor the sufficient reason that we then 
attribute to the object, taken by itself, what belongs 
to it only in relation to the senses, or in general to 
the subject, for instance th8 two handles whioh were 
tormerly ascribed to Saturn. 
While redness, then, can be ascribed to the rose and is a genuine 
appearance, the two handles which Galileo attributed to Saturn, 
or t.he roundness of a distant tower, the curve on a straight 
stick in water are mere illusiona. Yet is it not t rue that in 
a certain position Saturn necessarily appears as possessing two 
handles' A square tower viewed Jlrom atar must look round. A 
stick in water cannot but appear bent. If Kant still insist. 
that these are not appearances, then his onl1 distinotion between 
appearancea and Illusion seems to be relative to the varying 
nature of the conditions under which observation takes place. 
It the stiok, tor example, is removed from the water, the empiric 1 
objeot will appear more in harmon, with experience.9 It the mode 
of observation Is all that distinguishes illusions and appearance~, 
then Kant hardly answers the oriticisms he here protesses to meet 10 
.. 
8 B 69 (89), note. 
9 But it such i& the case, a science lIke astronomy 
or chemistry deals only with illusions. For the telescope in the 
one and the microscope in the other certainly modity the ordinarr 
perceptions of the senses. 
10 HI. critios objected that it bodies In space are 
representation. existing onl1 wi thin us, as Kant so otten assert.. !' 
their appearing to exist outside u& is a complete illusion. 
r 
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-In the very heart of the Critique, the "Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories," the argument is weakened by subjec-
tivism. There is the passage: 
~en we consider that this nature is not a thing in 
itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, 
ao m~y retresentations of the mind, we shall not be 
surpr sed -&at we can discover rr-only in the radical 
faoulty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcenden-
tal apperception, in that unity on account of whiCh 
alone it can be entitled object of all possible 
experience, that is, nature.ll 
This subjeotivism is not confined to the first editicn 
of the Critique. No lesa a oommentator than SmIth admits this, 
thougn he minimizes its importance by insisting that nan alterna-
tive view more and more comes to the tront in proportion as Kant 
gains masterr over the conflicting tendencies that go to oonsti. 
tute his new Critical teaching.,,12 
And yet, even though the second edition was to have 
been a revision of certain idealistically tinged expressions in 
the first, the subjectivist tendency finds expression in very 
important section.. Thus in Section 16 of the "Transcendental 
Deduction,"13 a seetion which contains perhaps the most essential 
part of the Deduction, the word "representation" (Vorstellungen) 
occurs constantly, "object" (Ob3ect) never, aegenstand only once, 
11 A 114 (140). Italics not in the original. Se. al8 
A 104 (134) and A 109 (131). 
12 qommentarz, 295. 
13 B 132-136 (152-155). 
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and then only In the remark that combination (Verbinduns) cannot 
be given in the objects (liegt nlcht ~ ~ Gegenstanden) but 
must be contributed by the understanding.14 
Smith attempts to minimize even more the subjectivist 
tendency by saying that Kant interpre~ed subjec~ivity in an 
entirel,. new war. Unlike Descartes and his followers, Kant did 
not oppose the subjective to the objective, but made it a sub-
species within the objective. For subjectivity could be an obaee 
of knowledge (the data of inner sense, for example) and in this 
war it was "objective." Whereas Desoartes had a dualism of 
objeotive and subjeotive, Kant has one of appearance (both 
subjective and objective, 1.e., pertaining either to the empirica 
ego or to "nature") and reality. 
All subjectivist modes of statIng the problem of 
knowledge, such as we find in H~e and in Lelbniz 
no I ••• than in Descartes, Looke, and Berkeley, are, 
Kant finally concluded, illegitimate and question-
begging. Our so-called subjective states, whether 
they be sensations, feelings, or desires, are ObJjC-
tive in the lense that they areobjeots tor conso OWl-
iiiii.15 
Smith believes this to be a striking element of Kant'. revolution 
16 in the theor,y of knowledge. 
However, there are Revere objections to the benign 
interpretation of Smith. Prichard mainta1ns17 t~t Kant's 
-
14 B 1.34 (153). 
15 Commentarr, xlvi. Italics in the original • 
. 16 Ibid •• 313 • 
• 
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subjectivism has led him to prove causality, not even or the 
appearmce. (phenomenal objects) of which he wished to prove 
It, but ot repre.entations .olely. The same repre.entations 
are related both a8 physical and as psyohical events, 1.e., 
as our repre.entations or apprehensions and as parts of tne 
objects represented.18 
Yet there mar be a way ot extricating Kant trom this 
difficulty_ If the phenomenal world is only an appearance to 
human minds, why should It be impo8sible that a succes.lon ot 
.tates in a phenomenal object should also be a succession ot 
Ideas in RJ mind' This would obviously be impossible in a 
philosoplli 1h loh olaimed to know things In themael vea. But 
that is preclaely what Kant d18claima. Then, too, a representa-
tion need not be considered as the act ot apprehending. It may 
be that Kant ls ooncerned only with the oontent of the repre.en-
ta tiona. This interpretation;-would seem to tit in with Kant fa 
Inaistence that he is primarl1y interested in the logical element 
neces.ary tor knowledge of objects, not the psychologioal proce •• 
According to this interpretation, a representatlon would be an 
event in the knower'. mental history and an event in the world 
18 "The appearancea, in ao 'ar aa they are objects ot 
consoiousness simply in virtue or being representations, are not 
in any way distinct from their apprehension." A 190-8 235 (219). 
Se. Paton, Kant's Metap~8ic ot Experienoe, II, 266: "To aome 
this may seem suftlclen Bround for rejectIng hia whole theor,r, 
but we must ask ourselves whether suoh a theory is selr-contradic 
tory or impossible." 
III III 
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known to him. Dreams, again, though their content would be 
part of a mental history, would be exoluded from the world ot 
appearances. For they would not fit into the neces8a~ sucoes-
sion ot oontents which tor us oonstitutes the objeotive world. 
But this interpretation is only an attempt to parry what seems 
to be a decisive thrust against Kant, at least against his 
subjectivist tendency. 
Prichard aims another suoh thrust at the main principle 
ot the "Transoendental Deduotion." Hi. oriticisms are 
it limited to partIcular points of Kant's philosopby. But 
Prichard may well be negleoting certain teatures of knowledge 
redisoovered and emphasized by Kant in the uncongenial atmos-
p_ere ot eighteenth oentury rationalism and empirioism. These 
teatures can be ot great importanoe tor modern epistemology. 
Thus in the neat few pages we shall briefly present Prichard's 
views, then weigh the. against those of Kant's profound soholas-
I 
/ tic interpreter, Joseph Marechal. 
Analyzing the main prinoiples of the "Transoendental 
Deduction," Priohard oonclude. that though Kant is attempting 
to formulate the nature ot knowledge, what he desoribes is not 
20 knowledge. Por knowledge, according to Kant, consists in an 
19 See Paton, Kant·s Metaphy8ic ~ Experience, II, 26 • 
20 ~ant's Theorr ~ Xnowledse, 230. 
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activity o~ the mind whereby 1t combines the mani~old of sense 
on oertain pr1nciples and 1s to some extent aware that it doe. 
so. By theae principles, the mind gives the manifold relation 
to an object. The two leading thoughts underlying the view are 
thus. first, knowledge 1s a process WT which representationa 
aoquire relat10n to an object; and secondly, knowledge is a 
proces8 ot synthesis. 
Now, 8ay8 prichard, to speak ot a prooess by which 
representations acquire relation to an objeot has no meaning 
other than this that an apprehension becomes the apprehen.ion 
of an obJect.21 But how can this beT Apprehension i8 essentiall 
relat1ve. Pram the very beginning it involve. something whioh 
1s apprehended. Thus an apprehension which is not an apprehensio 
of something is no apprehension. Therefore, it is meaningl.s8 
to s peak of a process by which an apprehension beoomes the 
apprehen.ion ot an objeot.22 
21 Kant t • Theorz o! Knowledge, 230. 
22 Ibid. Se. also ibid., 231-233, for Prichard's 
criticism ot tno-proposal tha~r Kant a representation i8 the 
representation ot something only from the point of view of the 
thing in itselt. Muoh of the critioi •• i8 baaed on Priohard" 
basic contention that appearances are nothing else than purely 
subjective state. or mental modificationa which Kant tries 
somehow to obJectivate. See Paton, Kant'. HetaP91aic of EXieri- !'II 
ence, II, 272, note 1; "This psychologts. is the central ma Eer I" 
'O'ii""Wh1ch M7 interpretation difters consistently trom Professor Ii 
Priohard's penetrating analysis in Kant'. 'l'heoq of Knowledie. 
He interprets Kant as 41 xplaining how expertenoe ortae oDJec£ive 
comes to be, and I entirely accept hi. criticism ot tba view 
he ascribes to Kant, but I do not believe that what he i. here 
f tt 
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As f'or know164ge.regarded as a prooess of' synthesis, 
Prichard oontinues,23 this only identif'ies knowing with making. 
Knowledge becomes the process of oonstructing the physical world 
out of the elements given in perception. Kant naturally rejoioes 
Priohard adds, 1n the manufacture beoause it is just this which 
makes the categories valid. For if knowing is really making, 
the prinoiples of synthesis must apply to the "reality" known. 
It i8 by these very prinoiples that the reality is made. 
But knowing, argues Prichard, is not to be equated with 
making. The very nature of knowing presupposes that the thing 
known is already made, or-, .to speak more aocurately, already 
exists.24 Even if' the reality known happe~ to be something we 
make, e.g., a house, the knowing of' the house is distinot from 
the making of it. Music and poetry are undoubtedly realitiea 
whioh are in some sense made or composed. But here also the 
apprehension of them is distinct from and presupposes the process 
by which they are oomposed.2S 
23 Kant's Theotl ~ Knowledge, 233. 
24 True, itspby'sical existence is already completed. 
But may there not be the con8t~ction of an intentional counter-
part in cognition? See the following pages for Marechal's views. 
2$ If/knowing is so obviously different from making, 
why did Kant apparently feel no difficulty in reducing knowledge 
to making? Prichard, ibid., 238-242, gives a8 the reasons: 1) his 
belief that we do sometEIng when we think; 2) his position that 
we cannot know reality made him think that we can construct 
appearances of' it; ) Kant
1
fa
1
Iled to hdiishtingutsh kniowin
lm
g t
i
rom I, 
the formation of the menta magery w 0 aocompan es ow ng. II 
I' 
I 
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At this point, Marechal'. int~rpretation at Kant may 
throw some light on the question at issue. Ma~bhal, though 
he admits Kant's subjectivist tendency,26 sees in the Kantian 
theory ot knowledge an attempt to trace the immanent and objec-
tivating actIvity or cognition. True, Kant tluctuated between 
ascribing this activity to sense intuition at the manifold 
(ultimately the thing in itselt, that bate noire tor Beeker, 
Fichte, and others who dared go beyond the master) or to the 
intellectual spontaneity ot the knower.27 still, Mare'chal 
believes, the attempt was there. He even tinda parallels in the 
Thomistic theory ot oognition.28 
/. According to Marechal, the activity involved 1n cog-
nition exercises itselt through or upon the sensible represen-
tation and brings to it aomething not exclusively ot the concrete 
sensible, something which enters into a synthesis with the purel1 
sensible diverlity. The prihduct ot t his cooperation ot • ense 
and intellect il an ~anent construction oonstructed trom the 
sensible data by lame orlginal intellectual principle, call it 
an ~ Erleri to~ or a forma universalis.29Thl. immanent object, 
however, is not to be contused with the object known, or signltie • 
" 26 Point ~Depart, IV, 106. 
27 Ibid., IV, 101-112. 
-as Ibid., V, 386-)87, 479-487. 
-
29 Ibid., V, 480. 
-
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The two a~e related but not oonvertible.30 
/ Marechal' then a!llk. himself the obvious question. In 
this vital communion of subject and object, what is the object 
known, the ~ 3u~~ cOgno8citur? His answer recalls the argument 
he used in a p~eceding chapter.31 Let us .ay that b.1 the object 
known we mean all the ele.ents of objective cognition, impliCit 
and explicit, which the knower can recall by or in the cognitive 
synthesis that takes place within him. In that case, the compre-
hension (!tameleur) of the object known will reach out as far as 
the external singular object which originated the synthetic 
process and which became its first oonscious term. But if we . 
understand by the object known this first term itself (the object 
expliCitly apprehended in the direct act of cognition), it Is 
then neoe.8a17 to say that the object mown, the II suod, Is 
nothing other than the ooncrete object offered by the sense. But 
30 "Dana un. intellIgence iiscursive, l'objet immanent 
(le cognosclbl1e in actu) nt.at formellement connu quIa la 
reflexion: il est la condition prochaine ~d quo), non l'objet 
primitif (ld quod), de 1s connaissance. C'~st l'objet immanent 
(et Eas son id guod) iui est declar~ fir ArI.t;te et Ear S. 
Tnomas non moina i ue 2ie !int, s;:ntlie que, constrUI't. II appartfe~a 18 p11a.e v a';;-preconaclente, sensItIvo-rationel1e 
•• slmilante, de l'intelleotion; et la vie d'une intelligence 
assiml1atrice est neoeaaalrement a7Oth.ae d'elements acquis." 
!oin~ ~ D~part, V, 481, Italics not in the original. 
31 Ibid., V, 439-468. 
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this object has alread7 been operated on by a higher element 
'" (deja salai de plua haut). It has been posited objectivel; 
, 
and aeen In tne light 01' a universal (vu a travers un universel~ 
which cognition does not at tirst distinguish tram the s8nalble 
representation in which the universal is individualized. 
Direct intellection thus turnishes the mind on17 with 
a physical object, corresponding to the material content 01' the 
immanent intelligible objeot. When rerlection has begun, the 
metaphysical object begina to take ahape under the t ranscenden-
tal aspects 01' being, the true, and the good, then tormally as 
a universal 1n re. 
--/ 
POI' Mareohal, then, the 1ntellectual construction of 
the immanent object ia a synthesia" and, b8 it noted, an ! prior1 
aynthesia.32 Mar'chal admit. that h. doe. not relish the term 
"! prio~i .7Dthesia." But he adds that it alone in modern 
terminology connot •• the logioal and psychological process called 
"abstractio totalia" '07 Thomists.33 
In justification of the! Erleri, he argues that it 
the! 2r,ior1 signified an inatinctive .. arbitrary, or subjective 
production 01' idea8, then perhaps the theoretical justification 
of its objective valtilt7 would leave us perplexed. But the a 
-
priori here aignif1es on17 the spontaneity 01' the subject in the 
32 "La construction intellectuell. de l'objet immanent 
synth~se ••• et est une synth6se a priori." Point de 
V, 465. --
11 Tbid 
r 
9$ 
experIence ot an external "gIven" whloh presents Itself to hlm.34 
Does Mar.(chal,then, admit Kant's synthetl0 .! Eriori 
judgments? From the viewpo1nt of their validity, no. For 
I' Marechal seeke to prove the metaphysical validi t,. of every ob jeot 
ot thougnt. The Kantian synthetiC .! E~iori, however, excludes 
God, the world, and the soul. Fram the viewpoint of their 
structure, then? " In this oase, says Marechal, he does admit 
the pw,yohologlcal reality of a certaln~ind of synthetic ! priori 
jud~ent, namelJ, one which is oapable of objectlve Justitioation 
because it pertains to the natural and preconsoious oonstruction 
ot the immanent object ot cognltion of Which it is the neceasar, 
oonstituent. " But Marechal places the ultima te prinCiple ot this 
8ynthe.ia not In the understandlng alone, as does Kant, but in 
the human intellect regarded as tending toward an end.35 
'" In hls booklet, ~ Seul1 2 !! Meta@1s1que: AbstraotlCln 
ou Intuitlon,36 Mar*ohal presents in summary form the theory ot 
_ .................................... 
objeotlvity whioh he expounda in greater detail In the last volURe 
\ 34 "Le pr~d~it immanent de,cette experience participe 
a la toia aux propriete. du sujet et a oelles de l'o~jet: objet 
et sUJet y aont mieux que solidalres, 111 sont complementaires; 
connaltre l'un modlti' par,ltautre, c'est conna!tre ce dernler 
atrect' par le premier; l'a prlori s~thetlque, essentiellement 
relatlt a une matlere extrlnaeque, r~v.le l'objet"lo1n de masquer. 
On se aouvlendra, du reste, que nous avons expllque cette relati· 
vlta abjectivante de i'. priori intellectuel par la flnalit' 
necessaire d'un devenir asslmilateur." Point ~ Depart, v, 487. 
35 ~, V, 488-491. This is Marechal's doctrine ot 
the finalistic~amis. ot the intellect. 
36 jaW.fn" ·i9!~. 
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of his Point !! Depart. He argues that the characteristic 
quality of our knowledge, its Objectivity,37 is due not to the 
species of the object alone but also to the dynamism of the 
knowing subject. He points out in the fifth volume of the Point 
I 
~ Detart, however, that this Kant-inspired position was invalida 
ted for Aant himself because he held that the onlT content tound. 
in our thought 1. the phenOBenal given. All the rest is purelT 
functional and fOnMal. Without the phenomenal given, the 
functional and tormal is emptr. Consequently, Kant fell back 
in his conclusion to the formaliz1ng ot Descartes and Woltt,38 
even though he had glimpses ot cognit1on as act. 
We he'ttate to orlticlze the thought of a man who is 
sometimes reterred to as the most profound scholast1c thinker ot 
modern times. The consideration ot his: work rightly merits a 
stUdy ot 11;s own. Apart, then, from Har$chal' a probing inSights 
into Kant. suttice it to s ay that he agrees wi th WI aa to Kant' 8 
subjectivism and ita fatal ettect on the Kantian argument: 
37 Mar'chal 1nsiated that he was always a realist. In 
the late twenties ot this century, he made a public statea.at 
to that ettect, wInch surprised more than a tew philosophera, 
among them Haritain, who suspected him of idealism. 
38 "Aved une essence abstraite on ne fait pas de 
l'existenoe, ni aveo d.u tormel de l.actuel, n1 avec du logique 
pur du r'elJ bret, ~'avec de la puissance on ne fait pas de 
l'aote." Point ~ Depart, v, $90. 
r 
~ , 
Et voie! maintenant la diffioult. inextricable ou 
slembarrasae la philosophie kantienne ••• 11 ne 
reste plus dans la conscience qu 1une organisation 
synthetique ~e phenomenes, que!!!!:.!!! rapport. ! 
ltobjet plutot qufau sujet.J9 
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After thepreeeding pages, some sort of synthesis is 
necessary. The figure below may help to bring out the elusive 
nature of the Aantian objeot'. 
l':raURE 1 
*'***********'***** *******'"'********* 
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... ... 
'* 
... 
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Consoiousness ... 
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... ~ ARearance • " .. Verbum <- --
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-- * 
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.. . Object) * .. ,.. 
*) • ... 
* 
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.. 
• 
• 
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• 
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••• **********_ ... *********iH'n'}****'" 
THE ORITICAL AND THE THOMISTIC THEORY 
OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 
Since the appearance above i. all that we know, and since we know 
it in representation., the representations are nothing apart trom 
the appearance. The7 are the appearance.40 In view of the 
, 
39 Point!! Depart, V, 591. Ita11cs 1n the or1ginal. 
40 See Paton, Kant·. M.etap~.ic ot Experience, 11,21+2: 
"It the event 0( and the eventA? werelngs=:fn-themaelves, it 1. 
manifest that we oould never pais fram the oommon-.ense assertion 
that, 1n perceiving the objective succession ~ ,sense-per.e.ti n 
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difficulties aoon to be brought against the Kantian phenomenal 
object (appearances), the following comparison may be giving 
Kant more credit than he deserves. Let us suppose that some 
enterprising scholastic philosopher cuts off the cognitive pro-
cess at the stage of the verbum.41 It now becomes a •• dium in qUOi • 
It i. a synthesis of the content (Kant's manifold?) d.r~ved fram 
reality (the noumenon) and the itrJInanent (now, of course, no 
longer intentional) activity ot the knower (agent intellect--
possible intellect: Kant's categories and transcendental unit,. 
\. 
a must be followed b7 sense-peroeption b to the quite dI1"fe:rent 
assertIon that the objective aucces8Ion-~£is itselt causall1 
determined. Kant appears to be arguing since the event~ 
and the event /.3 are, on Cri tical prinoiples, only the conte~ 
of •• nae-perc'8p'tTons .! and h, the attribution of necessarY' . 
succession to a and b (on tne ground of the objectivity of the ", 
succession q~-) is Tpao ~acto an attribution of necessary aucc •• ~ 
sion to ~ an ~. • • !Era contention seems to me to be the 
orux or-Kint'ft argument." 
It is to be remembered that Kant starts with objects 
or objective sequences as alreadr present to oonsciousness. 
Awareneas, then, means for him, not awareness of representations 
except 1n the case 01" purely subjeotive states like dreams, 
illUSions, and chimeras. It means the awareness of the objeot 
kno~ in the representations. Only bY' philosophical study doe. 
he come to the cmolu.lon that the ol?jeot is a unity 01" represen-
tations made possible by the torms, oategories, and the transcen-
dental unity of apperception working upon the manifold of experi-
ence. To apeak of oonsciousness of representations, then, in our 
immedIate consoiousness of the phenomenal object could only mean 
tor Kant somehow going behind the object present in oonsoiousne •• 
at the moment of consciousness itselt. In the context of Thomiam, 
it would be 11ke saying that we can be just as conscious 01" the 
Verbum as of the object known in the Verb~. 
41 ~he,1mplication of time here is unfortunate, since 
the s.,.Dii'1tu:aJ.activity of thought 18 beIng considered. Think of 
t~A stage as ~ logioal -moment." 
r 
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ot apperceptlon). Thus cut short of realit7, the Verbum (Kant.s 
representatlons) glves us merel:r appearances (compare St. Thomas' 
te~ "species"). For us it would be the appearanee of reallt:r. 
But how could Kant call such an appearance objective' 
Granted that it i. an objeot for us, how can we distinguish it 
from dreams, IllusIons, etc., Which also are objects for U8 1n 
a way? Kant would answer that since the object1ve is that wh1ch 
necessitates us to know it in a certalnway,42 and since neces-
sity can in no W&7 come from experlence,43 the only expl~4ation 
tor the objective is taat there exist certain apriori fo~s 
which render possible the necessity implied in objectivit;y. Yet 
one wonders whether Kant does not tall into a pre-established 
ha~OD1 here whereby the forms relate the !lements given us In 
the manlfold. It aeema also, if utter idealism 18 to be avoided, 
that the unknown and unknowable noumenon pla7s a more important 
role than Kant give. it cred1t for. Then, too, if appearance. 
aile only In(consclousness, Just what sort of existence do they 
have' Kant's appearanoes would seem to be an elaborated version 
of Berkeley t 6 !!!!. .!..!i pe rc Ipi • True, the n01).menal Mount Ever.st 
42 He takes for granted the validity of the dlstinctl0 
between the objective and the subjective. That we do distinguish 
them Is a tact. Kant's problem is how can we distInguish them. 
In answering the fthow." he a180 answers the "why." 
4.3 This pre8upposltion i8 prob.al:y Kant r 8 'lnortal sinu 
1n philosophy. 
r 
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exIsted even when Aillary and Tenzlng were not present to aee It. 
But 1 t was an appear..nce tor t hem all the while they fought to 
reaoh its aumm.it. Kant's world is the Critical version of Plato' 
cave in which the imprisoned men are surrounded by reality even 
though they are aware only of its shadows. Plato, however, 
8.110l.,s some of the men to eome up to the sunlight. For the 
theoretical reason of Kantian man, this 1s an idle dream. 
At this point in our criticism, Norman Kemp Smith's 
remark is a~ropos: 
Finding subjectivism to be emphatically and unambiguous-
ly inculcated in all the main sections of the Critisue, 
and the phenomenalist views, on the other hand, to e 
atated in a much le88 de.flnite and somewhat elus1ve 
manner, commentators have impoverished the Critioal 
teaching by suppressiop. of many of its most subtle and 
progressive doctrines.44 
Aocordingly. lest we also be guilty of thus "'impoverishing the 
Critical teaching," we shall consider Kant's causal doctrine in 
the light of his phenomenalism. 
But here, too, loom difficulties. 
B. KANT'S PHEHOMENALISM 
First of all, the phenomenalist analysis of causality 
adulterates the meaning of causality. Kant never proves the 
necessary connection or intrinsic dependence of the very being 
of an effect upon its cause. In fect# we shall soon see that 
-
44 commentarz, 321. 
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he invalidly p~esupposes it. He can validly state at most that 
causality involve. a necessa~y success10n or appea~ances.45 
Thus in the ~angin8 positions ot a ahip moving down-
stream, positions A and B cannot be reversed. The i~reversible 
aucceasiv~ representations ot these two positions in conscious-
ness thus;parallel--o~ bette~, sinoe we are deallng only with 
appearanoea In consciousness--!£! those two positions. The 
representationa are the objeotive sequence present co consolous-
ness. Kant.s phl10sophioal analysis tries to show that the 
objeotivity ot the sequence, and so our distinotlon of it trom 
the purelysubjeotlve, Is poasible only by reason ot a rule 
whlch necessitates us to conneot A and B in one speoitic way. 
S must be apprehended a8 following necessarily upon A in time. 
45 "IAnt only proves causality in the sense ot 
neoessar, sucoession • • • As meanlng necessa~ sucoession in 
time, it is undoubtedly regarded b,y Kant as the temporal sohema 
ot the logical category ot ground aDd consequenoe, but that 
there is any oonneotion ot the logioal sort between partioular 
causes and etteots as phenomena such that the one oould ever be 
deduoed trom the other a priori, he not only never attempts to 
prove, but emphatically repudiates." Ewing, Kant'. Treatment ot 
Causality, 189. Such an interpretation of necessary oonneo£lon-
In whIch a particular ettect is claimed to be deduced a friori 
trom its cause oan rightly be repudiated. But there is another 
meaning ot neoessary conneotion, one whioh involves the spon-
taneous assent ot human reason when its meaning i8 understood, 
namely, that a contingent being demands a oause for its existence 
It is this necessary connection which hovers over the Kantian 
argument, as will be brought out in the text. This may be part 
ot the "dogmatism" (remnants ot a natural realistio outlook), 
which Watson atDributes to Aant. See Kant and His English 
Critics, 338. - --
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And .inee n •••••• ~ .uece •• ion in time 1. the sohema of the 
categolT ot cau.allt7, .. and B are .au.all,. oonnect.d. )Jot 
that A 1. her. and now the cause of B, Kant might add to avold 
.uch an obvlous dlffloulty as the day-nlght .equence, but that 
h.re and now the objeotlve .equence AD, If It la to be known at 
all, must have B followlng A. 
Grantins now that in hia Crltlcal s,..tem Kant has 
'J 
ahown that obje.tlve ~.quenoes are n •• eaaarr and 80 cauaall,. 
connected, 1. n.c •• sary succe.slon .11 that hls causal doctrine 
la,.. claim to' B7 no meana. For atter ana17z1ng objectiv., or 
oausal17 oategorised •• qu.no. in the "Second Analogr," Kant • .,.., 
In the tlrat p1ao., I oannot revers. the serle., placins 
that which happen. prior to th.t upon whlch 1 t follows. 
And •• condly, It!.!!!. .tat. whloh preceded .!! Eo.lted, .1. 
thl. d.terminate ev.ni Poll ow. tnevitaSIz !!! n.cea.arl11.~ 
'Causalit7, then, tor Kant .eana two thlnga, first, that the 
-
aucce.dlng ev.nt to110w. upon the precedlng event in accordance 
wl th a rule ot neo.aslll'J a ucce.aloD, secondl,., .... t -ha ....... t_t!!!, aucc.ed .. 
in, event !!!!. .llisround 1,! !!!! 2re.edlng event. 
The f1rst part haa alread, been dl.cuased In aome detal • 
)Jow the aeoond part ot Kant'. atatement, "It the atate whlch pre-
ceded la poslted, thi. determlnate event tollowa Inevltabl,. and 
ne.ea.ari17," la one to 1Ihloh ltant hal n.o valid 01a1m. For It 
makes caulallt7 nece •• ar" oonnectlon. Paton'a comment Is 1n 
46 ·A 199-B 244 (22S). Itall.a not In the or181nal. 
r 
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plac. h.ret 
!ant clalmB to have proved that there 1. more than 
n.c ••• arr, or unv&r,Jlng, Bucce.slon In accordance 
wlth a rule. He clalm. to have prov.d that In .uch 
a n.ce •• ary .ucce,.lon what prec.de. 1. the ground 
of what .ucceed •• 47 
The repetitlon ot the phra •• "clalm. to have prov.d" ..... to 
r.tl.dt 80me doubt In Paton'. mind as to wh.th.r Kant actually 
dld prove the va~itJ ot applJing the ground-con.equ.nt r.latlon-
and the nec ••• ary connection it implie.--to appearance •• 41 It 
i. quite true that "the plain man, and tor this purpose Kant i. 
a plaln man, b.li.v •• that the etfect i. reallr ground.d in the 
eaus., so that such a modification ot the !Antian doctrine limi-
tatlon to neo •• aarr .uoceasion would mean tor him a detinite 
loaa ."49 
But what olaim has Kant to apply the ground-conaequ.nt 
relation to appearanoe.' Kia philo.oph" as w. not.d in our 
" clo.ing remarks on Mar.chal, is not an existential pbiloaopn, 
whioh .mpha.i.e. the distinction between contingent and nece.sar, 
being. In keeping with the tormaliam ot hi. rationalistic 
47 1! Detence .2! _B ..... a_ ..... o.-n, 40. 
48 Ewing, Kant'. Treatment ot Cauaalltr, 110 and 111, 
argue. that Kant .. erISe. thl. oonneotIOn ABot to the cau.allJ 
conn.cted appearance. them.elv •• but to their noumenal condition. 
• • • It .om.time •••••• a. thougb tar trom r.al cauaalit1 b.ine 
.xclud.d trom the noumenal sphere, it i. only t ound there and not 
in pheno •• na at all." Por the diffioultie. inherent in thi. 
interpretation, .ee pagel/Jot \hi. th •• le. 
49 Paton, Kant'. M.tap91aic £! Experience, II, 10. 
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baokground, Kant's onlJ claim to the g~ound-consequent ~elation 
is hi. exceedingly tormaliatic view ot jUdgment.50 Pe~hapa c~l.lc 
ape too caustic when thel pOint out the extreme artificiality ot 
Kant's method 1n the "Metapn,8ical Deduction." There he alleged-
17 di8covers the twelve--no more, no less--catego~ies by a review 
or tn. twelve pO.8ible kinds ot judgment.51 There the categor" 
ot g~ound and cans.quent 18 .ald to be baaed on the hypothetic.l 
judgment.52 But even Paton, who certainly cannot be acoused ot 
belng unfair to Kant, cannot wholly acoept thls. "To accept the 
torm. of judgment in Pormal Logie as g1 ving U8 an infallible' 
olue to the •• detinite kinda ot .ynthesis is oertainly a tritle 
Ingenuous.uS3 One wonders whether the dispassionate logician 
SO "When the whole ta.k ot philo8ophl' is summed up in 
a demonstration ot the dependence of the objective world upon the 
tONS ot intelligenoe, the oonnectlon ot the varlous elementa whl h 
go to torm knowable objects cannot be represented otherwise than 
.. external or .upertiolal. lant accordlngly neglect. what .aJ, 
atter Comte, be oalled the dJna.ical aapect ot the world." Wataon 
Kant and Hl. Enfol.h Ori tl •• , 342. Kant' 8 tormallam thus .eem. 
~~Ittl. 0 otter tne d,fnamical theories ot modern pbJaic •• 
$1 See Paton, In Detence ot aeason, 45, where he 
de.renda ltant 'a di •• ove17 or a clue tothe oategorie •• p rinoipl •• 
ot arntb •• la, 1n the torae of anal{tlo JUdgm.nt. Se recommends 
at le.st • peconsid.ratlon ot liht a ~gum.nt. 
$2 s •• page ,r , note L3, ot this thesi •• 
$3 Kant'. MetaP!l.lc ot Experlence, II, 75. Se. alao 
1bld., I, 188t "fo Kant'. mI.tortune t5i doctrine of tne 
oategorl •• la large17 baa.d on the 10g10 ot hi. ttm., which ~ln~. 
then haa suttered •• rioua, and perhaps shatterlng blow •• " 
r 
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ot Xoenig.be~g va. not really falling baok on a common .en •• 
attitude tova~d causallty whioh colored hi. view of the judgment. 
in fOl"Dlal logio. 
:wi 'rescl~8 trom his formali .. , was Kant at all 
Justitied in speaking ot grounds and cons.quents among appearane , 
Grounds and oonaequents tnvolye intrinsio, necessar,r .ann.otion 
and It •• em. iapo_sible to~ appearance. to be .0 oonn.oted. 
For intrinsI0, nece.sar,y oonnection indioates SaRe ch~.te~i.tl. 
in the things connected, a oha~acte~l.tic 'xisting independentlJ 
ot the knower. But appearances of their very nature depend on, 
are relatiYe to, a knower. 
In an ettort to .aye Kant, one might argue that all I 
that appearance. d .... nd 1s the appearance ot necess&rJ connectio 4. I 
But vhat is this "app.aranc. ot n.oessar,y connection"' It oan 
•• an that app.aranc.. •••• tc--appear tc--b. connected 'ut are 
not r.ally so. or it can mean that nece •• arr connectlon is 
it.elf an appearance. !h. tir.t solution i. me~.ly v.rbal and 
actuallJ denies n.ce.8ary oonnecti.n between appearance.. A. 
tor the second, nece.aary oonnection i. not an empirical object 
ot consciousne.s 11ke tree., birda, or dog.. Inyolving as it 
S4 P.rhaps Paton has something s1m11ar in mind when 
he aarsl "The tact that the world i8 on1r an ., pearance to human 
minds ls no reason wl'q it should not appear to human minds as 
made up of aubstances and dlsplaying real efticaor or dJnam1cal 
causality." Kant-a K~tapbJsic ~ Experienoe, II, 282. 
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does implication, nece •• aF,1 conneotlon 1. something intelligible 
not senaible. For Kant's theoretical reason, then, It 1. unknD 
and unknowable. We .hall soon study the posltion ot ane Kantlan 
commentator who does in taot interpret Kant as relegating thl. 
necessa17 oonnectlon to things In themaelve •• » There neoes.arr 
connection can inspire our faith but never tncre.se our knowledg • 
Even it tor the sake ot argument we suppo.ed that 
necessa~ connection could be involved in the sequence ot appear 
ance., we would have ditticult1 In explaining it. Thus the 
intrinsio or nece.Barr conneotion between A and B mlght be sup-
posed to lie in the applloation o. tne causal oatego~, the 
indlspensable tormal ele.ent ot the causally connected appearane 
of A and B. But why should the intrinsic connection ot A and 8 
11e wholly In the mental form as applied to t he empirical manito , 
Whence this speclal prerogative ot the catego~, which Kant _qs 
ls only an external form of unity imposed by our understanding 
on a .eterogeneous and unconnected dlversit.1' What just1fies a 
concept that 1s empt7 ot 1 tself auddenlT to d iotate so tJ'rann1ca 
ly to experience when applied to experience' Is there yoluntarl 
here' Does the understanding, led on b7 the will, attribute~ 
Intrlns1c causality without suitioient reasan' Or 1. It a 
quest10n ot chanoe? Of tnstinct? Is the eat.sorf an elaborate 
5> Se. also page 10), DOte 48, ot this thesis. 
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innate idea which introduoe. eonneotion into the appearances ot 
A and B b7 80me aort ot pre-established harmoni6with whe empirica 
manifold ot A and 5, or with noumana them •• lve.' All this 1. a 
tar ery trom the Intrinaic oonneetion or A and B. 
It the solution does not lie in the ro~al element 
ot appearances can it l1e in the material elem.nt, the emptrical 
manifold? If the intrineic, neoessarJ connection.lies in thi8, 
two objeotions to Kant tollow. Pirst, the empirical manifold i. 
not as brute and unconneoted a. Kant sa,.8 it is. Though it i. 
the material elem.nt of the appearances which are pre.ent 1n 
oonsc1ouaness, it must have aame deterMinat.ness about 1. it the , 
torma and oategoriea, eapt,. in th •••• lves, are to bring about 
definite appearance. in oo~otion wit~ it.57 How else explain 
that we .ee this object or know,thi. particular causal sequence 
rather than anothe.' And vh,. i8 it that certain k1nds of caus •• 
have o.rtain ktnde ot etteet., Water can extinguish tire but 
not cause it. The second object10n ia that hhis determinateneS8 
already present in the empirical manifold tells ua aam8thing 
56 See Pierre Lathiez-Re,., L'IAea118.e Kantien, 
.econd ed1tion, paris, 1950,:Aote, and lawartf calr!, 1$e Oritioal 
Ph1lo.o29l £!~, seoond edition, Glasgow, 1909, I,~8-jjo. 
57 "Did not sen.e Itself otter material irreveraible 
e.quenees, the catego1'7 ot cause and. ttect would be null and 
vo1d. it would never be called 1nto pla7 at all." Jame. Hutchison 
Stirling, "lrate.aor Oalrd on Kant," Journal ~ Speculative 
Philo.ORhZ, Hew York, XIV, ,8. 
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a1)out the aupposedl" unknown and unknowa1)l. noumenon. If the 
dlfferenoe between the appearance. that &1'. known to WI aa water 
and aa t1re are to be traced 1)ack to the emplrioal manltold, and 
lt the manitold It.elf 1. grounded 1n the noumenon, then water-
In-itael! and tlre-in-itaelt are not enigmas to us, at least not 
a. enigmatlc aa Kant ol&1m. the,. are.58 
But perbapa appearance. and their neoesaarr suocesslon 
1n tlme are only tn. phenomenal correlate ot the sP0und-consequen 
relation in 10glc. Aa Paton ea78' 
" 
S8 Itl'o doubt It muat be due to something 1n things-b-
them •• lve. that we .e. one:· 'able aa round and another as square." 
8Th1. vIew ot Kant'. dootrlne 1. oommonl1 denled, but it a •• m. to 
me the on17 view whloh oan make his tbeOl'J intellIgible." Paton, wtt. Meta2miC ot Exerlence, I, lJ4" and note. Coming t"rom . 
e ie.alng tian odmmen£ator today, one who ls ganerallT 
.,.pathetio to Kant, the ocaaent is all the more slgnltlcant. 
Stl:-1lng, again, argue. that the empIrical manitold 
must somehow oonta1ft noumenal obaracterl.tios within It.elt, ~u. , 
a. It were, blow Ita OMft prompt.r'. waistle ff 80 that the correct 
oat.gorl •• are applIed." f;Xf;BOOk to Kant, Edinburgh, 1881. 
100-101. But he .e .. _ to p ~tth!i"Or8anlzed manlfold exis • 
apart tram and prlor to the torma and categor1es. 
Boutroux 1. llOl'e tNe to Kant (a •• A 137-13 1'6) when 
h. tnalats tnat there 1. neI~.r an organis.d manifold nor mental 
torma but the un10n ot both, name 17 , the phenomenal 00 j eot. Tbis 
i8 what we oan oall 01'Can1zed, not ihe empirical manIfold. S •• 
bla La Ibl1o.0~e 4e Kant, 191-195. 
- !.£~l1iis-r;-rIgbt 1n polntlng out that .a regard. 
tbe 4etermtnatlan ot the phenomenal object (e.g., .a tr •• rather 
than .. dog) the empirioal a.nitold must 1)e, to u.e a aCholaatic 
teN, .tur~ 21'1\11. 
'.1, 
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We manltestl1 do not apprehend grounds and c onsequanta 
by sense; but Kant believes we can find 80mething 
correspondIng to ground and consequent in the Objects 
ot our experienoe, it we consider that all objects must 
be combined in one time. What he finels i. neoe8sarr 
8UCce88ion; ... t 18, invariable .ucce •• lon in accordanoe 
with a ~ule--.uoh that it A is given 1n time, B must 
tollov.;;J9 
Paton's Inte~p~etatlon 1. questlonable. The phenomenal co~relate 
ot the ground-eonsequent relat10n Is much mo~e than neoe •• arr 
successlon. It 1s nece.sary oonnectlon.60 Though Kant'. world 
ot appearmces has no clalm what80ever to neces88.l7 connection, 
as was shown a 8hort while betore, It hovers In the background 
ot all Kant t 8 example8 and arguments. Por whJ should the 
phenomenal consequent B "inevltably and nece.8arl1y"61 tollow 
its ground A, unless there were some nece8sary connection between 
B and A? 
Kant, then. atter .peaking ot oauaallt7 as nec ••• arf 
sucoe.alon, a'-o.t In.tinollvely--"plaln man" that he waa--draw. 
59 Kant'. Ket!pSl.l~ ~ Experl.nee, 11,18. 
60 Can thi. be what Paton under.tands b1 nece.saI7 
succession? Note that be equate. It with Invarlable succession. 
But Vhf invariable unle.. there be neoe •• aJl7 oonnection? Later 
on Paton say •• "rlhether rightly or wrongly, Kant alwaya as.ume. 
that causality implies regular succe •• ion; and what I calI 'nece. 
sarr .uccession t i8 to be taken as meaning regular auccesaiorl." 
Ibid., II, 54. Italio. not In the original. 
-
61 A 199-B 244 (22)). 
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on the gro~d-co~equent relatIon.62 ThIs latter we have now 
found to be the unjustified addItion ot necessar,r connection 
to his doctrine ot causality, unjustified because presupposed for 
a world ot appearances in whIch it can have no part. 
Kant cannot be saved by being interpreted as saying 
that !2!! event must tollow the posited anteeedent. In that 
oase, B (e.g., a lOUd noise) would follow A (the light1ng of a 
Cigarette), but C (amote) would be the real consequent ot A. 
Or, reversing the Situation, we can supPdse A as preoeding a, 
but not necessaz-ily a8 its phenomenal gI'ound. This, however, 
aeems to violate the ground-consequent relation in logiC, ot 
which necess4r.J auccession in appearances was supposed to be 
the phenomenal correlate. The hypothetioal judgment, "It A, then 
B," excludes C. It C is substituted in place ot B, then B should 
not have been mentioned at all. C was really B all the while. 
I 
III 62 Watson makes much of the remnants ot "dogmatism" 
in Kant, by which "even to the end the woz-ld loomed up betore 111.1.111 
him as a thing apart, which by some.,means got j;rans.t"erred to lil,.II,1 
human intellIgence." ,ant and His ~liah CrItics, 338. ~In 
regaN to Kant t I tinal positron;-is reveate(! In tue ~pud Poatumum :111;1' 
whateve:tt else be doubt:t'ul, two pOints at least azte a un antIy 'II 
clear: tirst, that he detini tely commits himself to a z-eali.t ~lllli 
vIew of the physical syatem in space and time and 01' the manner 1':i'lll 
in which we acquire knowledge ot it} and .econdly, that he 1s IJIII 
wI1lbg to go to almoat &.nJ lengths In the way ot specula tins I Iii! 
hvpotheses regaretina the Iloumenal conditions 01' our sense- lill" e~perience, it onq °thez-eb7 the difficult1es which stand 1n tb.e ill. II'! 
way ot th1s empirioal realiSM can be auccesa.t'u117 dealt with." I' 
Smith, Oommenta17, 618. I'I~ 
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FUrthermore, Kant does not .ar ".ome" event, but "this d.t.rmtna 
event. But wbJ doe. he say "th1. determ1nate" .vent unless 1t 
be necessarily connected with the preceding event' The follow1n 
comment or Paton is no help here. "I take it that it tthe event] 
must necessarily be tollowed b1 an ettect which, it we knew what 
to look tor, we could actually perceive.n63 For S, whether we 
know wh.re to look tor It or not, i. still nec ••• ari11 connected 
with A. 
The invalid presuppo.ition ot n.e •••• ry sonneetion 
between appearances Is again brought out in the followlng passage: 
Were It not so, were I to poalt the antecedent and the 
event were not to tollow neces.arll, thereupon, I should 
have to l' egaI'd the auccesslon .s a merely sub Jectl va plq 
ot ., tancYI and ItI atl11 represented it to myselt as 
something objeotive, I should have to call It a .ere 
clre ... 64 
Thu. the actlon ot str1klng a match may precede ,thunder 1n a 
liven a equen.e. But Kant would say that tbe tact that when a 
match 1s struck agaln, thunder doe. not tollow ahows that the 
.ueee.sion must be regarded a.~objeetlv •• But Why can A be 
po.ited and WhJ do •• not B tollow nece.sarlly? The re.eon 1a 
that tbe,. are not nece •• ar1ly connected. 
63 Kant's MetapbJsic ~ EXperience, II, 244. 
64 A 201-202, B 247 (227). 
~------------....... 
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The invalid presupposition of neoe.8ar.J oonneotion 
betweon appearance. 1. fairly obvious in Kant's ~reat.ent of 
particular cause.. He admita that partioular cause. muat be 
discovered through experience. This •• e •• to be an implicIt 
admission, that causallt,. 18 neceslary connection, even though 
Kant hims.lf ls entitled 011.1,.. to necess&rJ aueo.aaion. Let u.s 
auppos. tor the t 1m. being that partioular thing- and partlcular 
cauaal!laws can be known without intrinsic contradiction to the 
Kantian a7ltem.6S Muat not the partioular phenomenal character-
latic. ot the objects be taHtD lnto aooount1 AnJ reaaon tor 
the .equence ot A and B (flre and heat) mu.t include a reason, 
derived from -the partioular qualitie. ot S, wlq' it, pather than 
any other particular, i. &8soclate4 with A. Eving o'blervea. 
Even 1n modern pQJ8ical acienoe, we have the principle 
that the ettect must be "contained in the cause," anc! 
that &n7 prooe.s must be "oontinuous," i.e., that there 
must be no breaka in 1t of such a character that there 
1. at an,. point ot it a hopele.a di.parity betw.en 
caule and e ttect.66 
But granted that neeesaar, conneetion in aE2earances 
baa been shown to b. an invalid pre,upp08ition tor Kant, ma7 not 
the Kantian ana17sis involve 80mething else, namely. noumena? 
As Ewing sa,..a, "Can we reall7 maintain at once that causality 
involve. nec.a.ity and that it 1& merely an external relation?"67 
6$ S.e pages 1.t~-IJ.fot the pre.ent st;u47. 
66 Kant'. Tre.taen~ .2! Causality. 178. 
67 Ibid., 179. 
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\ihen we say that B must follow A, do we have here a brute, 
unintelligible fact? But "mustness" or necessity 1s not a 
brute fact. It Involve~ implication, a relation between raets.6 
"We thus seem to have 8etTle ground foI" admitting that causality 
(necessary succession) involves intrinsio cannection. ft69, 
Where is this intrinsic connection? We have shown it 
cannot be in appearances. According to Ewing, Kant too insists 
taat necessary connection cannot be found by analysis o~ the 
causally connected appearances. He then supposes the real 
ground of this necessary connection to lie in the ~oum.ena\ 
sphere. 
There oan be no doubt that he regards noumena as the 
ground ot phenomena generally, and the differing con-
-tent "i.' partioular causal laws as due to nO\ll1lenal 
charaoteristica, and, a8 "ground" tor him certainly 
means "logical ground," tht. ia equivalent to plaoing 
the Intrinsic, intelligible oonnection behind causality 
in the noumenal world.10 
But as Ew1~g himsel.t adm1 ts, this recourse to nOUll'lena involves 
faith on Kant's part, not ph1losophic knowledge. "He decla~.8 
'dogmaticallY" .tor the existence cf a something, humanly 
unknowable, other than phenomena, but Its ultimate intelligibi-
lity, as opposed to mare eXistence, 18 for him a matter of faith, 
68 See D.J.S. Hawkins, Causalitl and Implioation, 
London, 1937, 47. ----
69 Ewing, Kant's Treatment £! Causnlitl, 180. 
70 Ihid. S.e the OPltl<1ue, A 494-13 $22 (441)J and 
critijUe ot JudS!ent, in Sel.etlona from Kant, translated b7 
~o&n atsOn, Glas ow 1921 320. - -
r 
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Kant, then, has not proved oausality as neoessary 
oonnection, whether it be grounded in noumena, as Ewing suggests, 
or in appearances. AnJ attempt to interpret his dootrine along 
such lines on17 leads to serious diffioulties. If neces.arr 
oonnection aomehow plaJ. a role in Kant's argument I it is onl,. 
because he has illegitimatel,. introduced it. 
But the rejectlan of nece.sar,. connection need not 
involve allot Kant's oausal the 01'7 • If we disregard the 
diffioulties centering around the phenomenal objeot,72 causalit,. 
as necesearl succe.sion 1. quite valid within the .,.st ... 73 
True, the schematized catesorf, now deprived ot the ground-
con.equent relation, i. imp.verished. In taot, all that remains 
is the transoendental sohema. Perhaps eome other pure category 
of cau.e ma,. be conceived which, added to the transoendental 
schema, will put the ne~ schematiaed categorf on it. teet.74 
71 Kant'. Treatment ~ Causalitl, 180. 
72 See pases/l7-/~f this thesis. These diffioultie. 
involve the problem ot how we know when to apply the categories. 
73 "Xant's doctrine rests upon two main foundations, 
firstl,., the forms ot Judgment. and .eoond17. the transcendental 
synthesi. of space and time. It is possible that the second m&J 
stand, even it the fir.t has been undermined." Paton, Kant's 
HetaRhlSio !! EXRerlence, II, 77. 
74 What that pure oategol"7 ot oau.e would be is not 0 
task to declde. It should have 80me relation to necessary succes 
sion, the transcendental schema of cau.alit,.. "We oan still 
approach Kant's Principle. 1n the hope of discovering a proof 
of the neoe.sit,. of certain oatagorial characterislics, tor 
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At thi. polnt we ma;y ask what doe. causallt,- a. 
neo •• sa~ succe •• lon ot appearanoes mean In the conoret., I 
.trlke a match. A fl .... appear.. 1'01' Aant, the oocUI'l'ence means 
th1a. One appeu8nce, that of the flame, bas tollowed ob jecti". 
theretore neoessaril,-, theretore causall;y, 1.e., by the applica-
tion of the causal categor,y, the appearance. that constitut. mr 
strikIng a matoh. On17 If we pre.upp.se the necessary connection 
ot the beini of the tlame with the action of .triklng the match 
ls thel'e que.tlon here of anrthing moJ'e than neoe.saJ'7 succ ••• lon. 
Oausallty 1s Intrinsic to the situation onlY' in the 
senae that the "ppearanoes constituting the matoh-t'lame a equene. 
can be an object In consciouane •• only through the application 
of the oategor,y ot oauae, through the proper sohema, to the 
spatial17 and temporall7 conditioned manifold. The necessitl' or 
the causal relation i. not the absolute neceasit;y involved in 
the intrinsio d ependenoe of a contingent being on its cause. 
For Kant, the necesslt;y ot t he cawal relation is relatlve and. 
.xtl'lnaio. 
The neceasi t7 is I' alatl ",e because it holds on17 of 
human consolousness. A no~human consclousnes. which operate. 
through no categories or througn dltfel'ent ones need not concei"e 
the matoh-flame sltuation as cauaal. 75 At le.st, Kant glves no 
uni t7 of t lme • n Paton, Kant'. ~ __ ...... ~ ....... 
For the meaAing of • 
e'c., ••• pag • .,3 , note ~5" of 
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concluslve reason why it should--and he ls humble enough to 
adm! t his qualif'ioatlon to speak only of human e xperlence' 
Watsonpolnts out the sceptlcal c oncluaion to which this rela-
tive knowledge of' Kantian man can lead. It the world we actuall 
know exists only in relation to hu.an intelligence, we cannot 
be said to have real knowledge, but only knowledge true tor U8 
as men. But relative knowledge i8 not knowledge at all, in any 
proper sense, though it may b. all the knowledge we are capable 
01' having. 
It the obs.rvations peouliar to men as indlviduals 
are unwortbJ 01' the name 01' knowledge, the obser-
vations common to all men, whioh they vainly suppose 
to b. knowledge, must likewlse be oounted unwortbJ 
01' it. It all men were madmen, it would matter 
little to th.m that there was a method in their 
madness. It the best of knowledge i. only that 
whioh we cannot help having, but whlch with dit-
terent taculties we sbould not hav., whf should we 
pin our taith to itf76 
The necesslty 01' the oausal relation ls extrinsio 
because it ls limlt.d to human consclousness. Human conscious-
ness 01' Object. is' it.elt contined to sanso17 experience. Thus 
the necessity 01' the causal relation can be postulated only it, 
and so long aa, actual or at least possible occurrence 01' aans. 
experienoe la assumed. It at a given moment all sen.e experi-
76 Kant and His En~iSh Critics, 337. The same author 
makes another ititement-rital 0 ihe kantlan positions "Unless 
there were in us a capaolty tor appr.hending that which truly is, 
we could not know tbat what we do apprehend is only relative to 
our intelllgence as men." Ibid. 
-
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ence were to cease for us, we could not say that there was 
ooJectively valid causality in our world. We might analyze 
the category or concept of cause. But since the category by 
itselt is empty, our analysis of it would be a mental exercise 
with no objeotive validity. And if we somehow knew that contin-
gent spiritual beings .xi.ted, we could not apply the category 
to them and say that they have a cause. 
Here again, Harttain's comment is to the point that 
with Desoartes began the philosophical retreat in which human 
reason gradually lost its grasp on Being.77 With the loss ot 
absolute reality, absolute truth, and absolute value, arose 
the relativism that characterizes much ot modern thought. 
Causality 1s no longer an absolute principle rooted 1n the ver,r 
nature ot contingeat being, Whatever, Wherever, and when.ver it. 
interiors may be. It is wholl, dependent on and relative to the 
human consciousne.8 trom which it derives 1ts supposed reality, 
truth, and va lue • 
How does this relative, extrinsl0 nature of Kantlan 
causality aftect Kant's relation to Hume' Has Kant decisively 
answered Hume? Is causality oonsi~ed as necessary succession 
the tinal refutation ot Huma'. probing analysis of causality' 
At first 8igb.t, it would seem so. For what does any 
17 Ih! Range ~ Reason. 186. 
\ 
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polnt out dlfflculties under which nec •• sarf succession ltselt 
labors. 
The big problem is hew the mind can know when to apply 
the oategory, a problem unjustly belittled as artiriotal.78 And 
yet, it among appearances ca~sa11ty can mean only necessary 
sequence, how explain--without EresuEpos1ng necesaQrz connectio~­
the fact that some necesBarr sequences appear to consciousnes. 
as causel and others do not1 I strike a match. A flame appear •• 
At the same moment, a peal of thunder rolls aCDOSS the building 
in Whlch I &In. The match-thunder sequence is just as objective, 
and therefore on Kant's principles (objectivity implies neeeasity 
Just as necessar7 aa the match-flame sequence. Yet we regard 
only the latter as a causal sequence. Why? Watson's comment, 
"Philosophy, as I understand it, doe. not seek to originate ract. 
but only to give a selt-consistent explanation ot thlm,"79 is 
preci.ely the point at issue. The match-flame and match-thunder 
78 "This dittioulty arises trom tailure to appreo1ate 
the central the.i. upon which Kant's proof or the prinCiple ot 
oauaa1ity ultim.ately resta •• , • that the catesorf 1s a nec.s8ary 
and invariable tactor in all consciousness." Smith, Comment.rt, 377. t --
It i8 true that tor Kant, the oategory has already b.en 
applied when an Object 1s thought by us. That i8 whJ Kant s&7. w. "tind" the causal connection and do not tal.e1y suppo.e it. 
Yet why i. the category applied in 80m. case., not in others? 
79 Kant and Hi8 English Critics. 235. 
- - - ---- ----
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aequences are both objectlv.80 and so necessa~ at the moment ot 
conscIousness ot th... Yet one Is presented to conscIousness aa 
causalJ the other 1s not. Where Is the oonsistencr,el Once agaIn 
Is there mere voluntarlsm here, or chance, or 1nstlnct, or same 
sort ot pre-established harmoIl1? Or does the mind know more abou 
reality than Kant would admit? The man on the street, oontDonted 
with the matCh-thunder sequence, would reply equivalently that th 
80 Perhaps Watson would agree with the following camme 
of Calrd and thus deny the objectivity of the matCh-thunder seque 
"In 80 tar as we do not reter a succession 1n our perceptions to 
an event or change In the previous time as its necessal'1 eorrelat • 
we do not regard it as itself representing an objective suecesai 
or event. In this latter case, the 'eoming to bet of the new 
perception tor me is not regarded as the objective 'caning to bet 
of the state ot a substance which it represents, i.e., I regard I! 
the sequence as merelr subjective, or as not representing an 
objective sequence, though the synthesis of phenomena or sequent. 
In my perceptlon may represent .ame other objective relation." 
Oritical Phllo.oPhl ot Kant, I, S18. The situation, argues Oaird 
mar call forth .ome otner category tor another type ot objectivit , 
e.g., substance, but not the c ... al categol'1 tor the objectivity 
required by a cau.al .equenoe. 
But must an obJectlve .equence alway. be a causal one' 
And are not all the oategorle •• uppo.ed to be present 1n ~r 
knowledge ot object.. Sm1th, oommentatI, 369, admits the pos-
sibi11ty ot objective yet nan-causal sequences. 
81 Another inconslstencYI I see smoke, then tlre. 
Despite the present objectlve and neoessary sequence, I .ay tlre 
oauses smoke, not vice ver.a. Also,the causal categol'1 has al-
ready been applied when an Object ls first known intellectuall,._ 
1) How does the category deter.mine what thing 1s to be the cause 
of another? 2) BoW does It '0 act that the aame cause 1s the 
cause of the same ettect at wldel,. aeparated Intervals, and 
constantly oviF'iian:r 7ear,' 3) Wb.J does the same appearance 
"cause" the same ettect tor all men' 
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effect was not proportioned to the cause. Such an argument 
implies, first, the intrinsic connection (or lack of it in th1s 
instance) between the disputed cause and etfect; and .econlly, 
some knowledge, at least, of match-in-itselt and thunder-in-itselt~ 
Kant, we have aeen, has no right to either 01' these statements. 
Or take the seq)1el1ce or night and day. Why, given 
Kant's analysis 01' causality, should not niGht cause,day, Watson'. 
rebuttal falls short of the mark. "That supposition is at once 
nullitied by the tact that it night follows day, so also day 
tollows night whereas in every causal succession, event A must go 
tirst and event B came .econ4."82 But watson i8 dealing here 
with day and night in the abstract. Actually, we have an irrever-
aible series 01' difterent nights and days, e.g., Sunday night, 
November 17; Monda,-, November 18; Monday night, November 18 J 
Tuesday, November +9, etc.83 
. 
82 ~~!!! Enillsh Critica, 233-234. 
83 Watson has no trouble accepting Kant's example ot a 
ahlp tloating downstream as a cas. of objeotive, causally catego-
rized aequence. Ibid., 227,. But there aeems to be little or no 
difterence in the sequence of the ship'a positions and the sequenc~ 
ot day and night. In both cases our represenaations are forCed to 
tollow til definite order. Monday night follows Monday as irrever-
aibly as position B tollowa p •• ition A. If the one sequence is 
admittedly objective, why should not the other be? If the first i. 
causally oategerizad, Vhf should not the other be .0 also' In a 
realist analysi., both ca.e. are examples of extrinsic principles. 
There is no question of a cause.ertect or ground-consequent relati~n 
between the elementa of eIther the day-night or the ship sequence. .1 
I II 
, 
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But perhaps the succession of night and day imp lie. 
only this, there is a causal sequence somewhere, but it 1s not 
such that night is the cause of day.84 Once again, the reason 
for objecting to the statement that night oauses day is the 
Implicit assumption that causality means necessary connection And 
there i8 evt.dently no neoessary connection in the series of 
appearances under discussion.85 
Moreover, to ins1st that the oauaal sequence may li. 
samewhere beyond the sequence il~ediately present to consciousne. 86 
presupposes the knowledge of particular causal laws. But i8 Kant 
entitled to such knowledge' Deny it. Admit It. In either case, 
there are difficult!e •• 
84 Watson, ~ ~ !!!. En~18h Oritics, 2)). 
85 "Such a 8equence as day and night is not a real 
change in the sense that we suppose the one to tollow fram the 
other." Ibld. 
-86 This objectlon can be carrie. to .uch extremes that 
the knowledge ot partioular causes might well became impossible. 
"Suppose I shoot a bird and it fal Is to the ground. The talling 
to the ground may obvioualy be regarded as an eftect, but where 
are we to look for the cause? In spite of Kant's argument to the 
contrarJ ••• most men would s&1 that it was my having previousl 
pulled the trigger of mJ ~n • • • Yet this 1s an obvious over-
simplification of the situation ••• That the shot found ita mar 
when I aimed In this partioular direction was perhaps beoause a 
depres.lon which had been oentered over Ioeland three days ago ha 
moved eastward and caused strong south-east winds; this was becau e 
there had been a h~icane in the West Indi •• a week before, and 
So on ad infinitum. AnJ ettect 1. seen to be oonnected to previo s 
events-oy an endless succes.ion of strings of events all of which 
meet in the effect. D J .... leana, PhJs1cs and Philosoph{, New 
York, 1943, 10). Yet the intluence 0 the Whole universe on any-
given event is so small that it can be disregarded even tor acien 
Then, too, in speaking of cause. we are interested in immedIate 0 
127 
. 
1s not tormally identified with the necea.ity of having a cause. 
Man ia a rational animal. But it is also true that it man is a 
aomething-that-comea-to-be, his esaence connote., that ia, has 
as a logical property, the need of a cause. Thua the mind can, 
by a knowledge ot the meaning of "aomething-that-comea-to-be" 
and "necessity or. a cause"; see of itselr the necessary nexus 
between the two, a nexus which can never be given by experience. 
true, the mind lea~Da tram expe~ience about tb1ngs that came into 
being and thing. that cause the coming into being.93 But thia 
) 
experiential knowledge, once it is acquired, tree. the mind 
from any further dependence on experience to aee that a t~ing 
that cames to be as auch d.mands a cause. 
Kant, then, vaa unjustitied in setting up the oausa1 
principle aa synthetic ~ priorl.94 He was equally unjustified 
In p~ea·uppoaing wIth Imme that expe:-ienoe can in no war be the 
ground tor neoea.ity~ ThIs a.aumption is an echo ot the Platonio 
Ideas. Plato postulated the eternal immutable Ideas to explain 
93 Poran acoount ot the parchologloal orlgin of the, 
notlon of cause, .ee A. Mlchotte, La Peroeption d. la Causalite, 
Louvain-Jaria, 1946. 'o~ the meta~a1oal account O? Ehe notIon 
or cause, see Th'odore de Regnon, Meta~si~ue des Causes, Paris, 
1886. See also artlol •• mentioned In b bllograpbi. 
94 Kant·. pre.upposltion of the exIstence of the 
synthetlc a prlori In math.matios and scienoe also aeema uniust1-
fied. Paton, who generally t~iea to juat1fy Kant, a~lts, lIt 
mar be maintained that all mathematloal judgments are analytio. 
Thls vlew 1. the predamlaant view ot mathematical loglolan. at 
the present tIme; and it lt i. true, it outs the ground traa 
under Kant's teet." Kant'. MetaphIale ~ E!perlenee, I, 89. 
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necessary aftd universal truths in contingent experience. But as 
Aristotle pointed out, these Platonlc Ideas are really In a world 
apart and 10glcally can have nothing to do with the world of humar 
experience. Thus they had to be brought down so.me.aow into the 
world of experience. Aristotle showed how, trom a study at the 
operation ot things, one can rise to a knowledge ot natures or 
prinoiples ot operation. Conceived by the abstractive intellect 
of man, these natures or essencea are stripped, as it were, of 
their individuating notes. The result Is a unlversal ooncept or 
idea, e.g., man, whioh can be predicated univocally, that ls, 
equally and individually,ot all ita interiora, Peter, raul, John, 
etc. The univebaal exists to~lly only 1n the intellect. But 
In so tar as It is derived ultimately by a conaideration ot the 
characteristic note. ot individual natures, it has a foundation 
in reality. 
Ita concepts thua rooted in reality. the human intellect 
can grasp being or the real. Knowing being, the intellect can 
also come to know Its properties and the principles that govern 
being. Among these principles are those of contradiction, sut-
fic1ent reason, andcausaltty. The.e principle. are universall,-
valid and nec •• sarJ preci •• ly becau.e they appl,- to being as 'uch. 
Kant, because he turned his back on being and objective rea11t,-
in its ordinary non-Kantlan sense, ensnared himselt in the Scylla 
of subjectiviam on tne one hand and the Charybdis of phenomenalian 
on the other. 
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After the arguments of the preceding pages, one wonders 
how Ewing oan prove that starting from Kant's argument in the 
"Seoond Analogy," an argument which will eatabliah causality for 
an independent physioal world as well as for our experienoe. ot 
peroeptions may eaaily be developed.9$ Ewing's argument, tol-
lowing that of Kant, centera on the point that an objeot can be 
conoeived only aa a neceasarily oonneoted aystem. ThiS, he add., 
oan easily be turned into an argument for causality, ainee neee.-
.ary conneotlon between d1tferent stages In a prooess of ohange 
1a for Kant identioal with cauaality. 
Whatever else the being ot a physioal objeot may involve, 
it involves this at anJ rate, a necessary oonneotion be-
tween its difterent qualities or states. A state of an 
Object unoonnected with the other atatea of the aame 
obJeot oould not rightly be oalled a state of that object 
at all, and connection of different qualities or atates 
aa qualitIes or atatea of one objeot without mutual 
dependenoe and ao implioation, i ••• , necessary connec-
tion, .ee.a impos.ible. And for aDJ object whioh change. 
1n time, thia neceaaaP,y connection must Obviously involve 
causality_ Thia .eema to be an argument that will hold 
good both traa a reali.t and from an idealiat point of 
view.96 
Ewing'. analy.is seema to labor under some of the very 
presuppositions which vitiated Kant's analysis. He aays that an 
object can be conceived on17 aa a neoessarily oonnected 57stem. 
This seems to be nothing other than th. two-rold doctr'ne ot 
9$ Kant's Treatment £! Cauaalltl. 91. 
96 Ibid., 98-99. Ew1ng t s generous inclusion in his 
hheory of both idea11sm and realism reminds one ot the fable of 
the grain, the go~ae, and the tox. 
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~epresentatlonali8m and the atomic theory of peroeption. Our 
knowledge begins with isolated peroeptions whioh we somehow 
oombine Into objeots. But once the representationalist theory 
is adopted. it i8 hard to 8eo how the incarcerated mind oan 
aohieve a~thlng but appearances. 1 •••• its own ~.p~esentatlon •• 
4Py olaim to reality is a ~atuitous assumption.97 
Ewing is oorrect, and Kant is oorreot. in emphasizing 
the role of ohange in causality. But the final analysis of the 
meaning and nature ot that change must lie elsewhere. It must 
lie in a philosophy that oan attain being or the ~eal; that can 
graap the inner signifIcanoe, the essenoe,of the real, d18eov.rln~ 
there the intrinsic dependenoe ot • oontlngently existing being 
upon its cause.98 
'7 "The moat tempting of all the false first principl. 
is: that tho~t. not being, is involved in all my representation. 
Here lies th~tial optIon between idealism and realism, which 
will .ettle once and for all the future course of our philoaoph1, 
and make it a failure or a luoeeaa. Ar. w. to .ncompass b.ing 
with thought, or thought with being." Etienne Gilson, Unittn0t 
PhilOIO~hical EXEerienoe, New York, 1947. 316. Italics ine-
orIgIna • 
98 ct. Hawkina, Causali:l and Implication: 38: "Dr. 
A.C.Ewing has argued in hia book on lantTi freatment of Caua.lit, 
that, even 1f the subjeot1vist v1ew ra rejec£ed, a ppoot tRat 
without cauaa11tl knowl.dge would be tmposa1ble is st111 of value 
Perhapa 80 • • • but (his protes~ shows that there 1s a proble. 
to be solved; it does not l1eld the solution ot the problem. xt 
the objectivity of causalItY' il to be vindicated adequatelYi 
against Hums, it must be shown how the notion is to be analyzed I 
from the given of .xperienoe." 
i !III 
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p~eaupPositlona. Kant could not help turning off on the detour 
that led him farther and farther away from the true solution. 
Presuppose, for example', that all the mind knows ls its 
oontents. The faot that the concepts obtained from the real are 
intentional ls immediately diaregarded and the result is idealism 
or 80me fo~ of phenamenallam. 
Presuppose an atomic view of sensation. The problem 
of knowledge as a 'TDthe.is of the discrete particulars of 
experience at onoe ari •••• 
Further presuppose .uch a relatlon between the taoultie 
of sensibility and understanding that what i8 in the latter muat 
have been formally in the former, even if under a different type 
of .rnth.sis. 
To the postulate of senaism, add the abaence of &n1 
Idea ot an ab.tractlve intellect whlch, though Intrin.icallr 
independent ot matter, ooordinates ita operationa with those of 
the phantasy. 
Presuppose with a number ot philoaophe~ as tar baok aa 
Ockham the conoeptual knowledge ot the singular. The problem of 
universality from singular experienoe 18 immediate17 highlighted. 
Presuppose, in taot, that universality and neoessity 
trom experienoe i8 not merelr a problem, but an impo8sibility_ 
Some ~ Eriori principle of the mind looma on the horizon. 
Presuppose that analytic propositions must necessarily 
IIII 
I .. 
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Negatively, Kant'a philosop~ is invaluable on at leaat three 
counts. First, it is another hiatorioal witness to tne impotenoe 
of a non-existential philosopbJ. Kant's system i. one of those 
philosophical oorpae. whloh, as Gilson puts it, strew the path 
to the Sph1nx beoause thel have tailed to anawer its riddle.a 
The &nswer 1., aeing. Secondly, Kant t • syatem ahows the fatal 
weakne.s of a ph1loaopbJ Whlch looka askance on metapn,slcs, 
that fails to go A£ TOl CO( f u ,r,l(o(. • For by hIs ve1.7 nature 
man ia a metaP.b.J'alcal animal.9 Thlrdly, Kant's system is one 
of the best answers, even 1t negative, to the queation, how do 
we know that we know realitl' Kantta whole system, built on the 
conviotion that we do not know reality, failed utterly on certain 
most easential pOints, aa our atudy ot Kantian phJaical cauaallty 
has shown. 
In oonoluaion, the ph1loaopher ot Koenigaberg certa1nly 
has more to otfer the world than mental gy.mnastlca. But as 
regards his argument tor the objective va11dity of the causal 
princlple, we must atate once again: Kant dld not &nawer Hume. 
~-- .-... 
8 Unltl!! ~iloaophioal E!2erience, 312. 
9 "It is an objeotlve tact that men have been aiming 
at metaphysioal knowledge tor more than twenty five oenturies ••• 
A law ot the human mind that rests on an experience ot twentl 
tive centuries is at least as safely guaranteed as any empiricall 
established law." Ib1d., 307. 
I
', 
1.1.1 
1:,1 
FIGURE 2 
Dlagram of the LogIcal Element. Involved 1n the Knowledge ot Phenomenal ObJeot ... 
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Notes on the Diagram 
General Note: Kant professed not to be very much interested in 
Srlnglng out the PS7ohological faoultie. and act. involved in 
knowing phenomenal objeots or appearanoes. He would in tact 
have great dittioultr in doing 10. ae was profel.edl7 intereste 
in the logical elements necessary for an act ot pure knowledge, 
element. that oan be discovered only by philosophical refleotion 
on a possible object of consciousness. This emphasia on pure 
thought determining ita own nature and limits is Kant's her1tage 
fram the formalism of Descart~s, Leibniz, and Woltf. It ia 
tberefore very important to consider the el.ments given on the 
diagram aa presented at one and the same time with the Object. 
For without each and every one of them, the object would a1mplr 
not be an objeot, i.e., would not be present to consciousness. 
Thul, the po.itlon on the diagram of the empirical manifold, tor 
example, is not meant to indicate logioal priority to space and 
time, .1nce one cannot speak of the empirical manifold at all 
except in so far as It is under space and time. 
1 Noumanar the objects unknown in themselves from which come 
ihe manitold of experience, highly controversial element 
ot Kantianlsm, springboard tor Fiohte and Hegel. 
2 EmpirIcal manifolds material element of knowledge presented 
In tleeE1ng, subjective representations that are united b7 
the various fo~ ot the knower into the object known in 
.on.clau.n •••• 
3 Spac •• a 2r1ori tora ot •• naibllit7 by which all objeots are 
perceived as Selng in the same spaoe (thus making juxtapositio 
pos.ible). 
4 Tim •• other a erior! torm of .enaibility b7 which all objects are-perceive~ as Selng In the same time (thus making permanone , 
aUGe.sslon, and oo-existence possible). Time is the univer.al 
to~ of sen81b1lity because all objeots are in time but not 
5 
6 
all objects are 1n _pace. 
Schematas transcendental tunctions of time produced by the 
ImagInatIon, wh1eh bridge the gap between sensibility and 
understanding. Througb them the categories are applied to 
perceptions. i.e., the sense-conditioned manifold. 
Oategorles. twelve a trior! forms of the understanding cor-
re.pondlng'to the twe ve logical ~Ulctlons in all possible judsments b.r which the sense-conditioned manifold is brougnt 
under universal and nec ••• ary rules. 
139 
7 ~e "I"i not the empirioal ego nor the noumenal ego; but the 
pureI, a ,rlor1 logIcal torm of the unit, of the ego whioh 1. 
requ1reaor tne unit, of experienoe. Like the other forms 
1t must be consIdered as given as soon as the object is pre-
.ent in consoiousness. Its last plaoe on the diagram does 
not therefore signlfV temporal sequenoe. It shows the 
supreme role of the-~I" as the form that aocompanies the 
represBntatlona of the manifold and shows them to be all part 
of one and the same consoiousness. The object 1s an object 
for me. Consciousness of objeots, then, oonnoting as it does 
one and the same eubject, 1s impossible without selt-consoioua~ 
ness (l.e., unity or identity of consciousness). Cbnverse17, 
self-consciousness ia imposaible without consciousness of 
objects. C~to, e£fo rea aunt. 
Thee on . e~gram-represents this mutual ~p11-
cation ot the "I" and appearances. The two arrows ind1cate 
the OPPOSition of subject and object right within conscious-
n... or •. x.perience. 
8 APpoarance., phenomenal obJeots, or things as known, sum ot 
empIrIcal manifold and the oonditioning torms of the knower. 
A. Sense or Sena1b1litf,purelY receptive faculty; lntuits the 
manIfold In pe~cep£ on) unites the diversity of the manifold 
1n the fol'lll8 ot apaoe and time. 
B. Imaeinatlon, ~acult7 of determining the material element ot 
knoW edge Intu1te4 1n .en.e to gertain general relat1on. ot 
time. It is at once universal and partioular. It unlversallz~1 
by drawins a sort ot general outline or sketch (the schema: 
see note 5) ot a thing which applies to all objeots of the 
same specles. (f.hus the notion of a triangle might be call~d 
a schema with ~egard to the dltfe~nt t,p.a of tr1angles: 
110aceles, rIght, .t.~); It particularizes because it enables 
the knower te ::c!':"'p17 the categories to an individual thing. 
The imagination is closely al11ed witn the understanding) lt 
mar even be the understanding in a passive mode. ct. crit~ue 
B 162, note b (171)1 "It 1s one and the same spontaneity wh cn 
in the one cas. under t.he tl tle of imagination, and in the 
other ca.e, unde~ the t1 tle of understanding, b r1ngs combina-
tion into the mani.told of Int\~ltlon." 
c. Understanding. seat of the twelve categories; through the 
schema It app11es tne categori •• to the spatially and temporal-
ly conditioned manitold. 
D. Transcendental Unitz of firperc~PtIonl purely logical tor.m of 
the UDIty or the ego req rea fOr unIty of experienoe. nAppe~_ 
ception-is a term talbn1z us.d to desIgnate consciousness ot 
................. _ ... _A _ ... + __ + ... ,"' ..... _ ................. . 
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